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Resumen
Introduccio´n
Balancear el acceso a medicamentos necesarios contra el aumento en los costes es uno
de los retos fundamentales en el disen˜o y la reforma de los sistemas de salud. Del an˜o 2000
al 2008, el crecimiento promedio en el gasto per capita en productos farmace´uticos para los
pa´ıses de la Organizacio´n para la Cooperacio´n y Desarrollo Econo´mico (OCDE) fue de casi
60 %. La problema´tica se encuentra especialmente presente en el proceso de introduccio´n
de nuevos medicamentos orientados al tratamiento de condiciones cro´nicas. Aqu´ı los precios
de lista propuestos por los productores farmace´uticos tienden a ser altos para recuperar la
inversio´n, en algunas ocasiones contrastando con la falta de evidencia robusta con respecto a
la coste-efectividad del tratamiento al momento de la negociacio´n del precio de transferencia.
Ma´s au´n, tal coste-efectividad puede variar a trave´s de las diferentes indicaciones terape´uti-
cas de un mismo medicamento, i.e., para distintos grupos de pacientes. Como resultado, en
los acuerdos tradicionales el pagador de salud (e.g., Sistemas Nacionales de Salud, Organiza-
ciones de Mantenimiento de la Salud, grandes empresas aseguradoras) puede verse atrapado
entre restringir el acceso al medicamento o arriesgar el pago de altos precios que pueden no
justificarse ex-post debido a la incertidumbre sobre el valor real de la innovacio´n terape´utica
del medicamento, la falta de solidez en los resultados presentados por el productor, o la re-
plicabilidad de esos resultados en la pra´ctica cl´ınica. En respuesta a la creciente presio´n para
controlar el gasto en el sector salud, los pagadores de salud han empujado a los productores
farmace´uticos a reducir los precios, potencialmente reduciendo los incentivos para invertir en
tratamientos innovadores, y continuamente resultando en la (temporal o definitiva) ausencia
de un acuerdo entre ambos agentes involucrados con la consecuente pe´rdida de bienestar
para los pacientes potenciales y de beneficios financieros para el productor. Lo anterior ha
motivado a los productores - particularmente aquellos en los sectores cardiovasculares y de
oncolog´ıa - a explorar acuerdos ma´s sofisticados donde los riesgos puedan ser compartidos
de una manera ma´s eficiente.
Motivados por la tendencia mencionada, reconocemos que un pagador de salud debe deci-
dir no u´nicamente si aprobar o no un nuevo medicamento para su (parcial o total) reembolso
por consumo para la poblacio´n de pacientes que sirve, sino tambie´n determinar el nivel de ser-
vicio (cua´l sera´ el volumen adquirido para satisfacer la demanda de los pacientes), el nivel de
acceso (cua´les grupos de pacientes estara´n cubiertos por el pagador de salud), y las condicio-
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nes de reembolso a los productores (los para´metros del contrato). Adema´s reconocemos que
un pagador de salud puede tener diferentes prioridades segu´n el ambiente social e industrial
donde opere (e.g., maximizar la eficiencia de los recursos versus maximizar el bienestar de
los pacientes), as´ı como restricciones (e.g., l´ımite ma´ximo de gastos por periodo de demanda
para algu´n medicamento o innovacio´n terapeu´tica, y un l´ımite mı´nimo de coste-efectividad).
Con respecto a los productores farmace´uticos, consideramos que: la determinacio´n del precio
de transferencia puede ser exo´gena (a trave´s de precios de referencia externos) o endo´gena
(a trave´s de acuerdos directos con los pagadores de salud); que pueden internalizar (parcial
o totalmente) el riesgo de mantener el inventario; y que en algunos casos son capaces de
segmentar el mercado a trave´s de la creacio´n de productos o canales distinguibles enfocados
a cada grupo de pacientes.
Preguntas de Investigacio´n
En el contexto descrito donde un medicamento innovador con mu´ltiples aplicaciones
terape´uticas busca su introduccio´n al mercado, la presente investigacio´n pretende responder
de manera anal´ıtica las preguntas mostradas a continuacio´n.
En un sistema verticalmente integrado, ¿co´mo interactu´an los niveles de acceso y de
servicio en funcio´n de las prioridades y restricciones del sistema?
En una cadena de tipo productor - pagador de salud, ¿que´ cambia cuando el precio
es determinado de manera exo´gena (vs. endo´gena) y el productor esta´ (vs. no esta´)
dispuesto a compartir los riesgos asociados a la incertidumbre en la magnitud de la
demanda y en los resultados observados en los pacientes?
Para un medicamento con mu´ltiples aplicaciones terape´uticas, ¿co´mo se refleja la deci-
sio´n de segmentar vs. consolidar el disen˜o/canal de distribucio´n, en el nivel de servicio
y los incentivos para ejercer esfuerzo orientado a la innovacio´n?
¿Cua´l es el efecto de todo lo anterior en los beneficios del productor farmace´utico, los
gastos del pagador de salud, y el bienstar de los pacientes?
De este modo, la investigacio´n espera contribuir a una comprensio´n ma´s amplia del compor-
tamiento del sistema, y as´ı eventualmente orientar el disen˜o de la estructura y los contratos
en las cadenas de suministro del sector salud, de modo que exista una mejor alineacio´n con
los objetivos de los agentes involucrados.
Metodolog´ıa y Suposiciones Fundamentales
El procedimiento general para responder a las preguntas anteriores se basa en una modela-
cio´n matema´tica de las situaciones previamente descritas utilizando la estructura del modelo
del vendedor de perio´dicos (o newsvendor, como se le conoce normalmente en ingle´s). Es-
ta eleccio´n se debe a: i)los tiempos de espera extensos (aproximadamente 4 meses) para la
construccio´n de capacidad productiva, aprovisionamiento de materias primas, produccio´n,
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y env´ıo de los medicamentos; ii)la pra´ctica comu´n en la industria de ofrecer precios pre-
ferenciales para o´rdenes de gran taman˜o, respaldando la suposicio´n sobre la divisio´n de la
demanda en periodos largos de tiempo; iii)los altos niveles de utilizacio´n que son t´ıpicos
en la industria, limitando la suposicio´n de una amplia capacidad productiva; y iv)la baja
probabilidad de, y las consecuencias negativas en tema de salud asociadas con, retrasar el
tratamiento me´dico de un paciente. La cadena de suministro considerada se compone de un
productor farmace´utico que ofrece la venta de un medicamento a un pagador de salud quien
esta´ a cargo de la disponibilidad de dicho medicamento para la poblacio´n de pacientes. Se
asume que existe heterogeneidad de pacientes de modo que al menos dos grupos de pacientes
pueden verse beneficiados al recibir el medicamento, donde se espera que cada grupo ob-
tenga beneficios cl´ınicos diferentes entre s´ı al consumir el mismo medicamento. Analizamos
el problema de optimizacio´n con restricciones para el productor, el pagador de salud, o el
sistema integrado (segu´n sea el caso en cuestio´n), utilizando conceptos de teor´ıa de juegos
para caractrizar la solucio´n de equilibrio en la toma de decisiones tanto simulta´neas como
secuenciales.
Contribucio´n Teo´rica
En su art´ıculo seminal, Arrow (1963)1 sostiene que la incertidumbre tanto en la incidencia
de la enfermedad (i.e., el taman˜o de la demanda) como en la eficacia del tratamiento (i.e.,
el ingreso/beneficio cl´ınico por unidad de tratamiento) genera adaptaciones que limitan el
poder descriptivo del modelo tradicional de competencia y sus implicaciones para la eficien-
cia econo´mica. Tomando esto en cuenta, la disertacio´n contribuye primordialmente a tres
vertientes de investigacio´n.
Primeramente, la literatura en economı´a de la salud se concentra sea en la determinacio´n
del nivel de acceso dada la heterogeneidad en las caracter´ısticas de los pacientes y la incer-
tidumbre en la eficacia del tratamiento (e.g., Barros, 20112; Zaric, 20083), o en la decisio´n
binaria de incluir un medicamento en la lista de tratamientos reembolsables por un pagador
de salud dada la incertidumbre en la demanda (e.g., Zhang et al., 20114). En constraste,
la tesis analiza de manera simulta´nea el problema del nivel de acceso e incertidumbre en la
demanda, bajo las caracter´ısticas espec´ıficas del sector.
Tal situacio´n es similar al problema planteado en administracio´n de operaciones donde el
precio de venta y la cantidad de inventario disponible son determinadas de manera simulta´nea
en la presencia de demanda aleatoria y dependiente del precio. La disertacio´n contribuye a
1Arrow, K. 1963. Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. The American Economic Review
53(5): 941-973.
2Barros, P. P. 2011. The simple economics of risk-sharing agreements between the NHS and the pharma-
ceutical industry. Health Economics 20: 461-470.
3Zaric, G. S. and B.J. O’Brien. 2005. Analysis of a pharmaceutical risk sharing agreement based on the
purchaser’s total budget. Health Economics 14: 793-803.
4Zhang, H., G.S. Zaric, and T. Huang. 2011. Optimal design of a pharmaceutical price-volume agreement
under asymmetric information about expected market size. Production and Operations Management 20(3):
334-346.
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tal l´ınea de investigacio´n (e.g.,., Petruzzi et al., 19995; Salinger et al., 20116) al analizar dicha
interaccio´n de decisiones segu´n diferentes disen˜os de contratos entre el productor y el pagador
de salud, bajo una combinacio´n de objetivos y restricciones. Adicionalmente, contribuye a los
trabajos en coordinacio´n de la cadena de suministro (e.g.,., Bernstein et al., 20057; Cachon et
al., 20058) al permitir que el “ingreso” por unidad “vendida” , i.e., los beneficios cl´ınicos, sea
un valor no determin´ıstico, limitando adema´s el espacio de los posibles “precios de venta” a
un subconjunto de valores discretos, siendo estos una funcio´n del nivel de acceso seleccionado.
Finalmente, se contribuye a la literatura de agregacio´n de inventarios (e.g., Eppen, 1979)9
al incorporar la heterogeneidad de pacientes en un sistema de primeras-llegadas primeros-
servicios sin posibilidad de reserva, demostrando resultados contrastantes con respecto a las
preconcepciones sobre los beneficios generales de la agregacio´n.
Estructura de la Disertacio´n
El Cap´ıtulo 1 ofrece una introduccio´n extendida de la problema´tica. Los Cap´ıtulos 2 y 3
se concentran en la decisio´n simulta´nea de los niveles de servicio y de acceso, mientras que el
Cap´ıtulo 4 considera la decisio´n de acceso como un para´metro predefinido y analiza el disen˜o
estructural y el nivel de esfuerzo o´ptimos. Comentarios finales aparecen en el Cap´ıtulo 5. La
Figuras 1 ofrece una imagen instanta´nea del ana´lisis, junto con las suposiciones correspon-
dientes.
Cap´ıtulo 2
El ana´lisis comienza con la modelacio´n del proceso de introduccio´n de un nuevo medi-
camento que puede ser utilizado por mu´ltiples categor´ıas de pacientes que se benefician del
medicamento en diferente grado. Un productor farmace´utico, quien busca maximizar sus
beneficios financieros, ofrece vender el nuevo medicamento a un pagador de salud, quien
decide los niveles de acceso y de servicio para la poblacio´n de pacientes de la que esta´ a
cargo. Se realiza una comparacio´n anal´ıtica suponiendo que el pagador de salud maximiza
ya sea el bienestar de los pacientes, o la funcio´n total de utilidad (i.e., incorporando los
costes de adquisicio´n del medicamento). Bajo ambos criterios de decisio´n, se incluyen dos
restricciones: una restriccio´n de presupuesto absoluto que establece un l´ımite superior en el
gasto del sector salud, y una restriccio´n de coste-efectividad orientada a mantener un balance
mı´nimo entre los costes y los beneficios de una intervencio´n. Inicialmente se presenta el ana´li-
sis para la cadena verticalmente integrada, sirviendo tanto como una referencia de ma´xima
5Petruzzi, N., M. Dada. 1999. Pricing and the newsvendor problem: a review with extensions. Operations
Research. 47(2): 183-194.
6Salinger, M. and M. Ampudia. 2011. Simple economics of the price-setting newsvendor problem. Mana-
gement Science. 57(11): 1996-1998.
7Bernstein, F., A. Federgruen. 2005. Decentralized Supply Chains with Competing Retailers Under De-
mand Uncertainty. 2005. 51(1): 18-29.
8Cachon, G. and M. Lariviere. 2005. Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts:
Strengths and Limitations. Management Science 51(1): 30-44.
9Eppen, G. D. 1979. Effects of centralization on expected costs in a multi-location newsboy problem.
Management Science. 25(5), 498-501.
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Figura 1: Instanta´nea de la Estructura de la Tesis
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eficiencia, as´ı como un escenario simplificado para comprender la dina´mica entre los niveles
de acceso y de servicio bajo las caracter´ısticas part´ıculares del problema. Se caracteriza el
comportamiento del sistema en funcio´n de la interaccio´n de los parametros y se obtienen
dos puntos de referencia (uno para cada prioridad del pagador de salud) que permiten una
ra´pida deteccio´n de los niveles o´ptimos de acceso y de servicio considerando dos grupos de
pacientes; posteriormente se propone un algoritmo que permite aplicar la misma lo´gica cuan-
do el nu´mero de categor´ıas de pacientes es mayor a dos. Finalmente, se formula y resuelve el
contrato de precio-lineal exo´geno, estableciendo la base para el ana´lisis de contratos en los
cuales el productor tenga la posibilidad de determinar de manera endo´gena al menos uno de
los para´metros.
Cap´ıtulo 3
En este cap´ıtulo, conservamos la estructura del modelo previamente introducido, y lle-
vamos el ana´lisis a las decisiones hechas por el productor farmace´utico considerando que
puede anticipar las decisiones en los niveles de acceso y de servicio del pagador de salud. Es-
pec´ıficamente, se analizan tres mecanismos de contratos: contratos de precio-lineal endo´geno;
contratos de precio exo´geno con capacidad de reabastecimiento; y contratos basados en el
desempen˜o. Los contratos de precio-lineal endo´geno han sido ampliamente estudiados en
la literatura, pero no un en contexto de cadena de suministro comparable con el escenario
de intere´s a la tesis; concretamente, no donde el agente que adquiere el producto tenga el
espacio de decisio´n mencionado en el Cap´ıtulo 2. Uno de los resultados ma´s relevantes es
que cuando el nivel o´ptimo de acceso es restringido, el precio de transferencia var´ıa poco en
funcio´n de la prioridad del pagador de salud, de modo que el productor es capaz de extraer
el excedente en la transaccio´n. Sin embargo, si el productor desea inducir niveles de acceso
mayores, el precio o´ptimo de transferencia es menor cuando el pagador de salud maximiza el
beneficio neto que cuando maximiza el bienestar de los pacientes. Esta restriccio´n de com-
patibilidad de incentivos provoca que, iro´nicamente, el bienestar esperado de los pacientes
pueda ser mayor cuando el pagador de salud busca maximizar la utilidad neta que cuando
busca maximizar el mismo bienestar de los pacientes. Los otros dos contratos son propuestas
nuevas basadas en contratos previamente estudiados, pero adaptadas a las necesidades y
limitantes del sistema. El contrato de precio exo´geno con capacidad de reabastecimiento es
especialmente u´til para incrementar el nivel de acceso y la cantidad de medicamentos dispo-
nibles para los pacientes. Por su parte, el contrato basado en desempen˜o es especialmente u´til
cuando por una parte existe una amplia diferencia entre los beneficios esperados declarados
por el productor y el equivalente de certidumbre para el pagador de salud, y por otra parte
el productor posee informacio´n privada que le hace tener un alto grado de confianza en el
desempen˜o del medicamento. A lo largo del ana´lisis se detectan las virtudes e inconvenientes
de cada mecanismo, enfatizando la bu´squeda de mecanismos de mejora en el sentido Pareto,
de modo que los contratos propuestos no sean simples mecanismos de control de gastos, sino
que sean una genuina estructura de riesgos y beneficios compartidos.
Cap´ıtulo 4
La u´ltima parte de la disertacio´n se distancia del ana´lisis de la decisio´n del nivel de ac-
ceso, y captura una consecuencia diferente de la heterogeneidad de pacientes al comparar
anal´ıticamente el desempen˜o de dos disen˜os de cadena de suministro. Bajo el primer disen˜o,
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(hasta) dos categor´ıas de pacientes son atendidas por un inventario u´nico bajo un esquema
de primeras-llegadas primeros-servicios, mientras en el segundo disen˜o existe un inventario
dedicado a cada categor´ıa de pacientes, sin posibilidad de compartir el inventario entre cate-
gor´ıas. Se asume que la existencia de la segunda categor´ıa de pacientes depende de manera
estoca´stica del nivel de esfuerzo de innovacio´n realizado por el productor farmace´utico, que
tal productor selecciona el disen˜o de la cadena de suministro al tener la opcio´n de comercia-
lizar dos productos diferentes (e.g., a trave´s de diferentes presentaciones, diferentes formatos
de administracio´n, canales de distribucio´n exclusivos), y que el pagador de salud es respon-
sable de decidir el nivel de inventario. Primeramente se analiza la estrategia o´ptima cuando
la cadena esta´ verticalmente integrada. Los resultados fundamentales son la demostracio´n
anal´ıtica de que la seleccio´n del disen˜o estructural o´ptimo depende u´nicamente de la relacio´n
entre los beneficios ofrecidos por ambos medicamentos, y que el disen˜o estructural o´ptimo
requiere un menor nivel de inventario total e induce un mayor nivel de esfuerzo, que el di-
sen˜o ineficiente. En una segunda parte se detectan los conflictos en los incentivos generados
cuando el productor y el pagador de salud actu´an de manera independiente. Finalmente se
presentan extensiones teo´ricas y aplicaciones pra´cticas del modelo en otros contextos.
Director de tesis: Dr. Mustafa C¸agri Gu¨rbu¨z
Cargo: Profesor de Gestio´n de la Cadena de Suministro, Zaragoza Logistics Center
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Executive Summary
Introduction
Balancing access to needed medicines against escalating costs is one of the most challeng-
ing tasks in health care system design and reform. From 2000 to 2008, the average growth in
the per capita spending on pharmaceuticals for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries was almost 60%. The trade-off is particularly present in the
introduction of new drugs aimed at treating chronic conditions where list prices proposed
by the pharmaceutical manufacturers tend to be high in order to recoup their investment,
sometimes contrasting with a lack of robust evidence regarding the cost-effectiveness of the
treatment at the time when price is negotiated; moreover, such cost-effectiveness may vary
across a drug’s different indications, i.e., for different patient groups. As a result, in tra-
ditional agreements a health-payer - e.g., National Health Systems, Health Maintenance
Organizations, large insurance companies - may be forced either to restrict access or to
risk paying high prices that are not ex-post justified due to the uncertainty about the real
value of a drug’s therapeutic innovation, the lack of solidity of the results presented by
the manufacturer, or the replicability of those results in clinical practice. But as pressures
to control health care spending keep increasing, health-payers have pushed pharmaceutical
manufacturers to decrease prices, potentially decreasing the incentives to invest in innova-
tive treatments, and often resulting in the (temporary or definitive) absence of an agreement
between both players at the loss of patient welfare and manufacturer’s profits. This has
motivated manufacturers - particularly those in the cardiovascular or oncology sectors - to
5
explore more sophisticated agreements where risks can be more efficiently shared.
Motivated by the above trend, we understand that a health-payer must decide not only
whether to accept a new drug under (partial or full) reimbursement for the patient population
it serves, but also determine the service level (what will be the volume purchased to satisfy
patient demand), access level (which patient groups will be serviced by the health-payer),
and reimbursement conditions to the manufacturers (contract parameters). Furthermore
we acknowledge that a health-payer may have different priorities affected by the social and
industry environment where it operates (e.g., maximizing resource efficiency versus maxi-
mizing social welfare), and constraints (e.g., expenditure cap per demand period for some
drug/therapeutic indication, and minimum cost-effectiveness threshold). As for pharmaceu-
tical manufacturers, we consider: that price-setting may occur exogenously (through external
reference pricing) or endogenously (through direct negotiations with the health-payers); that
they may internalize (partially or fully) the risk of holding inventory; and that they are able
to segment the market through the creation of distinguishable products targeted at each
patient group.
Research Questions
Within the above context where an innovative drug with multiple therapeutic indications
looks to enter the market, the research aims at analytically responding to the questions below.
Thus, it expects to contribute to a wider understanding of the system’s behavior, eventually
leading to structural and contract designs in health care supply chains which are better
aligned with the players’ objectives.
• In a vertically integrated system, how do access and service levels interact as a function
of the system’s priorities and constraints?
6
• In a manufacturer-health payer system, what changes as the selling price is exogenously
(vs. endogenously) set, and the manufacturer is (vs. isn’t) willing to share some of the
risks associated with demand and health outcomes?
• How does the decision of segmenting vs. consolidating the design/distribution channel
for a drug with multiple therapeutic indications reflect on the service level and the
incentives for innovation effort?
• What is the effect of all the above on: pharmaceutical manufacturer’s profits, health
payer’s expenditures, and patient welfare?
Methodology and key assumptions
The approach followed in this thesis is to mathematically model the described situations
based on the newsvendor model framework. This choice is driven by: i)the long lead times
(approximately 4 months) for capacity building, sourcing, manufacturing, and delivery of
drugs; ii)the industry’s common practice to offer preferential pricing for large orders, thus
supporting the partition of demand into long periods; iii)the industry’s high utilization lev-
els, limiting the ample supply assumption; and iv)the low probability of, and negative health
implications associated with, delaying a patient’s treatment. The supply chain considered is
that of a single pharmaceutical manufacturer that offers to sell a drug to a health-payer who
is in charge of making that drug available to the patient population. Patient heterogeneity is
assumed so that at least two patient groups could potentially benefit by receiving the drug,
where each group is expected to receive different health-benefits by consuming the same
drug. We analyze the constrained optimization problem for the manufacturer, health-payer,
or the integrated system (depending on the case), making use of game theory concepts to
characterize the equilibrium solution under simultaneous and sequential decisions.
7
Theoretical Contribution
In his seminal paper, Arrow (1963) sustains that the uncertainty both in the incidence of
disease (i.e., the size of the demand) and in the efficacy of treatment (i.e., the revenue/health
benefit per unit of treatment) generates adaptations that limit the descriptive power of the
traditional competitive model and the implications for economic efficiency. Taking this into
account, the dissertation contributes mainly to three research streams. First, the health
economics literature focuses on determining access level given the heterogeneity in patients’
characteristics and the uncertainty in the treatment’s efficacy (e.g., Barros, 2011; Zaric,
2008), or on the binary decision to include a drug in a health payer’s list of reimbursable
treatments given demand uncertainty (e.g., Zhang et al., 2011). In contrast, the thesis simul-
taneously analyzes the problem of access level and demand uncertainty under the sector’s
particularities. Such situation is similar to the problem studied in operations management
where selling price and stocking quantity are simultaneously determined in the presence of
random, price-dependent demand. The thesis further expands the latter line of research (e.g.,
Petruzzi et al., 1999; Salinger et al., 2011) by analyzing the interaction with different con-
tract designs under a combination of objectives and constraints, and additionally contributes
to the supply chain coordination works (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2005; Cachon et al., 2005) by
forcing the feasible “selling prices” i.e., the access level, as will be explained in detail, to
be discrete and allowing the “revenue” per unit “sold” to be a random variable, i.e., the
health benefits. Finally, we contribute to the inventory pooling literature (e.g., Eppen, 1979)
by incorporating patient heterogeneity in a first-come first-serve system with no possibility
of reservations, providing contrasting results with popular belief regarding the benefits of
aggregation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to the Problem
1.1 Motivation
Ever since Arrow (1963), the health care sector has been recognized as having particularities
that often require tailored economic models in order to better approximate the dynamics in
the system. He sustains that the uncertainty both in the incidence of disease (i.e., the size of
the demand) and in the efficacy of treatment (i.e., the health benefit per unit of treatment)
generates adaptations that limit the descriptive power of the traditional competitive model
and the implications for economic efficiency. From an operations management perspective,
Arrow’s argument can be interpreted as demand and price uncertainty. While the former is
one of the most common assumptions in supply chain analysis, the latter is much less studied.
Price is typically assumed to be an exogenously determined parameter, and even when it is
included as a decision variable (e.g., the works in supply chain contracts and coordination),
such price is deterministically known to the seller at the time of the transaction. That is not
necessarily the case in health care since a patient’s reaction to a given treatment may be the
output of a probabilistic function, i.e., there may not be a guarantee over the effectiveness of
a drug (when the outcome is binary), or the extent of the effectiveness (when the outcome is
measured over a continuous range). The causes for such randomness include the particular
characteristics of the patient, the drug, the disease, and the interactions between them.
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However when analyzing health care from a supply chain perspective, demand and out-
come uncertainty are far from being the only sources of complexity. While there are a number
of dimensions under which the challenges in health care supply chains can be categorized,
three such dimensions are proposed next as these are considered particularly relevant from
a strategic perspective for the problem that will be introduced below. The first dimension
is the source of uncertainty, which includes:
• Supply uncertainty: the discovery process of new drugs is not an exact science. Neither
the timing of new discoveries nor the future number of suppliers available (i.e., the
level of competition) can be fully predicted. This poses difficulties for pharmaceutical
manufacturers who must incur costly investments on the hope that a large enough
fraction of their research and development efforts are successful enough to financially
justify their actions. As a result, health-payers need to provide sufficient incentives
for the manufacturers, where the patent system has been the main strategy used to
protect and reward successful innovations. Patients are dependent on the efficacy of
these processes to gain access to new treatments that are more effective, more practical,
safer, or more accessible than the existing outside option. The implication for our
problem is that manufacturers may have an incentive to segment the market and/or
price the drugs sufficiently high in order to recoup their investments and justify the
R&D risk.
• Demand uncertainty: the number of patients that are candidates for receiving a given
treatment, or the extent of the treatment for each patient (e.g., the dosage) may also be
unknown to both pharmaceutical manufacturers and health-payers. Such uncertainty
will influence the production capacity and inventory stock that will be maintained at
the manufacturer level, the inventory ordered by the health-payers, and consequently,
the availability of drugs to the end patients. The probability of a small number of
patients demanding the drug (possibly via their physicians) may affect a manufacturer’s
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revenue and a health-payer’s costs (depending on the conditions of the agreement
between these players), while the probability of a large realized demand can create
stock-outs, expediting or higher purchasing costs for the health-payers, and possibly
lost sales and negative goodwill for the manufacturers.
• Outcome uncertainty: the complexity of determining the value of a therapeutic inno-
vation, the solidity (or the lack of it) in the results provided by the manufacturer, or
the doubts about the replicability of results in clinical practice, are all factors leading
to an uncertain benefit derived from a drug intervention. In a setting where the prod-
uct being sold is an individual’s health (and the treatment is a means to deliver such
health), the source of revenue for the player paying for the medical treatment can be
considered a mapping of the patient’s realized health outcomes. The argument holds
true both if a health-payer charges the patient as a function of the efficacy of the service
provided, or if the health-payer internalizes the patient’s health outcomes as the rev-
enue in his utility function. Health economists have developed a variety of techniques
for translating health outcomes into economic terms, where the two most commonly
used are QALY’s (Quality Adjusted Life Years) and DALY’s (Disability Adjusted Life
Years). Each technique weighs the impact of an intervention differently and can result
in a different measurement of the health benefits. However, their importance lies on
their ability to map health outcomes into financial terms that allow for an economic
assessment of a drug’s intervention.
A second important dimension that is present in health care supply chains is the level of
heterogeneity which can be present at different points in the chain:
• Health-payer heterogeneity: health-payer’s vary widely in their nature, and as a re-
sult, in their decision-making process and priorities. National Health Systems, HMO’s
(Health Maintenance Organizations), and large insurance companies are the typical
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health-payers that can play an active role in the negotiations with pharmaceutical
manufacturers to determine access levels, service levels, and contract conditions for
a given drug. Depending on whether a health-payer is a for-profit or a not-for-profit
organization, the driving force of the decisions can be closer to the financial returns or
the social benefits, respectively.
• Patient heterogeneity: patients can be categorized into mutually exclusive categories
depending on their present condition. Such categories can determine the treatment
recommended, the dosage of the treatment, and the probability of a successful inter-
vention. For example, heterogeneity may exist for patients who share a common disease
but are at different stages of disease progression, or for patients with different diseases
who share a common drug treatment but benefit differently from the drug given the
economic measure used (e.g. the QALY’s achieved are different).
• Product heterogeneity: a single pharmaceutical compound can often be used for dif-
ferent treatment indications, and the pharmaceutical manufacturer may in some cases
be able to create differentiated products for each of these indications (or for subsets
of them). Different delivery methods, commercial brands, packaging, or distribution
channels are some ways in which the pharmaceutical manufacturer may create differ-
entiated products. The decision to have a single common product versus creating a
number of dedicated products is a critical design decision with possible consequences
on inventory and access levels.
Finally, the level of vertical integration is presented as a last key dimension in the analysis
of health care supply chains. Namely, depending on the level of integration, the following
factors become crucial:
• Information asymmetry: a variety of parameters and probabilistic beliefs about the
sources of uncertainty can be either openly shared, privately held, or learned as a
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function of a player’s actions; even the same knowledge can be interpreted differently
by each supply chain member depending on his degree of risk aversion. As motivating
examples, the manufacturer may not openly announce its production capacity or may
hold an informational advantage about the drug’s probabilistic distribution of health
outcomes. This can affect the level of trust between the players, and therefore the
input that they will use to determine their optimal actions.
• Contract parameters: every key decision regarding the interaction between the health-
payers and the pharmaceutical manufacturers will depend on the conditions negotiated
in their agreement. The transaction price, minimum commitments, and risk owner-
ship, are known in the operations management literature to have an important impact
on the system’s behavior. Taking advantage of the existing knowledge and adjusting
to the particularities of the health care sector, it is expected that supply chain perfor-
mance and profit allocation may benefit greatly from a contract design that meets the
system’s goals and needs.
1.2 Structure of the Dissertation
Considering the above, the dissertation focuses on a particular situation within the health
care sector: the introduction of new drugs aimed at treating patients with chronic condi-
tions. The initial motivation for focusing on this problem is the continuous rejection of new
drug treatments for chronic conditions on the basis of lack of cost-effectiveness evidence
along with the growing pressures to cut health-care spending. By definition, following the
complete evolution of a chronic disease from the beginning of the treatment requires time,
whereas pharmaceutical manufacturers have an incentive to introduce the drug to the market
as early as possible, sometimes at the expense of statistically significant data regarding the
true value of a drug’s intervention. As such, the manufacturer attempts to commercialize
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the drug in order to enjoy the benefits of patent protection for a period sufficiently long and
at a price sufficiently high to justify the research, development, manufacturing and market-
ing costs associated with introducing a new drug to the market. Additionally, on top of
the direct expenses associated with launching a new drug, the pharmaceutical manufacturer
must also consider the cost of failed projects, i.e., those compounds that at some point
during the clinical discovery process were considered unsuccessful and had to be divested.
On the part of the health-payers, the growing costs of providing health care has increased
their awareness of the risks of paying a high price for a drug. The latter could be due to
the value being lower than expected. Also, demand could be either larger than expected
thus affecting the budget, or lower than expected which carries an associated opportunity
cost for other products or services that may have been cut due to budget constraints, and
can become an issue when there exists a minimum sales commitment. In short, there is a
growing tension between the pharmaceutical manufacturers who want an early introduction
of the drug at a sufficiently high price and the health-payers who want to make sure they are
not paying an amount beyond the drug’s realized value nor beyond their financial capabilities.
To make matters more complicated, the multiple dimensions of health care supply chain
complexity previously discussed can all exist in the above setting. As exploring all of them
simultaneously is an extremely challenging task, we focus on subsets of those dimensions in
each of the following three chapters. Table 1 shows how the different aspects are included
in each chapter. In general, they are aimed at understanding some of the structural causes
leading to delayed, limited, or inefficient introduction of new drug treatments given uncer-
tainty in the incidence of disease and/or the efficacy of treatment. Using the newsvendor
framework, the focus is on the impact of: i)patient heterogeneity, ii)different decision-making
priorities and constraints that pharmaceutical manufacturers and health-payers may have,
and iii)design of the supply chain structure and contract agreements. Key strategic deci-
sions including capacity and inventory investments, access level, contract parameters, and
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innovation efforts are modeled. The results, which hope to orient public-policy making, are
provided in terms of firm profitability, health care spending, drug access, and patient welfare.
Methodologically, the research contributes firstly to the operations literature by translating
familiar concepts such as the price-dependent newsvendor and the pooling effect in a new
setting with particular characteristics for which results are not fully explained in previous
works; and secondly, to the health economics literature by simultaneously modeling demand
and outcome uncertainty. The detailed discussion of the theoretical contributions and con-
clusions derived from the analysis is provided within each chapter.
Figure 1.1: Structure of the dissertation
1.3 The Analysis
Chapter 1 provides an extended introduction to the problem. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on
the simultaneous access and service level decisions, while Chapter 4 takes the access level as
exogenously given and analyzes the optimal structural design and effort decisions. Table 2
and Table 3 provide a snapshot of the analysis, along with the key associated assumptions.
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1.3.1 Chapter 2
We begin the analysis by modeling the introduction process of a new drug treatment that can
be used by multiple patient categories who benefit differently from it. A profit-maximizing
pharmaceutical manufacturer offers to sell the new drug to a health-payer, who decides the
access and service levels for the patient population he serves. An analytical comparison
is done assuming that the health-payer either maximizes patient welfare, or maximizes the
entire utility function (i.e., incorporating purchasing costs). Under both decision-making cri-
teria two constraints are included: an absolute budget constraint to set a limit on health care
spending, and a cost-effectiveness constraint to maintain a balance between costs and bene-
Figure 1.2: Snapshot of Chapters 2 and 3
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fits. First, the analysis for the vertically integrated chain is presented both as an efficiency
benchmark and as a simplified setting for understanding the dynamics between access and
service level under the problem’s particular characteristics. Second, the exogenous price con-
tract is formulated, setting the grounds for the analysis of contracts where the manufacturer
can endogenously determine at least some contract parameters.
1.3.2 Chapter 3
In this chapter we keep the structure of the model presented earlier but focus on the deci-
sions made by the pharmaceutical manufacturer, given that she can anticipate the health-
payer’s access and service level decisions. Specifically, we analyze three contracting mech-
anisms: endogenous price-only contracts; exogenous price contracts with capacity buffer;
and performance-based contracts. Endogenous price-only contracts have been thoroughly
studied, but not in a supply chain setting as the one we consider where the downstream
player has such decision space (as mentioned above for Chapter 2). The last two contracts
are novel proposals based on existing models, but adapted to the needs of the system. The
virtues and drawbacks of each mechanism are detected, with an emphasis on the search for
Pareto improvements.
1.3.3 Chapter 4
The last part of the dissertation departs from the analysis of the access level decision and
captures a different consequence of patient heterogeneity by analytically comparing the per-
formance of two supply chain designs. Under the first design, (up to) two patient categories
are served by a single inventory stock on a first-come first-serve basis, while on the second
design a dedicated inventory stock is used to serve each patient category. It is assumed
that the realization of the second category is stochastically contingent on innovation efforts
made by the pharmaceutical manufacturer, that such manufacturer chooses the supply chain
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Figure 1.3: Snapshot of Chapter 4
design by having the option to commercialize two differentiated products (e.g., through dif-
ferent presentations, different delivery formats, exclusive distribution channels), and that
the health-payer is responsible for making the inventory decision. First, the optimal deci-
sion path for a vertically integrated chain is analyzed, and then the incentive misalignments
derived from vertical separation are explained along with some theoretical and managerial
extensions to the model.
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Chapter 2
Analyzing the joint access and
coverage problem in health care
2.1 Introduction
A report in the United Kingdom (UK) by the Rarer Cancers Foundation shows that since
2009, 18 new treatments were rejected by the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE)
- many because they were not deemed “cost-effective” - out of 34 put forward.1 In Australia,
the federal government announced on February 2011 that to return the budget to a surplus,
no new drugs would be added to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) until 2013,
irrespective of the recommendations of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee
(PBAC).2 Balancing access to needed medicines against escalating costs is one of the most
challenging tasks in health care reform (Chalkidou, Lopert and Gerber, 2012). From 2000 to
2008, the average growth in the per capita spending on pharmaceuticals for Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries was almost 60% (and exceeding
70% by 2010, considering the subset of countries for which information is available); Figures
1http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-2194998/Number-cancer-drugs-rejected-health-watchdog-
rises-50-years.html
2Following criticism by pharmaceutical industry, providers, and patients, the measure was removed on
September the same year.
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Figure 2.1: Pharmaceutical expenditure per capita (2000 - 2010)
Note: Expenditures are expressed in U.S. dollar purchasing power parity.
Source: 2012 OECD Health Data, http://www.oecd.org/health/healthpoliciesanddata/oecdhealthdata2012-frequentlyrequesteddata.htm
2.1 and 2.2 provide more specific information about some of the largest/most influential
markets. The trade-off is particularly present in the introduction of new drugs aimed at
treating chronic conditions where list prices proposed by the pharmaceutical manufacturers
tend to be high in order to recoup their investment, sometimes contrasting with a lack of
robust evidence regarding the cost-effectiveness of the treatment at the time when price is
negotiated; moreover, such cost-effectiveness may vary across a drug’s different indications,
i.e., for different patient groups. As a result, in traditional agreements a health-payer - e.g.,
National Health Systems, Health Maintenance Organizations, large insurance companies -
may be forced either to restrict access or to risk paying high prices that are not ex-post jus-
tified due to the uncertainty about the real value of a drug’s therapeutic innovation, the lack
of solidity of the results presented by the manufacturer, or the replicability of those results
in clinical practice. But as pressures to control health care spending keep increasing, health-
payers have pushed pharmaceutical manufacturers to decrease prices, potentially decreasing
the incentives to invest in innovative treatments, and often resulting in the (temporary or
definitive) absence of an agreement between both players at the loss of patient welfare and
manufacturer’s profits.
The United Kingdom’s Department of Health has been one of the most innovative play-
ers regarding the relationship between the pharmaceutical manufacturers and health-payers.
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Figure 2.2: Pharmaceutical expenditure growth per capita (2000 - 2008)
Source: 2012 OECD Health Data, http://www.oecd.org/health/healthpoliciesanddata/oecdhealthdata2012-frequentlyrequesteddata.htm
The Pharmaceutical Price and Regulation Schemes (PPRS) - a non-contractual agreement
renegotiated every five years between the UK Department of Health and the Association of
the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) - were first introduced in 1957 as a mechanism
to ensure access to good quality branded medicines at reasonable prices to the National
Health Service (NHS) and fair returns to the pharmaceutical industry, where the price is
regulated by setting profit caps for pharmaceuticals. In 1999, NICE was established, playing
a key advisory role in technology appraisal by quantifying benefits in a consistent and com-
parable way across the full range of health-related conditions and applying an Incremental
Cost-effectiveness Ratio (ICER) methodology; it is important to note that NICE’s recom-
mendation is by law a sufficient but not necessary condition for inclusion of the drug in the
NHS list. In the existing system based on the PPRS 2009, a standard willingness-to-pay
(WTP) threshold is applied to all new products so that a drug will be recommended for
inclusion in the NHS if the cost per QALY3 achieved (i.e., the incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio) is less than £20,000, and analyzed on a case by case basis when the ICER is be-
tween £20,000 and £30,000 (i.e., the WTP threshold). However, the recurrent rejection of
new treatments, often on the grounds of lack of cost-effectiveness evidence, has motivated
pharmaceutical manufacturers - particularly in the cardiovascular and oncology sectors - to
explore more sophisticated agreements where risks can be more efficiently shared. Pres-
sured by public and industry lobbying, and following the recommendations from the market
3NICE has used the Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) - a QALY is the amount of health represented
by a year of life at full health - to measure the benefits of an intervention.
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study performed by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT, 2007), the NHS is expected to make a
transition towards a value-based system of pricing medicines. Two temporary solutions are
currently in practice: the Cancer Drug Fund which provides £200 million per year to fund
cancer drug treatments not recommended by NICE that physicians deem appropriate for a
particular patient; and Patient Access Schemes where manufacturer and payer agree on an
evaluation time, a verifiable measurement, and a target, so that the manufacturer offers a
discount or rebate to the NHS when the target is not reached. However, both programs are
expected to be substituted in 2014 by value based pricing (VBP) which no longer considers
a unique threshold across all interventions, but rather has a base threshold which is explic-
itly increased for high burden of illness, therapeutic innovation, and wider societal benefits,
i.e., the threshold may be different for different drugs and/or indications. The approach
provides manufacturers with freedom to propose prices as long as the threshold is satisfied,
and expects to increase transparency in the technology appraisal process and predictability
for pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Other countries are following the trend of implementing mechanisms for using compara-
tive clinical and cost-effectiveness to inform technology adoption and regulate selling prices.
In Australia, the PBAC is responsible for recommending inclusion of drugs in the national
formulary for reimbursement, using a variable cost-effectiveness threshold contingent on each
drug’s characteristics. As opposed to the UK, in Australia the PBAC recommendation is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for the Minister for Health and Ageing to approve a
drug’s inclusion. Risk sharing contracts have included the use of rebates paid to the gov-
ernment when expenditures exceed an annual cap, a pooled annual sales cap for a group
of drugs that treat a common condition, and price-volume agreements. The Life Saving
Drugs Program operating outside the PBS has been set up to provide free access to certain
expensive, life-saving drugs for rare, serious, life-threatening conditions, currently funding
8 drugs for almost 200 patients. Germany uses reference pricing groups to regulate prices
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of drugs. Following the establishment in 2004 of the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in
Health Care (IQWiG) - modeled after NICE -, since January 2011 reference pricing is only
used for drugs that do not demonstrate additional benefits; for those that do, an agreement
between the manufacturer and the national association of statutory health funds (SHI) must
be reached within 6 months or else a central board of arbitration determines a rebate based
on international prices. In the United States, the establishment of the Patient-Centered
Outcomes Research Institute recognizes the relevance of evidence-based decision-making,
and Medicare’s Independent Payment Advisory Board is expected to motivate the use of
price-negotiations and risk-sharing agreements. Some detailed, recent surveys on the use of
risk sharing contracts across different countries include Pugatch, Healy and Chu (2010), and
Espin, Rovira and Garcia (2011). However, as such papers comment, many of the so-called
risk-sharing agreements seem to act as cost-containment mechanisms rather than a true re-
assignment of risks and benefits to both players.
Motivated by the above trend, we understand that a health-payer must decide not only
whether to accept a new drug under (partial or full) reimbursement for the patient popu-
lation it serves, but also determine the volume purchased (how many patients are expected
to be treated), access level (which patient groups will be serviced by the health-payer), and
reimbursement conditions to the manufacturers (contract parameters). In our model, we
explicitly acknowledge that each health-payer may have different priorities affected by the
social and industry environment where it operates, and that the manufacturer may hold
an information advantage about a drug’s expected future value. Moreover, a health-payer’s
decision may be limited by absolute and relative expenditure restrictions. To exemplify the
former, a prostate cancer drug that privately costs around £3,000 for a month’s supply had
been offered to the NHS at a discount, but NICE declared the number of men who need the
drug would make it financially unworkable.4 As for the latter, the ICER methodology which
4Retrieved Oct. 8, 2012 from http://www.savistamagazine.com/news/prostate-cancer-drug-
provisionally-rejected-by-nhs
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lies at the heart of any decision incorporating comparative clinical and cost-effectiveness,
requires an upper bound or threshold that essentially makes the maximum allowable level
of expenditures a function of the benefits.
As a result, the scope of this chapter is to analyze: a) the change in the system’s optimal
decisions as a function of the health-payer’s decision-making priority, constraints, and the
contract parameters using the newsvendor framework; b) the way in which double marginal-
ization and asymmetric beliefs between the pharmaceutical manufacturer and the health-
payer influence the mechanics; and c) the impact of all the latter on manufacturer’s profits,
health-payer’s costs, and patient access and service levels. Our contribution can be sum-
marized in three parts. First, we derive an efficient algorithm for determining the optimal
access and service level policy, based on two very easy to calculate thresholds, in a setting
based on the price and quantity newsvendor model but where the feasible prices are not
continuous5, the decision space is constrained, and the decision maker’s priorities may vary.
And second, we comment extensively on the situations - as a function of the combination of
parameters - that are likely to induce full or restricted access, providing interesting insights
for policy makers and pharmaceutical manufacturers.
The rest of the chapter is introduced with a literature review of relevant work. Section
2.3 introduces the model and solves the problem for a single decision maker under two types
of patients. Section 2.4 expands the results to n number of patient types, and derives an
algorithm to efficiently find the optimal solution without the need of full enumeration. When
the pharmaceutical manufacturer and the health-payer act separately, section 2.5 expands
the results to incorporate exogenous price-only contracts, setting the base model for the next
Chapter. Conclusions and further research opportunities are discussed in §2.6.
5In our model, the additive part of the objective function is given by the health benefits obtained by
those patients who receive the drug under analysis. As will be thoroughly explained in §2.3, there is a direct
mapping between the access level chosen, and the average expected health benefits received by the patients,
i.e., the retail price in typical newsvendor models.
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2.2 Literature Review
Ever since Arrow’s (1963) seminal paper, the medical-care industry has been recognized as
having particularities that set it apart from normal economic competitive models. Arrow
(1963) sustains that the uncertainty in the incidence of disease (i.e., the size of the demand)
and in the efficacy of treatment (i.e., the marginal revenue/benefits) causes adaptations that
limit the descriptive power of the normal competitive model and its implications for economic
efficiency. Acknowledging for these two sources of uncertainty, the chapter contributes to
essentially two streams of literature: the health economics literature, by jointly analyzing
the effects on manufacturers and payers of these two sources of uncertainty; and the price
and quantity problem in the operations literature, by considering a discrete demand distri-
bution and capturing the effect of different decision making criteria and constraints by the
downstream player.
Health Economics
The main interest of the health-economics literature has not been directed at simulta-
neously considering randomness in the the size of patient demand and in the treatment
outcome per patient. With regards to the former, the literature has focused on setting bud-
get constraints on the payer or profit caps on the manufacturer, to analyze either the effect
of manufacturer’s private information or the manufacturer’s reaction when she is able to
influence the size of demand through detailing effort, i.e., visits from pharmaceutical rep-
resentatives to physicians. However these papers tend to ignore the costs associated with
supply and demand mismatches. Zaric and O’Brien (2005) propose a model for financial
risk sharing under demand uncertainty based on the payer’s total budget in order to protect
the payer from larger than expected demand that may increase costs dramatically. They let
the manufacturer submit a budget impact analysis to achieve drug’s approval and maximize
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profits, assuming that the likelihood of the drug being accepted by the payer is decreasing
in the budget statement. While the model proposed here is more limited in that the man-
ufacturer is assumed to be able to observe the payer’s maximum allowable budget, a layer
of uncertainty is added by including randomness in the drug outcome. Also the present
approach increases complexity in the decision-making interactions by modeling payers with
multiple priorities and allowing the manufacturer to set a profit maximizing price in antici-
pation of health’s actions. A closer paper is Zhang, Zaric and Huang (2011), who consider
a setting where the market size is uncertain and the manufacturer may or may not have
an informational advantage over the payer about the true demand’s distribution. Similar
to us, they include a cost-effectiveness constraint in order for trade to occur. They then
let the cost-minimizing payer propose a price-volume agreement consisting of a unit price
and a rebate rate in excess of the manufacturer’s statement of projected future demand, and
characterize the optimal contract parameters and the manufacturer’s incentive compatible
reaction. They find that there always exists a contract inducing the manufacturer to reveal
his private information. We distinguish ourselves from this model in few but relevant ways.
First in terms of the key modeling assumptions, we do not consider the case of asymmetric
demand information; in our model it is the manufacturer, rather than the payer, who pro-
poses the contract; and we consider payer heterogeneity by allowing his objective function
to be maximizing either patient welfare, or the entire utility function (patient welfare minus
purchasing costs). Second in terms of the design of the contract, the budget constraint in
our model is fixed, while they use it essentially as a dynamic negotiation lever to extract
information from the manufacturer and maintain cost-effectiveness. Furthermore, in their
model the price is adjusted based on realized demand, while in our model the access level
- which indirectly determines the “revenue” component in the objective function as will be
explained in section 3 -, adjusts the expected demand, but the contract parameters will not
change as a function of demand’s realization.
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With regards to access decisions due to patient heterogeneity, the drive to achieve treat-
ment equality has raised interest in understanding the determinants of drug access for dif-
ferent medical indications, or even from patient subgroups within a drug’s same indication.
Zaric (2008) and Hawkins and Scott (2011) analyze the trade-off between increased access
and reduced price under patient heterogeneity with respect to their response to a treatment.
The former uses a Markov model of disease progression to find the optimal price and lim-
ited use conditions, both set by the manufacturer when seeking to achieve formulary listing.
Hawkins and Scott (2008) compare a health-payer’s reimbursement based on three differ-
ent criteria: whole-population cost-effectiveness, stratified cost-effectiveness, and negotiated
price and coverage. They allow the manufacturer to set the price of the drug to maximize
revenue and through an example show how access, manufacturer’s revenues and incremental
net health benefits may all be increased through negotiation compared to stratified cost-
effectiveness. Their whole-population and negotiation rationales are similar to the approach
we use to determine cost-effectiveness since for any subset of patient groups, we consider the
average incremental health benefits rather than doing the assessment independently for each
patient group as stratified cost-effectiveness suggests. Furthermore, by allowing the health-
payer in our model to be either a net utility or a social welfare maximizer, we indirectly
capture the payer’s willingness to subsidize the patient groups which would be rejected un-
der stratified cost-effectiveness with the surplus achieved by the patient groups with higher
incremental health benefits. Our analysis advances their work by incorporating demand and
health outcome uncertainty into the model, in addition to including a budget constraint for
the health-payer.
In the modeling of outcome uncertainty, So and Tang (2000) is worth mentioning as one
of the earliest papers to recognize the need to study the joint impact of cost containment
initiatives in health care on all relevant parties, taking a supply chain approach under the
presence of uncertainty in a health care system. They model an outcome-oriented reim-
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bursement policy aimed at discouraging excessive prescription behavior to determine the
optimal prescription policy of a clinic when the effect of the drug on the patient is uncertain.
Similar to our goal, they analyze the impact of the different parameters on the patient’s
well-being, the clinic’s profitability, and the pharmaceutical firm’s profitability. The main
difference is that their analysis focuses on the dynamically made dosage quantity decision at
the lowest echelon for all incoming patients, i.e., consumption is endogenously determined
based on the information set available at the time of each patient’s visit. On the contrary,
our model considers a single-period and does not incorporate learning to determine the op-
timal consumption, but rather assumes the size of patients treated to be a random variable
due to uncertainty in the size of the patients’ pool. Further, rather than limiting the dose
per patient, we allow the drug’s use to be irreversibly restricted to only some categories of
patients before the observation of patient arrivals, thus focusing jointly on the access and
service level decisions.
Operations Management
The problem of determining access and service levels in our health care model has large
similarities with the price and quantity problem studied in the operations literature. In our
model, the access level decision shapes the distribution of patient demand, which is the key
challenge in the price and quantity newsvendor model. This is because once the access level
is endogenously determined in our model, an expected health benefit per patient treated can
be obtained, i.e., expected health-benefits are stochastically decreasing as the access level
becomes more inclusive. Since health-benefits are the source of “revenue” in our model, we
can say that setting the optimal access level is equivalent to indirectly setting the expected
health-benefit per patient. Despite the managerial attractiveness of this problem, the anal-
ysis of the price and quantity problem has received limited attention in the literature until
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recent years, in part because of the complications to obtain general closed-form solutions.
Some papers have considered additive demand models (e.g., Mills, 1959) where the demand
is the sum of a deterministic downward-slope function of price - as in the classic marketing
literature - and a second term incorporating the size randomness. However, we consider
a multiplicative demand model where demand is given by a random number of incoming
patients, of which only a fraction are expected to satisfy the endogenously set access level
policy; for such reason we will focus only on multiplicative demand models. Karlin and Carr
(1962) was the first work to consider the same demand components as Mills (1959), but as-
suming demand to be the product of those two terms, and find - as opposed to Mills (1959)
-, that the optimal selling price is not lower than the riskless price, defined as the optimal
price under no randomness in the demand function. Subsequent papers have extended the
results within particular settings. Zabel (1970) shows the uniqueness of the stocking quantity
solution under uniform and exponential distributions of demand when the penalty cost is
zero. Nevins (1966) uses simulation to reach a similar conclusion when demand is normally
distributed. Young (1978) explains how for the multiplicative demand case, the variance of
demand is a decreasing function of price, while the coefficient of variation is independent of
price.
More recently, a series of papers have tried to provide a more unifying framework.
Petruzzi and Dada (1999) try to consolidate the previous results for additive and multi-
plicative forms of demand, arguing that pricing provides an opportunity to reduce the risks
of overstocking and understocking, so that for the multiplicative case under isoelastic de-
mand, it is possible to decrease demand variance without adversely affecting the coefficient
of variation by choosing a higher price, i.e., in our model, this implies setting a more restric-
tive access policy. Also useful is their definition of a base price instead of a riskless price,
where the former acknowledges that expected sales differ from expected demand, and define
the optimal pricing strategy as the base price plus a premium; the intuition of this per-unit
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premium is to recover on a per-sale basis, the total expected cost derived from the inventory
that is used as a buffer against uncertainty in demand. Salinger and Ampudia (2011) explain
how the price-setting newsvendor fits the Lerner relationship, linking profit-maximizing price
with marginal costs and the elasticity of demand. They use the marginal cost of an expected
unit sold instead of marginal cost, and elasticity of the average quantity sold with respect
to price instead of the elasticity of demand with respect to price. They prove that in the
multiplicative uncertainty case, the elasticity of the average quantity sold is constant for
a mean-preserving spread in demand, therefore the mark-up factor is unaffected while the
marginal cost of an expected unit sold increases due to a greater fraction of the marginal
increase in production being unsold. These combined effects result in an increase in the
optimal price as demand increases. Kocabiyikoglu and Popescu (2011) characterize more
general models of stochastic demand, finding a series of necessary and sufficient conditions
that guarantee uniqueness of the joint price-inventory solution. They do this by defining a
lost sales rate (LSR) elasticity, described as the percentage change in the rate of lost sales
with respect to the percentage change in price for a given quantity. They find that an in-
creasing LSR elasticity is a sufficient condition for uniqueness of the optimal solution when
the selling price observed by consumers and the order quantity decisions are coordinated. In
terms of our model, the result which is shown in Corollary 2b of their paper, indicates that
for the multiplicative demand (i.e., our case), the LSR elasticity is increasing in the order
quantity if and only if the distribution of the random variable that is independent of the
health benefits is IGFR (Increased Generalized Failure Rate); and the LSR elasticity is de-
creasing in the access level (i.e., increasing in the expected health benefits) if the access level
dependent function of demand is elastic with respect to the access level. Since our model
satisfies those conditions, we use their result as a starting point to incorporate particular
characteristics of our problem.
There are four main distinctions between our model and the works discussed above. First,
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we take a supply chain approach rather than focusing on a single echelon, by explicitly con-
sidering the role (and in Chapter 3, the best response function) of the manufacturer. Second,
the “expected price”, i.e., the health benefit, is assumed to be discrete in our model, which
complicates the analysis and requires a different treatment. Third, in addition to expanding
the analysis for the traditional objective function in the price dependent newsvendor model,
we consider a second alternative (maximizing social welfare, which will be formally defined
below) motivated by the mission of some of the institutions, usually public, in charge of
finding the optimal values for the model’s decision variables. And fourth, we incorporate an
absolute and a relative budget contraints, simultaneously, which has relevant implications
on the feasible decision space, and therefore, on the solution process to find the optimal
solution. In sum, our approach intends to aid public policy making and firm strategy by
analytically showing the changing supply chain impact of different decision-making criteria
by the payer under two fundamental constraints driven by the growing pressures surrounding
health care costs, and in particular, pharmaceutical spending.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 General Setup
Consider a health care supply chain where a risk-neutral pharmaceutical manufacturer, here-
after Pharma and denoted by subindex m, offers to sell a new (prescription) drug to a risk-
neutral6 central health care system (i.e., the health-payer and the health-provider are part of
the same governing institution), hereafter Health and denoted by subindex h, through some
take-it or leave-it contract agreement. Let N be a random variable representing the number
6This assumption, while inconsistent with the current observations regarding the introduction of new
drugs aimed at treating chronic conditions will be relaxed in Chapter 3. As will be explained there, its
relaxation under price-only contracts provides no additional insights and is therefore removed in the present
chapter to avoid unnecessary noise.
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of patients that arrive to receive treatment through Health within a single finite time period,
where N follows a Poisson distribution with parameter λ. We assume heterogeneity within
patients to exist so that upon arrival to Health, patients are categorized into 2 mutually
exclusive types based on their physiological conditions and medical history.7 Let f(i) be
the probability that an incoming patient is categorized as type i, i = 1, 2, and F (i) be the
probability that a patient is categorized as type i or lower, e.g., F (2) = f(1) + f(2), with
F (0) = 0, F (2) = 1. Henceforth we assume f(1) = θ, and f(2) = (1 − θ). Let bi represent
the multiplication of the incremental value of the health gains received by a patient catego-
rized as type i, i = 1, 2,, and the health-payer’s ceiling ratio; i.e., bi is the incremental value
derived from the drug’s administration times the health-payer’s maximum willingness-to-pay
for that value. For simplicity of exposition, we will henceforth refer to bi simply as health
benefits. Without loss of generality, we organize patient categories such that b1 > b2. This
implies that the perceived value to the health-payer from a drug being administered to a
patient of category 1 versus to a patient of category 2, is b1 − b2 > 0; this can occur based
on (a)superior clinical outcomes in patients of category 1; (b)on a higher ceiling ratio for
category 1 originated by the drug’s larger societal benefits, the disease severity, or the de-
gree of innovation for that particular patient category; or (c)on a combination of both. The
formulation therefore allows for a dynamic cost-effectiveness threshold, e.g., it allows for the
existence of different willingness-to-pay thresholds for each patient category, as is already
the case in Australia and will be in the UK starting 2014.
We approximate the trading opportunities between Pharma and Health using the single
period newsvendor framework where Pharma must commit production well in advance of
receiving Health’s order. This is based on (a)the long lead times in building production
capacity, sourcing raw materials, manufacturing the drug and delivering it to Health; (b)the
7We assume that all incoming patients are diagnosed in order to learn their medical status, and as a
result even in a fully inclusive policy, the examination cost is a constant which is not explicitly included in
the model.
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quantity discounts offered for large purchases which makes the partition of demand into long
periods a reasonable assumption; and (c)the manufacturer’s high utilization levels, given
limited manufacturing capacity and possibly multiple clients, which reduces her ability to
satisfy larger than expected demand in the short term.8 Additionally, we consider that the
newsvendor framework can be useful in representing the collateral costs associated with de-
mand forecast mismatches exacerbated by the growing budget pressures in the health care
sector. On one hand, overestimating demand may result in a portion of the health care bud-
get being “trapped” in anticipation for more patients, possibly rejecting or delaying inclusion
of other treatments into the formulary listings. On the other hand, underestimating demand
may result in higher than expected costs, either in terms of health outcomes because patients
are not treated in a timely manner with the best available treatment, or in monetary terms
because the treatment is available but creates a budget deficit that negatively affects future
introduction of innovative treatments.
The order of events in the model is depicted in Figure 2.3 and described next. (1)Pharma
announces bi for i = 1, 2, and announces the selling price for the drug, which may be ei-
ther exogenously or endogenously determined as will be explained in the coming sections.
(2)Health selects an order quantity Q of drugs and a prescription policy threshold τ so that
an incoming patient of type i is prescribed the drug only if i ≤ τ ; this means that the
probability that an incoming patient is an eligible candidate for receiving the drug is F (τ).
Mathematically, the conditional demand for the drug given some prescription policy thresh-
old can be seen as a random number N of trials, each with a success probability F (τ); by the
Poisson property, the effective demand, D(λ, τ), is also Poisson distributed with parameter
λF (τ). Let p(x;λF (τ)) = (λF (τ))
x
x!
e−(λF (τ)), be the probability that exactly x patient arrivals
from the effective demand occur during the period; and let P (x;λF (τ)) =
∞∑
j=x
p(j;λF (τ))
be the complement of the Poisson CDF. We can now define B(τ) ,
∑τ
i=1
bif(i)
F (τ)
to be the
8This assumption is relaxed in Chapter 3 through the introduction of a capacity buffer contract.
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expected health benefits obtained by a patient belonging to the effective demand that is eli-
gible to receive the drug treatment. (3)Pharma produces and delivers to Health Q units of
the drug at marginal cost c. (4)Demand is realized. Excess drugs may be salvaged at a per
unit value δ, which may be interpreted either as the opportunity cost or as a discounted sale
to a secondary market; to avoid trivial problems, assume δ < c < b1. If D(λ, F (τ)) > Q,
a per unit cost, g, is accrued to Health for each patient arrival that satisfies the prescrip-
tion policy threshold but does not receive the drug treatment due to a stock-out. To keep
integrality, we will use bxc and dxe as the floor and ceiling functions, respectively. For the
moment, all players are assumed to hold symmetric information about all functional forms
and parameters.
Figure 2.3: Timing of Events
2.3.2 The decision making process
Define A(Q, τ) , E [min[Q , D(λ, τ)]] to be the expected quantity of administered drug
treatments; E[max[0 , Q−D(λ, τ)]] = (Q−A(Q, τ)), to be the expected leftovers for Health;
and E [max[0 , D(λ, τ)−Q]] = λF (τ)−A(Q, τ), to be the expected quantity of understocked
units of the drug at the end of the period. Finally, let T (·) be the payment from Health
to Pharma as a function of the contract parameters; it is well-known that when Pharma
and Health act as a single decision-maker, it is optimal to set a transfer payment T = cQ
to prevent double-marginalization. Then, for a risk-neutral single decision-maker the social
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welfare expected utility function is:
S(Q, τ) = B(τ)A(Q, τ) + δ(Q− A(Q, τ))− g (λF (τ)− A(Q, τ)) , (2.3.1)
and the system’s expected utility function is:
Z(Q, τ) = −cQ+B(τ)A(Q, τ) + δ (Q− A(Q, τ))− g (λF (τ)− A(Q, τ))
= −cQ+ S(Q, τ) (2.3.2)
Based on the latter, in order to better understand the impact of the different priorities
used in practice by health care systems, we explicitly distinguish between two possible criteria
for the decision-making process:
• Maximize utility of social welfare, S(Q, τ); this is the case when Health’s priority are
the recipients of the drug treatments, i.e., the patients, and we consider it a more
appropriate approach in settings where the health-payer is a non-for-profit institution
as occurs in several national health systems. For example, in Germany a 2005 Court
Decree establishes that treatment in the case of a life-threatening disease is an essential
part of health care and statutory health funds must pay for it.
• Maximize the decision maker’s utility function, Z(Q, τ); this is the case when the de-
cision maker’s priority is to make an efficient use of its resources and we consider it
a more appropriate approach in settings where the health-payer’s priority is to maxi-
mize the use of its resources or when the payer is a for-profit institution, e.g., private
insurance companies, as occurs in a large portion of the the United States market and
some developing countries. For example, in Australia the PBAC recommendation may
be accompanied by closely specified access restrictions due to a drug’s lack of robust
clinical evidence of a clinically important additional benefit, or because the incremental
costs of obtaining those benefits mean that drugs are cost-effective in only a defined
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group of patients. In other words, a drug’s high cost-effectiveness for one of the indi-
cations cannot be considered to subsidize its use for an indication which benefits are
on its own not cost-effective.
In addition, the reality is that for both decision-making criteria, the amount of resources is
limited and the health-payer’s decision space is typically bounded by a set of minimum con-
ditions that should be satisfied in order for a drug treatment to be approved for a particular
segment of the patient population. In response to these issues, two constraints are included
in our analysis:
a budget constraint: T (·) ≤ Γ,
where Γ is an exogenous upper limit on Health’s expenses for the drug under analysis;
and a cost-effectiveness constraint: Z(Q, τ) ≥ 0,
which makes sure that the expected net benefits derived from the drug’s approval are above
some minimum threshold. This approach to evaluating new technologies is known as net
monetary benefits (NMBs), and as long as the terms in the calculations of incremental ben-
efits and costs are the same, then positive NMBs are equivalent to the ICER being less than
the willingness to pay in a cost-effectiveness analysis.
Next, we solve both the situations when an integrated decision-maker: maximizes ex-
pected social welfare utility (§3.3.1), and maximizes the system’s expected utility function
(§3.3.2).
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2.3.3 The integrated channel
We refer to this setting with the symbol ς, where ς is used to denote the single decision-maker
structure. Before going further, some useful structural properties of the model are presented.
Lemma 1: For a given τ , the social welfare function, S(Q, τ), is increasing and concave in
Q.
Lemma 2: For a given τ , the system’s utility function, Z(Q, τ), is concave in Q.
Figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 provide a graphical representation of Lemmas 1 and 2, and
are useful in explaining the intuition created by our formulation. For increasing values of
the order quantity, Q, the solid lines in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 plot the expected social welfare
curves while the dashed lines plot the expected system’s utility curves. Notice first that from
the formulation, when the access level is restricted, the value of b2 is irrelevant as only high
health benefit patients are treated. Second, the reason for the steeper slope in the social
welfare functions in Figure 2.4 versus 2.5 after reaching the maximum point in the expected
utility functions is driven by the higher value of δ in Figure 2.4; this happens because as
the incremental number of patients who are administered the drug goes to zero, the social
welfare curve increases at a constant rate δ. The obvious consequence is that as the salvage
Figure 2.4: Expected social welfare and total utility functions with no intersection
λ = 600; θ = 0.4; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.15; g = 0; δ = 0.2; c = 0.3
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Figure 2.5: Expected social welfare and total utility functions with intersection
λ = 600; θ = 0.4; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.5; g = 0.2; δ = 0.05; c = 0.3
Figure 2.6: Zoom on expected social welfare and total utility functions with intersection
λ = 600; θ = 0.4; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.5; g = 0.2; δ = 0.05; c = 0.3
value is positive, the unconstrained social welfare maximizer will continue to order indefi-
nitely. Third, when g = 0 both access levels provide a utility of zero when no drugs are
ordered, while when g > 0, the full access policy is inferior to the restricted access policy
when Q = 0. This occurs because under full access, more patients are expected to arrive, re-
sulting in higher costs of understocking. Fourth, under restricted access, the curves initially
grow at a faster rate due to the higher value of the average health benefits, but they do so for
a shorter range of order quantities due to the decreasing probability that demand exceeds a
particular order quantity. These effects are generated by the value of θ and the shape of the
demand distribution. As θ increases, the slope of the expected utility under the restricted
access policy will stay positive for higher values of Q; and also the initial increasing slope
for both access level policies will get closer to each other as θ gets closer to 1. Finally, it is
worth noting that in Figure 2.5 the access level policies cross paths, while in Figure 2.4 they
do not. Figure 2.6 zooms in on the crossing point for the same parameter combination used
48
in Figure 2.5; since due to integrality there may not exist an integer order quantity where
the functions are equal, henceforth when we speak of a crossing point or an intersection,
we refer to a change in dominace of one access level curve versus the other. Proposition 1
provides the conditions for this crossing to occur, and explains the changes in the crossing
point as a function of the problem’s parameters.
Proposition 1: Let q be a positive order quantity such that S(q, 1) ≥ S(q, 2); and S(q+1, 2) >
S(q + 1, 1).
a) If inequality (2.3.3) is satisfied, then q is unique and given by equation (2.3.4).
θ ≥
(
1− P (Q;λ)
1− P (Q;λθ)
)(
P (Q+ 1;λθ)
P (Q+ 1;λ)
)
(2.3.3)
q = max
{
Q
∣∣∣∣ ( gb1 − δ + g
)(
λ
A(Q, 2)
)
+
(
b1 − b2
b1 − δ + g
)
≥
(
A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)
A(Q, 2)
)(
1
1− θ
)}
(2.3.4)
b) b2 > δ is a necessary and sufficient condition for q to exist.
c) If b2 < δ, then S(Q, 1) > S(Q, 2), ∀ Q > 0.
d) If b2 = δ, then S(Q, 1) > S(Q, 2), for some finite Q > 0, and limP (Q,λ)→0 S(Q, 1) −
S(Q, 2) = 0.
e) The value of q is increasing in b1, g, δ, and decreasing in b2. The change in q with respect
to θ is ambiguous.
The existence of a unique q is critical in our analysis because it provides a threshold value
for the dominance of either of the access level policies, both in terms of maximizing expected
social welfare or expected system’s utility - because the manufacturing cost is linear in the
order quantity. In other words, q is independent of the transfer price and is then the same for
the social welfare curves and for the system’s utility curves. It is useful in representing the
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essential tradeoff between choosing higher access levels versus higher service levels; notice
that for any fixed order quantity, the service level will always be higher for lower levels of
access. Consequently, q will be utilized below as a reference point to determine the optimal
policy given the objective function and cost-effectiveness and budget constraints. Proposi-
tion 1a gives the conditions for finding q - equation (2.3.4) -, and for such q to be unique
- equation (2.3.3) -, which through numerical experiments hasn’t been found to be a very
restrictive condition; being more specific, we haven’t been able to find any combination of
values for which the two access level curves cross more than once. Further, as is shown in the
proofs in Appendix 1, if there exists at least one crossing point, then the number of crossing
points must be odd. This implies that if q is not unique, then the curves from the two access
level policies must cross at least three times. While imagining two concave curves that cross
three times is not an impossible task, the shape required for such curves does not correspond
with our observations. We believe there are two main situations where such complication
could occur: First, when the average benefits for a given access level, and the shape of the
effective demand distribution, are assumed to be independent; however, this assumption is
essential to our model’s formulation since the average benefit is given by the proportion of
patients that belong to each type, and therefore does not concern the problem studied here.
Second, when the demand distribution has very “fat tails”, e.g., when the expected system’s
utility function is relatively flat for a large range of values around the order quantity that
maximizes the function. Such formulation could be appropriate if the size of the demand
has high probabilities of being either very large or very small, and is left as an opportunity
for further research.
As a result of the above discussion, we will henceforth use the following assumption:
A1: If q exists, it is unique.
Proposition 1b, 1c, and 1d, provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for q to exist,
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or to not exist. These results are very intuitive as when δ > b2, it is more efficient, regardless
of the objective function, to get the salvage value of the drug than to provide the drug to
type 2 patients. As a result, full access can only be superior to restricted access if δ < b2.
As for the comparative statics shown in Proposition 1e, the reader is invited to direct his
attention to Figure 2.7 in order to get additional insights on the sensitivity of q with respect
to changes in the problem’s parameters. Notice first that for a given Q, limiting access is
more likely to maximize social welfare when goodwill costs or salvage value are relatively
high, and when the difference in the health benefits received by both patient groups is large.
All these results are intuitive. First, as the goodwill cost - g -, increases, the cost of under-
stocking increases; since the probability of understocks for a fixed Q increases in the access
level, then there is an increase in the minimum required order quantity for full access to
provide higher expected social welfare than restricted access. In terms of the salvage value
- δ -, note that the overstocking cost decreases as δ increases; in the limit of the feasible
values for q to exist, as δ approaches the expected benefit for patients of type 2, the value of
providing full access decreases because large order quantities may be ordered and then sal-
vaged at a high value if necessary. As for the health benefits, on one hand when b1 increases,
the slope of the expected utility curve under restricted access grows at a faster rate and for
a larger range of order quantities; while the slope of the expected utility curve under full
access will also increase, the effect is less because for any administered drug, the slope only
increases with probability (1 − θ). On the other hand, when b2 increases, the slope of the
expected utility curve under restricted access is unaffected, while the slope of the expected
utility curve under full access grows at a faster rate, causing the intersection point between
the access level policies to take place at lower values of the order quantity. Analyzing it
from a different perspective, as b2 grows, the probability of full access to be preferred should
(weakly) increase, meaning that q decreases in b2.
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Figure 2.7: Comparative statics for q
(a) λ = 600; b1 = 1; g = 0.5; δ = 0.1
(b) λ = 600; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.4; δ = 0.1
(c) λ = 600; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.4; g = 0.5
(d) λ = 600; b2 = 0.4; g = 0.5; δ = 0.1
Last, it is worth paying special attention to the role of θ. Strictly speaking, q is increasing
in θ if:
λ (P (Q;λ)− θP (Q;λθ)) >
Q (P (Q+ 1;λ)− P (Q+ 1;λθ)) + λ(1− θ) (P (Q;λθ)− p(Q+ 1;λθ)) , (2.3.5)
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and q is decreasing in θ if:
λ (P (Q;λ)− θP (Q;λθ)) <
Q (P (Q+ 1;λ)− P (Q+ 1;λθ)) + λ(1− θ) (P (Q;λθ)− p(Q+ 1;λθ)) . (2.3.6)
The details for these results can be observed in the proof of Proposition 1 provided in
Appendix 1. Notice that both sides of the inequalities are positive, and while we are not
able to provide intuition based on this expression, our numerical experiments always yield
that q is increasing in θ. This implies that when θ increases, the effect of a larger expected
demand - with mean λθ - under restricted access is higher than the effect of a larger average
benefit - B(2) - under full access. Notice that as θ increases, the fraction of patients for
which the average benefit increases under full access (i.e., type 2 patients) decreases; this
balancing effect may be the main element for which higher levels of θ require larger order
quantities for full access to yield higher expected social welfare than restricted access. Figure
2.7 is also instructive in observing under which circumstances does θ play a more important
role in the value of q. Looking at graph (a) in Figure 2.7, as b2 approaches δ, the effect of θ
is minimal since the order quantity needs to be very large for the administration of a drug to
a type 2 patient to be more efficient than restricting access and selling such drug at salvage
value. However as b2 increases, the incentive to provide full access grows, and the impact
is highest for low values of θ because the low levels of expected demand under restricted
access are more rapidly overwhelmed by the full access policy. From graph (b), when g
is very large, the risk of understocking is the main driver of the decision and θ becomes
irrelevant. However as g decreases, the penalty associated with understocks drops, and the
size of the expected demand becomes the main driver. Graph (c) in Figure 2.7 follows a
similar intuition as that explained for b2. As the salvage value - δ -, approaches the health
benefit of type 2 patients, θ becomes almost irrelevant in determining q. However as δ goes
to zero, the risk of overstocks increases and if θ is low, the minimal order quantity needed
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for the full access policy to be above the restricted access policy decreases because a large
demand is needed to justify larger order quantities. For graph (d), it is initially interesting
to see that the effect of θ is relatively constant as b1 oscillates between b2 and 1 (due to
normalization), and the increase in q with respect to b1 is not too large. The intuition is that
changes in b1 affect both access level policies similarly because the average health benefits
in both situations are contingent on b1, and the proportion of the demand which receives b1
under full access will be given by θ. Therefore, as b1 changes, the main role played by θ is in
determining the size of the demand, rather than the crossing point between the access level
curves.
Now that the determination of q has been explained in detail, we will turn our attention to
solving the risk-neutral single decision-maker’s problem when the objective function is max-
imizing expected social welfare (§3.3.1) and maximizing expected system’s utility (§3.3.2),
in the presence of cost-effectiveness and budget constraints.
Case 1ς: Maximizing expected social welfare
In this section we solve the problem of maximizing expected social welfare as might be the
case for a national health authority or a not-for-profit health organization. The problem
faced by the single decision maker under this setting is:
max
(Q,τ)
S(Q, τ) = (B(τ)− δ + g)A(Q, τ) + δQ− gλF (τ)
subject to:
cQ ≤ Γ
−cQ+B(τ)A(Q, τ) + δ (Q− A(Q, τ))− g (λF (τ)− A(Q, τ)) ≥ 0(2.3.7)
We begin by defining the feasible area for trade to occur. Let QςΓ =
⌊
Γ
c
⌋
, be the largest
order quantity that satisfies the budget constraint, and let Qς = min{Qς
1
, Qς
2
}, be the
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minimum order quantity that allows the system’s utility function to be nonnegative, where:
Qς
1
= min
{
Q
∣∣∣∣Q ≤ (B(1)− δ + g)A(Q, 1)− gθλc− δ ;Q ≥ 0
}
, and
Qς
2
= min
{
Q
∣∣∣∣Q ≤ (B(2)− δ + g)A(Q, 2)− gλc− δ ;Q ≥ 0
}
.
Lemma 3: QςΓ ≥ Qς , is a necessary and sufficient condition for trade to occur.
Lemma 3 simply states that if the largest order quantity that satisfies the budget con-
straint is lower than the smallest order quantity that satisfies the cost-effectiveness constraint,
then there is no feasible solution that results in a positive order quantity, i.e., all patients are
excluded from the access policy. This could happen when the goodwill cost is too large and
the available budget is relatively low (e.g., the case of the prostate cancer drug described in
the introduction of this chapter).
Next, recall from Lemma 1 that the social welfare function is monotonically increasing
in Q for a fixed prescription policy threshold. As a result, the optimal solution to the
unconstrained problem is unbounded, which implies that either the budget constraint, the
cost-effectiveness constraint, or both, must be binding. Define Q∗S,ς and τ
∗
S,ς as the optimal
order quantity and prescription policy threshold, respectively, when trade occurs. Let
QS = {QςΓ, Q¯ς1, Q¯ς2},
denote the set of possible optimal order quantities under this setting, where Q¯ςτ , is the
largest order quantity that satisfies the cost-effectiveness constraint for access level τ , i.e.,
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Z(Q¯ςτ , τ) ≥ 0 > Z(Q¯ςτ + 1, τ).9 By doing some algebra, we find
Q¯ς1 = max
{
Q
∣∣∣∣Q ≤ (B(1)− δ + g)A(Q, 1)− gθλc− δ ;Q > 0
}
, and
Q¯ς2 = max
{
Q
∣∣∣∣Q ≤ (B(2)− δ + g)A(Q, 2)− gλc− δ ;Q > 0
}
.
From the above definitions, it should be evident that the existence of Q¯ςτ depends both
on the combination of the marginal cost and benefit parameters and on the shape of the
demand distribution. Still, Lemma 4 provides a key minimum condition that needs to be
satisfied for Q¯ςτ > 0.
Lemma 4: c ≤ B(τ), is a necessary condition for Q¯ςτ , τ = 1, 2, to exist.
Notice that c ≤ B(τ) is not a sufficient condition due to demand’s uncertainty which
may result in understocking and overstocking costs. At this point, it is also worth noting
that even when the budget constraint is active, not necessarily all order quantities in the
range [Qς , QςΓ] will be feasible, since when Q¯
ς
1 < q < Q
ς
2
≤ QςΓ, all order quantities in the
range (Q¯ς1 , Q
ς
2
) do not satisfy the cost-effectiveness constraint. Lemma 5 further clarifies the
ordering of the different reference values that have been introduced.
Lemma 5: Assume Q¯ς1 and Q¯
ς
2 exist.
a) Suppose q exists.
a1) If Q¯ς1 = q, then the possible orderings are:
a1.1) Qς
1
≤ Q¯ς1 = q = Qς2 ≤ Q¯ς2.
9Notice that the system’s utility function may cross the zero-profit line at most at two positive values of
Q.
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a1.2) Qς
1
≤ Qς
2
< Q¯ς1 = q ≤ Q¯ς2.
a2) If Q¯ς1 > q, then the possible orderings are:
a2.1) Qς
1
≤ Qς
2
≤ q < Q¯ς1 ≤ Q¯ς2.
a2.2) q < Qς
2
≤ Qς
1
≤ Q¯ς1 ≤ Q¯ς2.
a3) If Q¯ς1 < q, then the possible orderings are:
a3.1) Qς
1
≤ Q¯ς1 < q < Qς2 ≤ Q¯ς2.
a3.2) Qς
1
≤ Qς
2
≤ Q¯ς2 ≤ Q¯ς1 < q.
a3.3) Qς
1
< Q¯ς1 = Q
ς
2
= Q¯ς2 < q.
b) Suppose q does not exist. Then Qς
1
≤ Qς
2
≤ Q¯ς2 ≤ Q¯ς1.
There are a few interesting ideas on which it is worth elaborating based on Lemma 5;
Figure 2.8 provides graphical examples to illustrate some of these different possible situa-
tions. Notice first that the crossing point between the two access level policies may occur:
when the expected system’s utility is still increasing in both access level policies; when the
expected system’s utility is already decreasing in both access level policies; or when the ex-
pected system’s utility is decreasing under the restricted access policy and increasing in the
the full access policy. Another observation is that a necessary condition for Qς
τ
= Q¯ςτ > 0 is
that g > 0; such equality would imply that under the access level policy τ , there exists only
one order quantity that achieves cost-effectiveness.
Analyzing the Lemma by parts, for Lemma 5a1, as is formally shown in the proof,
if Q¯ς1 = q, then it is also true that the value of the curves is equal at an integer value.
As result it is necessary that at least q = Q¯ς2 or q = Q
ς
2
. Still, it is even possible that
Qς
1
= Q¯ς1 = q = Q
ς
2
= Q¯ς2; this situation requires two very specific circumstances to simul-
taneously occur. First, q = Qς
2
= Q¯ς2 implies that under full access, the order quantity q
maximizes the expected system’s utility achieving a value of zero. Similarly, Qς
1
= Q¯ς1 = q
can only mean that the expected system’s utility under the restricted access level policy
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Figure 2.8: Ordering of the reference quantities (part 1)
(a1.1) λ = 600; θ = 0.4; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.29; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.477
Qς
1
= 118 < Q¯ς1 = q = Q
ς
2
= 503 < Q¯ς2 = 722.
(a1.2) λ = 600; θ = 0.95; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.12; g = 1.5; δ = 0; c = 0.9055
Qς
1
= 538 < Qς
2
= 589 < Q¯ς1 = q = Q¯
ς
2 = 629.
(a2.1) λ = 600; θ = 0.4; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.3; g = 0.1; δ = 0; c = 0.4795
Qς
1
= 39 < Qς
2
= 300 < q = 442 < Q¯ς1 = 500 < Q¯
ς
2 = 725.
(a2.2) λ = 600; θ = 0.95; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.96; g = 0.1; δ = 0.05; c = 0.65
Qς
1
= 127 < Qς
2
= 134 < q = 557 < Q¯ς1 = 902 < Q¯
ς
2 = 947.
crosses the zero utility line from below at order quantity (q− ε), ε ∈ (0, 1) and then crosses
it again from above at order quantity q, - notice that d(q− ε)e = q. This case of full equality
is highly unlikely and implies that for both access level policies, the only order quantity
that achieves cost-effectiveness is q; it requires that g > 0, that θ approaches 1, and that
b2 approaches b1. Further, taking into consideration that only a small subset of parameter
combinations yield Q¯ς1 = q, the relationship when the latter equality occurs is typically ei-
ther: Qς
1
< Q¯ς1 = q = Q
ς
2
< Q¯ς2, or Q
ς
1
< Qς
2
< Q¯ς1 = q = Q¯
ς
2, as is shown in graphs (a1.1)
and (a1.2) in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.9: Ordering of the reference quantities (part 2)
(a3.1) λ = 600; θ = 0.2; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.5; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.4795
Qς
1
= 59 < Q¯ς1 = 250 < q = 382 < Q
ς
2
= 484 < Q¯ς2 = 750.
(a3.2-1) λ = 600; θ = 0.9; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.05; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.88
Qς
1
= 436 < Qς
2
= 578 < Q¯ς2 = 605 < Q¯
ς
1 = 613 < q = 625.
(a3.2-2) λ = 600; θ = 0.9; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.06; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.88435
Qς
1
= 439 < Qς
2
= Q¯ς2 = 592 < Q¯
ς
1 = 610 < q = 622.
(b) λ = 600; θ = 0.4; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.15; g = 0; δ = 0.2; c = 0.42
Qς
1
= Qς
2
= 0 < Q¯ς2 = 790 < Q¯
ς
1 = 872.
The main difference between parts a2 and a3 is that for the former, Z(q, τ) > 0, while
for the latter Z(q, τ) < 0, which may result in the aforementioned discontinuous range of
order quantities. In Figure 2.8, graphs (a2.1) and (a2.1/a2.2) show situations when the joint
effect of demand distribution and the average expected benefits for a given access level are
relatively high relative to the transfer cost, c. It should be mentioned that the situation
from Lemma 5-a2.2 couldn’t be exactly replicated numerically, but it is easy to show that
if the cost-effectiveness threshold was positive and sufficiently large, instead of its currently
assumed value of zero, then the shape of the graph (a2.1/a2.2) would fit into this case;
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specifically if the cost-effectiveness threshold was raised to the horizontal red line, graph
(a2.1/a2.2) corresponds to part a2.2 of Lemma 5. For part a3, graph (a3.1) shows the most
common shape given that Q¯ς1 < q. Graphs (a3.2-1) and (a3.2-2) both correspond to Lemma
5a3.2, the main distinction being that for the latter there is a single order quantity that
satisfies cost-effectiveness under the full access policy. Part a3.3 requires a very specific com-
bination of parameters, where there is a single order quantity that satisfies cost-effectiveness
for full access, which coincides with the largest, but not unique, order quantity that satisfies
cost-effectiveness under restricted access.
Another important observation arising from Lemma 5 is that of dominance, i.e., the
(weak) superiority of a particular access level policy in the expected social welfare utility -
and consequently in the expected system’s utility - for any order quantity that satisfies the
cost-effectiveness constraint. On one hand, restricted access weakly dominates full access
under the situations that satisfy parts a3.2, a3.3, and b, of Lemma 5. In the first two of
these cases, the intersection between the two access level policies occurs at an order quantity
that is higher than that which maximizes the expected system’s utility under full access, and
in such way that all order quantities above q yield a non cost-effective outcome. Through
numerical experiments, we have observed that such situations are highly infrequent and oc-
cur when the fraction of type 1 patients is very high (above 0.9), the health benefit of type
2 patients is very low (below 0.1 b1), and the transfer cost c is high. For the situation from
Lemma 5b, the result follows from Proposition 1 and the only condition is for the value of
the outside option, or salvage value, to be higher than the value of health benefits for type
2 patients. On the other hand, full access weakly dominates restricted access under the
situations that satisfy Lemma 5a2.2. This means that the crossing point between the two
access level policies occurs at an order quantity that is lower than that which maximizes the
expected system’s utility under restricted access. Again, through numerical experiments we
have observed that this situation is not frequent either and requires the goodwill cost to be
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positive and both the fraction of type 1 patients and the health benefits of type 2 patients
to be very high, causing the two access level policies to almost overlap. For the rest of the
combinations, there is no clear dominance and the optimal solution will depend on whether
the inequalities in Lemma 5 are strong or weak, as well as on the value of the available budget.
Summarizing, and perhaps most importantly, even though Lemma 5 may appear to cre-
ate complexity by identifying a large variety of possible orderings, it is very useful in finding
a structure to understand the drivers of the optimal decision making process. From this
result, and assuming that there exists at least one feasible solution that yields Q∗S,ς > 0, we
are now able to reduce the analysis of the optimal decisions to the relationship between the
budget constraint, the minimum and maximum feasible quantities for full access, Qς
2
and
Q¯ς2, and the crossing point of the two access level policies, q.
Theorem 1: Assume Qς
τ
, τ = 1, 2 exist, and let QςΓ ≥ Qς . When the integrated supply chain
maximizes expected social welfare subject to budget and cost-effectiveness constraints, the
optimal solution is as follows.
a) Suppose q exists.
a1) min{Q¯ς2 , QςΓ} ≤ max{q , Qς2}, is a necessary condition for τ ∗S,ς = 1 and Q∗S,ς =
min{QςΓ , Q¯ς1} to be an optimal solution.
a2) min{Q¯ς2 , QςΓ} < max{q , Qς2}, is a necessary and sufficient condition for τ ∗S,ς = 1 and
Q∗S,ς = min{QςΓ , Q¯ς1} to be the unique optimal solution.
a3) min{Q¯ς2 , QςΓ} ≥ max{q , Qς2} is a necessary condition for τ ∗S,ς = 2 and Q∗S,ς =
min{QςΓ , Q¯ς2} to be an optimal solution.
a4) Jointly satisfying (min{Q¯ς2 , QςΓ} > q) and (min{Q¯ς2 , QςΓ} ≥ Qς2), is a necessary and
sufficient condition for τ ∗S,ς = 2 and Q
∗
S,ς = min{QςΓ , Q¯ς2} to be the unique optimal solution.
a5) min{Q¯ς2 , QςΓ} = q ≥ Qς2 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the decision-
maker to be indifferent between (τ ∗S,ς = 1 and Q
∗
S,ς = min{QςΓ , Q¯ς1}) versus (τ ∗S,ς = 2 and
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Q∗S,ς = min{QςΓ , Q¯ς2}).
b) Suppose q does not exist; then τ ∗S,ς = 1 and Q
∗
S,ς = min{QςΓ , Q¯ς1}.
Theorem 1 shows the conditions under which the optimal access level will be either re-
stricted (τ ∗S,ς = 1), or fully inclusive (τ
∗
S,ς = 2), and the corresponding optimal order quantity
of drugs. Note first that Theorem 1-a1 and -a3 are the result of Theorem1-a2, -a4, and -a5.
It is also easier to see the relevance of the (weak) dominance relationships we discussed after
Lemma 5. Namely, Lemma 5-a1.2, -a3.2, -a3.3 correspond to Theorem 1-a1, and as a result
also correspond to either Theorem 1-a2 or -a5. Similarly, Lemma 5-a2.2 corresponds to The-
orem 1-a3, and as a result to either Theorem 1-a4, or -a5. Finally, Lemma 5-b corresponds
to Theorem 1-b. Since the latter situations are less interesting from a joint decision making
perspective, none of the cases where strong dominance exists is represented in Figures 2.10
and 2.11, but the interested reader can verify in the corresponding graphs shown in Figures
2.8 and 2.9 that regardless of the magnitude of the available budget, the access level will
remain constant. Figures 2.10 and 2.11 is then used to assist the process of understanding
how the solution changes in many of the remaining cases once the budget constraint is in-
cluded.
One of the interesting observations is that when the budget is sufficiently high and the
value of the outside option is lower than the expected health benefits for type 2 patients,
full access level may be optimal for the social welfare maximizer even if the average health
benefit received by patients of type 2 is lower than the cost of the drug, e.g., Figure 2.10,
graph (2); the explanation is that the expected health benefits achieved by patients of type
1 subsidize those belonging to the second type, making aggregate cost-effectiveness possible.
In terms of indifference, graphs (1) and (12) show examples where the decision maker is
indifferent between both choices of access level, but the drivers and implications are very
different. On one hand, in graph (1) the budget constraint is the key driver of the decision
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Figure 2.10: Optimal decision making under expected social welfare maximization (part 1)
l represents QςΓ
(1) λ = 600; θ = 0.4; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.29; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.477; τ
∗
S,ς =1 or 2, and Q
∗
S,ς = Q¯
ς
1 = Q
ς
Γ
(2) λ = 600; θ = 0.4; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.29; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.477; τ
∗
S,ς = 2 and Q
∗
S,ς = Q¯
ς
2
(3) λ = 600; θ = 0.45; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.65; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.3; τ
∗
S,ς = 2 and Q
∗
S,ς = Q
ς
Γ
(4) λ = 600; θ = 0.45; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.65; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.3; τ
∗
S,ς = 2 and Q
∗
S,ς = Q
ς
Γ
(5) λ = 600; θ = 0.7; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.65; g = 0; δ = 0.2; c = 0.85; τ
∗
S,ς = 1 and Q
∗
S,ς = Q
ς
Γ
(6) λ = 600; θ = 0.7; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.65; g = 0; δ = 0.2; c = 0.85; τ
∗
S,ς = 2 and Q
∗
S,ς = Q
ς
Γ
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Figure 2.11: Optimal decision making under expected social welfare maximization (part 2)
l represents QςΓ
(7) λ = 600; θ = 0.3; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.9; g = 1; δ = 0; c = 0.65; τ
∗
S,ς = 1 and Q
∗
S,ς = Q¯
ς
1
(8) λ = 600; θ = 0.3; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.9; g = 1; δ = 0; c = 0.65; τ
∗
S,ς = 2 and Q
∗
S,ς = Q
ς
Γ
(9) λ = 600; θ = 0.3; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.4; g = 1; δ = 0; c = 0.5; τ
∗
S,ς = 2 and Q
∗
S,ς = Q
ς
Γ
(10) λ = 600; θ = 0.3; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.4; g = 1; δ = 0; c = 0.5; τ
∗
S,ς = 2 and Q
∗
S,ς = Q¯
ς
2
(11) λ = 600; θ = 0.95; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.12; g = 1.5; δ = 0; c = 0.9055; τ
∗
S,ς = 1 and Q
∗
S,ς = Q
ς
Γ
(12) λ = 600; θ = 0.95; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.12; g = 1.5; δ = 0; c = 0.9055; τ
∗
S,ς = 1 and Q
∗
S,ς = Q¯
ς
1 = Q¯
ς
2
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maker’s indifference since moving it slightly in any direction would yield a unique solution.
This situation tends to occur when the fraction of type 1 patients is medium to low; in
such cases, the decision maker will need to choose between providing high service level to
a limited fraction of the population, versus providing low service level to the whole patient
population. On the other hand, in graph (12) the key driver of the decision maker’s indif-
ference is the cost-effectiveness constraint. This situation tends to occur when the fraction
of type 1 patients is very high and the transaction cost, c, is also high; in such cases, there
will be no major difference between restricting or not access to type 2 patients. Finally,
note that by moving the budget constraint appropriately in some of the other graphs, such
that Qςγ = q, the indifference issue would also arise; this brings the attention to the fact
that under expected social welfare maximization, the decision maker may only be indifferent
when Z(q, τ) ≥ 0, τ = 1, 2, i.e., for graphs (7)-(10) the optimal solution is unique regardless
of the available budget because the crossing point of the curves occurs at a point which is not
cost-effective. Finally, when only one access level satisfies the cost-effectiveness constraint,
the solution is straightforward and given in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1: When the integrated supply chain maximizes social welfare subject to budget
and cost-effectiveness constraints:
a) Assume Qς
1
≤ QςΓ exists and Qς2 does not exist; then τ ∗S,ς = 1 and Q∗S,ς = min{QςΓ , Q¯ς1}.
b) Assume Qς
2
≤ QςΓ exists and Qς1 does not exist; then τ ∗S,ς = 2 and Q∗S,ς = min{QςΓ , Q¯ς2}.
Case 2ς: Maximizing the system’s expected utility function
In this section we solve the problem of maximizing expected system’s utility function as
might be the case for a private insurance company. The problem faced by the single decision
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maker under this setting is:
max
(Q,τ)
Z(Q, τ) = (B(τ)− δ + g)A(Q, τ)− (c− δ)Q− gλF (τ)
subject to:
cQ ≤ Γ
−cQ+B(τ)A(Q, τ) + δ (Q− A(Q, τ))− g (λF (τ)− A(Q, τ)) ≥ 0(2.3.8)
Define Q∗H,ς and τ
∗
H,ς to be the optimal order quantity and prescription policy threshold,
respectively, when maximizing the system’s expected utility function. Let
QςH = {QςΓ, Qς1, Qς2},
denote the set of possible optimal order quantities under this setting, recalling that QςΓ =⌊
Γ
c
⌋
, stands for the order quantity when the budget constraint is binding, while
Qςτ ∈ arg max
Q
{Z(Q, τ)}, τ = 1, 2,
is the order quantity that maximizes the system’s utility function contingent on τ . From
Lemma 2, the system’s expected utility function is concave for a given τ , and we can use the
method of finite differences to obtain:
Qςτ = max
{
Q
∣∣∣∣P (Q;λF (τ)) ≥ c− δB(τ)− δ + g
}
, τ = 1, 2. (2.3.9)
Before deriving the optimal access and service levels for this case, some intermediate
results are needed.
Proposition 2: Define c˜ = {c |Z(Qς1, 1) = Z(Qς2, 2)} .
a) c˜ exists ⇐⇒ q exists.
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b) Z(Qς1, 1) > Z(Q
ς
2, 2) for c > c˜, and Z(Q
ς
1, 1) < Z(Q
ς
2, 2) for c < c˜.
c) δ < c˜ < B(2).
The results from Proposition 2 allow us to set a threshold for our comparisons of the
efficient decisions under the system’s expected utility maximization. It is very interesting to
note the connection between the existence of q and c˜, even though the value of q is indepen-
dent of the drug’s transfer price. The reason is that the existence of both q and c˜ depends
on the same condition: δ < b2. While it has already been discussed why this is so for q,
in terms of c˜ the intuition is that when b2 ≤ δ, the utility under restricted access for any
order quantity can be increased at least at the same rate (δ) as the utility under full access.
When the latter is not the case, i.e., when δ < b2, as the order quantity is increased and the
probability of administering an additional unit of the drug decreases more rapidly for the
restricted than for the full access policy then the value of c > δ can be reduced enough to
achieve Z(Qς1, 1) < Z(Q
ς
2, 2).
Figure 2.12: Finding c˜ in relation to the health benefit
λ = 600; θ = 0.1; b1 = 1; g = 0.5; δ = 0.1
Additionally, from numerical experiments we have observed that the value of c˜ is always
in the neighborhood of b2, as shown in Figure 2.12, typically approaching b2 from below -
even though Figure 2.13 shows the latter is not always true. It has also been observed that
the change of c˜ with respect to the rest of the parameters is almost flat as shown in Figure
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Figure 2.13: Changes in c˜ in relation to goodwill costs and salvage value
λ = 600; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.75; (a)θ = 0.8; (b)θ = 0.5; (c)θ = 0.2
2.13. While initially surprising, the intuition is that when c ' b2, then at order quantity Qς2,
a proportional inventory allocation would imply that the expected amount of drugs destined
to type 1 patients is θQς2, which approaches Q
ς
1; notice that the (1 − θ)Qς2 remaining drugs
which are expected to be destined to type 2 patients generate a utility of (b2 − c) ' 0 if
administered, and a cost of (g + c − δ) > 0 when not administered. Therefore, having a
stock of Qς1 drugs in a restricted access level policy, and having a stock of Q
ς
2 drugs in a full
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access level policy, when c ' b2, yield very similar expected system’s utilities because the
type 2 patients barely affect the expected utility function at the optimal order quantity; in
fact if demand were deterministic, then when b2 = c, the effect of including the lower patient
category would be null.
Figure 2.13 shows the changes in c˜ for a fixed b2 with respect to the other parameters.
It is observed from the graphs that c˜ is slightly decreasing in g, that the effect created by
δ is ambiguous and depends on the value of g, and that for any given combination of g
and δ, the range of values that c˜ can take increases as θ decreases. Our intuition is that
the goodwill cost always affects the full access level policy more, and therefore the range
of values of c for which restricted access is preferred increases as g increases. The effect of
δ is ambiguous because when g is relatively small, then an increase in δ mainly favors the
restricted access policy, and so the threshold decreases; but as g grows, then an increase in
δ allows the full access level policy to compensate its increasing understocking cost with a
decreasing overstocking cost, and therefore result in a larger value of c˜. Finally, regarding
θ, as the proportion of patient population of type 1 increases, then the cost effect of under-
stocking and overstocking under a full access level policy becomes smaller, and so c˜ becomes
less responsive to changes in g and δ. To complement our intuition, Figures 2.14 and 2.15
show the change in the system’s expected utility function as c grows. Also, they provides
the value of c˜, if it exists, under different parameter combinations. As a consequence of the
finding from Proposition 2, the remaining analysis is now greatly simplified.
Proposition 3: Assume Q¯ςτ , τ = 1, 2, exist, and letQ
ς
Γ ≥ Qς . WhenQςΓ ≥ max{q , Qς2}, c > c˜,
a) is a sufficient condition for the optimal solution to be τ ∗H,ς = 1, and Q
∗
H,ς = Q
ς
1, when
QςΓ < bQς2c;
b) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal solution to be τ ∗H,ς = 1, and
Q∗H,ς = Q
ς
1, when Q
ς
Γ ≥ bQς2c.
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Figure 2.14: Changing c (part 1)
λ = 600; θ = 0.8; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.85; g = 0.5; δ = 0.2
(a-1)c = 0.15; (a-2)c = 0.35; (a-3)c = 0.55; (a-4)c = 0.75; (a-5)c˜ = 0.841265; (a-6)c = 0.95.
λ = 600; θ = 0.8; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.3; g = 0.5; δ = 0
(b-1)c = 0.15; (b-2)c˜ = 0.29443; (b-3)c = 0.35; (b-4)c = 0.55; (b-5)c˜ = 0.75; (b-6)c = 0.95.
70
Figure 2.15: Changing c (part 2)
λ = 600; θ = 0.2; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.8; g = 0.05; δ = 0.2
(c-1)c = 0.15; (c-2)c = 0.35; (c-3)c = 0.55; (c-4)c = 0.75; (c-5)c˜ = 0.797108; (c-6)c = 0.95.
λ = 600; θ = 0.7; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.1; g = 0.5; δ = 0.2
(d-1)c = 0.15; (d-2)c = 0.35; (d-3)c = 0.55; (d-4)c = 0.75; (d-5)c = 0.95; @c˜
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Proposition 3 incorporates the budget and the cost-effectiveness constraints to the results
from Proposition 2. Note that the assumptions: Q¯ςτ , τ = 1, 2, exist, and Q
ς
Γ ≥ Qς are only
there to restrict the attention to the (non-obvious) situations where there is in fact a trade-
off because both access levels have at least one feasible solution. One major implication is
that since it has been numerically observed that c˜ approaches b2 from below, then c > b2
will typically result in a restricted access policy. This contrasts with the result presented in
Theorem 1 where patients whose health benefits were lower than the drug’s cost could be
subsidized; system’s expected utility maximization is therefore more consistent with strati-
fied cost-effectiveness policies.
Additionally, it is instructive to point out that the reason for which c > c˜ is not a nec-
essary condition for restricted access to be the preferred policy is that the allowable budget
may be sufficiently low to limit the implementation of the order quantity that maximizes
the system’s expected utility under full access. In other words, when QςΓ < Q¯
ς
2, then the
range of values for the cost c under which restricted access is preferred, (weakly) increases.
Theorem 2 summarizes the conclusions from this section’s analysis, and Corollary 2 points
out the main consequences of maximizing the system’s expected utility versus maximizing
expected social welfare. A discussion of the results is provided below, along with a graphical
representation (Figures 2.16 and 2.17) of the key findings.
Theorem 2: Let QςΓ ≥ Qς . When the integrated supply chain maximizes the system’s
expected utility subject to budget and cost-effectiveness constraints, the optimal solution is
as follows.
a) Suppose q exists.
a1) QςΓ < max{q , Qς2}, or c > c˜, are both sufficient conditions for τ ∗H,ς = 1 and Q∗H,ς =
min{QςΓ , bQς1c} to be the unique optimal solution.
a2) c < c˜ is a necessary condition for τ ∗H,ς = 2 and Q
∗
H,ς = bQς2c to be the unique optimal
72
solution.
a3) Jointly satisfyingQςΓ ≥ bQς2c and c < c˜ is a sufficient condition for τ ∗H,ς = 2 and Q∗H,ς =
bQς2c to be the unique optimal solution.
a4) Jointly satisfying (QςΓ ≥ bQς2c) and (c = c˜), is a necessary and sufficient condition
for the decision-maker to be indifferent between: [τ ∗H,ς = 1 and Q
∗
H,ς = bQς1c] and [τ ∗H,ς =
2 and Q∗H,ς = bQς2c].
a5) If bQς2c > QςΓ ≥ max{q , Qς2} and c < c˜, then the result is ambiguous.
b) Suppose q does not exist; then τ ∗H,ς = 1, and Q
∗
H,ς = min{QςΓ , bQς1c}.
Corollary 2: When the integrated supply chain maximizes the system’s expected utility
subject to budget and cost-effectiveness constraints:
a) τ ∗S,ς = 1 is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for τ
∗
H,ς = 1.
b) τ ∗S,ς = 2 is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for τ
∗
H,ς = 2.
c) Q∗H,ς ≤ Q∗S,ς .
One of the key implications from the above results is that the combination of param-
eters for which the full access policy is chosen decreases with respect to the social welfare
maximization case. The result is obtained by comparing Theorem 2a2 versus Theorem 1a3.
For example, under social welfare maximization, as the budget increased, the probability of
choosing the full access policy was only limited by cost-effectiveness; however, under system’s
expected utility maximization, even as Γ→∞, full access policy necessarily requires c ≤ c˜,
including the indifference case. Figures 2.16 and 2.17 can facilitate the processing of the
analytical results by observing how and when did the optimal decision change in relation to
Figures 2.10 and 2.11. Graphs (2), (3), (6), (9), (10), and (12) all show strict decreases in
the access level policy, while for graph (1), choosing restricted access has become the unique
optimal solution; it’s worth mentioning that from all the latter, only in graph (3) the bud-
get acts as a limiting constraint. Going deeper, graphs (3) and (8) represent the situations
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Figure 2.16: Optimal decision making under system’s expected utility maximization (part
1)
l represents QςΓ
(1) λ = 600; θ = 0.4; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.29; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.477; τ
∗
H,ς =1 and Q
∗
H,ς = Q
ς
1
(2) λ = 600; θ = 0.4; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.29; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.477; τ
∗
H,ς = 1 and Q
∗
H,ς = Q
ς
1
(3) λ = 600; θ = 0.45; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.65; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.3; τ
∗
H,ς = 1 and Q
∗
H,ς = Q
ς
Γ
(4) λ = 600; θ = 0.45; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.65; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.3; τ
∗
H,ς = 2 and Q
∗
H,ς = Q
ς
2
(5) λ = 600; θ = 0.7; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.65; g = 0; δ = 0.2; c = 0.85; τ
∗
H,ς = 1 and Q
∗
H,ς = Q
ς
1
(6) λ = 600; θ = 0.7; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.65; g = 0; δ = 0.2; c = 0.85; τ
∗
H,ς = 1 and Q
∗
H,ς = Q
ς
1
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Figure 2.17: Optimal decision making under system’s expected utility maximization (part
2)
l represents QςΓ
(7) λ = 600; θ = 0.3; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.9; g = 1; δ = 0; c = 0.65; τ
∗
H,ς = 1 and Q
∗
H,ς = Q
ς
1
(8) λ = 600; θ = 0.3; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.9; g = 1; δ = 0; c = 0.65; τ
∗
H,ς = 1 and Q
∗
H,ς = Q
ς
Γ
(9) λ = 600; θ = 0.3; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.4; g = 1; δ = 0; c = 0.5; τ
∗
H,ς = 1 and Q
∗
H,ς = Q
ς
1
(10) λ = 600; θ = 0.3; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.4; g = 1; δ = 0; c = 0.5; τ
∗
H,ς = 1 and Q
∗
H,ς = Q
ς
1
(11) λ = 600; θ = 0.95; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.12; g = 1.5; δ = 0; c = 0.9055; τ
∗
H,ς = 1 and Q
∗
H,ς = Q
ς
1
(12) λ = 600; θ = 0.95; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.12; g = 1.5; δ = 0; c = 0.9055; τ
∗
H,ς = 1 and Q
∗
H,ς = Q
ς
1
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defined by Theorem 2a5. Intuitively, for Theorem 2a5 as c increases, QςΓ decreases, and c
approaches c˜, increasing the the likelihood that access will be restricted; having a large gap
between b2 and c has higher likelihood of inducing full access. Taking a graphical approach
based on Figures 2.16 and 2.17, it can be observed that while in (3) the budget is not large
enough to justify full access, it is indeed so for graph (8) despite being forced to order less
than the quantity that maximizes the unconstrained problem; the latter graph is also an
appropriate example for why Theorem 2a3 does not provide a necessary condition.
The other change of interest is that of the order quantity. It is easy to see from Figures
2.16 and 2.17 how the optimal order quantity is (weakly) reduced in relation to the social
welfare maximization case. The most frequent situation when Q∗H,ς = Q
∗
S,ς given τ
∗
H,ς = 2,
is while being in the region defined by Theorem 2a5 such that 0 ≤ Z(Qς1, 1) ≤ Z(QςΓ, 2) ≤
Z(Qς2, 2); similarly, the most frequent situation when Q
∗
H,ς = Q
∗
S,ς given τ
∗
H,ς = 1, is when
0 ≤ Z(QςΓ, 2) ≤ Z(Qς1, 1).
2.4 Extension for more than two types of patients
In this section, we describe a basic heuristic for solving the problem when there are I > 2
types of patients. The previous definitions are directly extended to this situation, i.e., let
bi represent the health benefits for type i patients, and assume b1 < b2 < . . . bI . It is true
that for most situations within the context described, the number of patient categories for
which a drug can provide relevant health benefits is not expected to be very large. As a
result, doing a sequential pairwise comparison wouldn’t be a time consuming task. This
would imply comparing types 1 and 2 and finding an optimal solution; then comparing the
optimal access level between them against including type 3 patients, and so on. However,
for the case when c is fixed, we are able to define more efficient algorithms contingent on the
problem’s structure. We will do so first for the social welfare maximizer, and then for the
total utility maximizer.
76
2.4.1 Maximizing the expected social welfare given I > 2 types of
patients
Based on the analysis from §2.3, we will use the additional definition for the crossing point
between the expected social welfare curves of two access level policies.
Definition 1: Let qi,j, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ I, be a positive order quantity such that S(qi,j, i) ≥
S(qi,j, j); and S(qi,j + 1, j) > S(qi,j + 1, i).
When the decision maker is trying to maximize the expected social welfare, Lemma 6
provides a key result which simplifies the calculations.
Lemma 6: For 1 ≤ i ≤ (I − 2), min{qi,i+1, qi+1,i+2} ≤ qi,i+2 ≤ max{qi,i+1, qi+1,i+2}.
The usefulness of Lemma 6 is that not all the crossing points need to be calculated in or-
der to determine the access level with the highest social welfare for any given order quantity.
To be more specific, only the crossing points between consecutive access levels are necessary.
Also, recall from Proposition 1 and Theorem 1, that when there is no crossing point between
the curves of two policies, then the policy with greater access is dominated by the one with
more restricted access. Since such result is now trivial, this section is only concerned with
the situations where further analysis is necessary to determine the optimal solution. Next,
Lemma 7 gives a condition which may further reduce the set of potential optimal solutions
for the access level.
Lemma 7: Let 1 < i < I.
a) if qi,i+1 < qi−1,i+1 < qi−1,i, then the expected social welfare under access level i is
dominated by either access levels (i− 1) or access level (i+ 1), for any Q.
b) otherwise, if qi−1,i ≤ qi−1,i+1 ≤ qi,i+1, then no access level (i − 1), i, and (i + 1), is
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Figure 2.18: Three Types of patients
(1) and (2) λ = 600; f(1) = f(2) = f(3) = 1/3; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.4; b3 = 0.3; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.3
(3) and (4) λ = 600; f(1) = f(2) = f(3) = 1/3; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.4; b3 = 0.3; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.6
dominated by the other two.
When Lemma 7a is satisfied for any i between 1 and I, then access level i can be discarded
from the calculations. However, it must be noted that we were neither able to generate a
combination of parameters that corresponds with this case, nor prove that this case can’t
occur; for this reason, it is included in the results, but will not be the focus of the analysis
henceforth. In contrast, Lemma 7b represents the typical behavior of the expected social
welfare and system’s utility curves under different access level policies. Figure 2.18 provides
a graphical representation for two different costs, c. Under this situation, before considering
the cost-effectiveness and budget constraints, every access level policy remains a feasible
candidate for optimality under expected social welfare maximization. As a result, we pro-
pose an algorithm to reach the optimal solution without having to solve completely for every
access level policy. The main value of the algorithm is that it allows the results of §2.3 to
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be extended to multiple types. While a trial and error approach would also be feasible, at
this point it should be clear that the different ways in which the social welfare and total
expected utility curves shift relative to changes in the parameters and decision variables
makes it highly complicated to correctly anticipate the system’s dynamics, and therefore its
optimal solution, without full enumeration.
Proposition 4: Suppose qi−1,i ≤ qi,i+1, for 1 < i < I. The solution algorithm for maximizing
expected social welfare is as follows.
1) Set qk−1,k = qˆ, where qˆ is given by equation (2.4.1).
2.1) If qk−1,k = qˆ, calculate Qςk, and Q¯
ς
k, and go to step 3.1.
2.2) Otherwise, calculate qk−1,k, Qςk, and Q¯
ς
k, and go to step 3.1.
3.1) If min{Q¯ςk , QςΓ} ≥ max{qk−1,k , Qςk}, then τ ∗S,ς = k and Q∗S,ς = min{QςΓ , Q¯ςk} is an
optimal solution. Go to step 4.1.
3.2) Otherwise, set k = (k − 1), and go back to step 2.
4.1) If (min{Q¯ςk , QςΓ} > qk−1,k) and (min{Q¯ςk , QςΓ} ≥ Qςk), then τ ∗S,ς = k and Q∗S,ς =
min{QςΓ , Q¯ςk} is the unique optimal solution. END.
4.2) Otherwise, the decision maker is indifferent between (τ ∗S,ς = (k − 1) and Q∗S,ς =
min{QςΓ , Q¯ςk−1}) versus (τ ∗S,ς = k and Q∗S,ς = min{QςΓ , Q¯ςk}). END.
qˆ ,

max{ q ∈ {q1,2, . . . , qI−1,I} | q ≤ QςΓ }, if q1,2 ≤ QςΓ
q1,2 otherwise
(2.4.1)
Proposition 4 integrates the results from Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 with the constraints
faced by the single decision maker. Figure 2.19, is useful in observing how the algorithm
works. Note that graphs (1), (3) and (5) only vary in the (decreasing) value of the budget
constraint; the same applies to graphs (2), (4), and (6). For example, the algorithm path
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Figure 2.19: Optimal decision making under expected social welfare maximization for I = 3
l represents QςΓ
(1), (3), and (5): λ = 600; f(1) = f(2) = f(3) = 1/3; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.4; b3 = 0.3; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.3
(2), (4), and (6): λ = 600; f(1) = f(2) = f(3) = 1/3; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.4; b3 = 0.3; g = 0.5; δ = 0; c = 0.6
(1) qˆ = q2,3; τ
∗
S,ς = 3 and Q
∗
S,ς = Q
ς
Γ
(2) qˆ = q2,3; τ
∗
S,ς = 2 and Q
∗
S,ς = Q¯
ς
2
(3) qˆ = q2,3; τ
∗
S,ς = 2 or 3, and Q
∗
S,ς = Q
ς
Γ
(4) qˆ = q2,3; τ
∗
S,ς = 2 and Q
∗
S,ς = Q
ς
Γ
(5) qˆ = q1,2; τ
∗
S,ς = 1 or 2, and Q
∗
S,ς = Q
ς
Γ
(6) qˆ = q1,2; τ
∗
S,ς = 1 or 2, and Q
∗
S,ς = Q
ς
Γ
followed in graph (1) is steps: 1 → 2 → 3.1 → 4.1, which results in a unique solution. In-
stead, graph (2) follows the path: 1→ 2.1→ 3.2→ 2.2→ 3.1→ 4.1, which also results in a
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unique solution; the difference is that the algorithm had to loop because the cost-effectiveness
constraint was not satisfied for the feasible range of order quantities. The path followed in
graph (4) is the same. Graph (3) shows the situation where the decision maker is indifferent
between two access levels, following the path: 1→ 2.1→ 3.1→ 4.2. Finally, graphs (5) and
(6) show the case where q1,2 > Q
ς
Γ, and therefore qˆ = q1,2; the algorithm then follows the
path 1→ 2.1→ 3.1→ 4.1 which results in a unique solution.
2.4.2 Maximizing the system’s expected utility function given I >
2 types of patients
Now we look at the problem when the decision maker is concerned with maximizing the
system’s expected utility. Just like in §2.4.1 we had used the crossing point between the
utility curves to simplify the analysis, in this part we use the key threshold that had been
derived earlier in §2.3.3 to determine which access level policy would achieve a higher ex-
pected utility for the system.
Definition 2: Let c˜i,j =
{
c
∣∣Z(Qςi , i) = Z(Qςj, j); 1 ≤ i < j ≤ I }.
Lemma 8: For 1 < i < I, c˜i−1,i > c˜i,i+1.
Lemma 8 can be inferred from the previously stated observation that c˜i−1,i → bi for most
parameter combinations; since bi is decreasing in i, then the required selling price for equat-
ing the expected utility under two consecutive access level policies is also decreasing in i.
The main implication is that if c > c˜i,i+1, then c > c˜j,j+1, 1 ≤ i < j < I, i.e., when the selling
price is sufficiently high for the more restricted policy to dominate in a consecutive pairwise
combination, then that restricted policy also dominates the rest of the more inclusive access
level policies. The result can be observed graphically in Figures 2.20 and 2.21, and is further
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Figure 2.20: Changes in c for I = 3 (part 1)
λ = 600; f(1) = 0.25; f(2) = 0.25; f(3) = 0.5; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.6; b3 = 0.2; g = 0; δ = 0
(1)c = 0.8; (2)c˜1,2 = 0.60241; (3)c = 0.4; (4)c˜1,3 = 0.33342; (5)c˜2,3 = 0.19895; (6)c = 0.05.
expanded in Lemma 9.
Figure 2.21: Changes in c for I = 3 (part 2)
λ = 600; f(1) = 1/9; f(2) = 2/9; f(3) = 2/3; b1 = 1; b2 = 0.4; b3 = 0.15; g = 1; δ = 0
(1)c = 0.45; (2)c˜1,2 = 0.38090; (3)c = 0.25; (4)c˜1,3 = 0.20365; (5)c˜2,3 = 0.14416; (6)c = 0.1.
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Lemma 9: For 1 < i < I, suppose c˜i−1,i > c > c˜i,i+1. Then Z(Qςi , i) > Z(Q
ς
j, j),
1 < j < I, j 6= i.
In addition to verifying the dominance towards more inclusive access levels, Lemma 9
states the dominance over more restricted access level policies. To understand the relevance
of the result, it is useful to note that in the unconstrained problem, c˜i−1,i > c > c˜i,i+1 im-
plies that the system’s expected policy is maximized at access level i and order quantity Qςi .
Furthermore, it is implied that when trade occurs, if the latter values for the access level
and order quantity are not the solution to the constrained problem, then the limiting con-
straint must be the available budget. Clearly, if the unconstrained solution didn’t satisfy the
cost-effectiveness budget, then no solution would satisfy it. Leveraging on this intuition and
previously derived results, Proposition 5 provides an algorithm to find the optimal solution
under expected system’s utility maximization.
Proposition 5: The solution algorithm for maximizing system’s expected utility is as follows.
1) Set k = τˆ , where τˆ is given by equation (2.4.2).
2) If k = 1, then go to step 3.1. Otherwise, go to step 3.2.
3.1) τ ∗H,ς = 1 and Q
∗
H,ς = min{QςΓ, bQς1c} is the unique optimal solution. END.
3.2) Calculate Qς
k
and qk−1,k. Go to step 4.
4) If QςΓ < max{qk−1,k , Qςk}, then set k = k − 1, and go back to step 2; otherwise go to
step 5.
5) Calculate Qςk. If Q
ς
Γ ≥ Qςk, go to step 6.1; otherwise go to step 6.2.
6.1) The result is ambiguous between (τ ∗H,ς = k and Q
∗
H,ς = Q
ς
Γ) and (τ
∗
H,ς = k − 1 and
Q∗H,ς =
⌊
Qςk−1
⌋
). END.
6.2) If c < c˜k−1,k, τ ∗H,ς = k and Q
∗
H,ς = bQςkc is the unique optimal solution; and if
c = c˜k−1,k, then the decision maker is indifferent between (τ ∗H,ς = k and Q
∗
H,ς = bQςkc) versus
(τ ∗H,ς = k − 1 and Q∗H,ς =
⌊
Qςk−1
⌋
). END.
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τˆ ,

max{ τ ∈ {2, . . . I} | c ≤ c˜τ−1,τ} if c˜I−1,I < c
I otherwise
(2.4.2)
Proposition 5 incorporates the constraints to the result from Lemma 9. The main ad-
vantage of the algorithm is that pairwise comparison will occur at most once.
2.5 Exogenous Price-only contracts
Finally, in this section we briefly show the relationship between the first-best solution and
the case where the pharmaceutical manufacturer sells to a health-payer through an exoge-
nous price-only contract. This situation is fairly common, and is a consequence of reference
pricing. Essentially, reference pricing may work in two ways. On one hand, internal reference
pricing sets the transfer price of the drug from Pharma to Health at a price that is compa-
rable to an existing treatment that is considered equivalent in terms of the health benefits
provided. On the other hand, external reference pricing implies that the transfer price will
be set using the mean or median of the existing transfer price for the same drug between
Pharma and other health-payers. To illustrate the existence of this method in practice,
we may consider the related case of the United Kingdom, where a transfer price is negoti-
ated between the pharmaceutical manufacturer and the NHS. Interestingly, even though the
United Kingdom represents only about 3% of the global pharmaceutical market, the transfer
price that is negotiated is used by many countries in their reference pricing calculations; as
a result, such price directly affects more than a quarter of the global pharmaceutical market
(OFT, 2007). The latter market is therefore the one being modeled in this section. Endoge-
nous price agreements will be the focus of the next Chapter.
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We next introduce the problem when Pharma and Health act as separate decision-makers
and Health makes a transfer, T (w,Q) = wQ, to Pharma in exchange for a delivery of Q units
of the drug. We denote this contract setting with the symbol χ for exogenous. Pharma’s
profit function is given by:
Mχ(w;Q∗j,χ, τ
∗
j,χ) = T (w,Q
∗
j,χ)− cQ∗j,χ,
= (w − c)Q∗j,χ. (2.5.1)
Health’s expected utility function is defined as:
H(Q, τ ; w ) = −T (w,Q) +Bh(τ)A(Q, τ) + δ(Q− A(Q, τ))− g (λF (τ)− A(Q, τ)) ,
= −wQ+ (Bh(τ)− δ + g)A(Q, τ) + δQ− gλF (τ). (2.5.2)
The social welfare’s expected utility function from Health’s perspective is:
Sh(Q, τ) = Bh(τ)A(Q, τ) + δ(Q− A(Q, τ))− g (λF (τ)− A(Q, τ))
= (Bh(τ)− δ + g)A(Q, τ) + δQ− gλF (τ), (2.5.3)
And the cost-effectiveness constraint also needs to be appropriately modified such that
H(Q, τ ; w ) ≥ 0. (2.5.4)
In the above formulations, we define Q∗j,χ, and τ
∗
j,χ as the optimal order quantity and
access level policy, respectively, under exogenous price-only contracts, given the maximiza-
tion of objective j = (S)ocial welfare, or (H)ealth’s expected utility function. By comparing
equations 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 to equations 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, we observe that there are two modi-
fications. First, the production and delivery cost c has been replaced by the transfer price
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w. By increasing the transfer price in this way, the well-known double marginalization effect
creates a decrease in the optimal service level for a utility maximizing health-payer, leading
to a decrease in the order quantity. An additional effect due to the price mark-up is that the
range of order quantities for which full access is feasible decreases in the selling price, which
not only decreases the order quantity under full access, but makes it more likely that Health
chooses to restrict access, either due to the budget constraint being active and not allowing
for a feasible solution under full access, or in the case of maximizing Health’s utility, because
the selling price is higher than the threshold
w˜ = {w |H(Qχ1 , 1; w) = H(Qχ2 , 2; w)} , (2.5.5)
where the latter is directly adapted from Proposition 2.
The second modification is the replacement of the average expected health benefits B(τ)
with the value Bh(τ). As it was noted in the introduction, a drug’s health benefits are often
uncertain. Pharmaceutical manufacturers are already investing in targeted therapies such
that patients with the same symptoms receive different treatments that are a function of
their genetic characteristics (Roche, 2011). However, the current state of the art for most
medical conditions is to provide a treatment based on the patients’ symptoms, which may
result in high degrees of uncertainty in the expected health benefits achieved by the drug.
Additionally, even after a drug is approved by a health-payer to be included under its re-
imbursement scheme, the manufacturer may expand its clinical trials, or collect additional
information from the drug’s initial introduction, in order to increase the drug’s expected
health benefits or to reduce the uncertainty around them. These factors combined can be
interpreted as a potential informational advantage by Pharma because Health may not fully
observe Pharma’s ongoing R&D efforts. In response to the latter, and the added increasing
pressure to control spending, Health’s risk aversion may come into play such that his cer-
tainty equivalent about the drug’s expected health benefits may be lower than that claimed
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by Pharma. As a result, we assume B(τ) ≥ Bh(τ) ,
∑τ
i=1
βif(i)
F (τ)
, where βi is Health’s belief
on the expected health benefits for patient type i; it is assumed b1 ≥ β1 > b2 ≥ β2. This
asymmetry of beliefs implies that the slope of the expected utility functions under any ac-
cess level will grow at a lower rate compared to the case where both players hold the same
information and beliefs about the expected health benefits. Therefore, the range of order
quantities that provide a feasible solution for any access level is reduced, plus there is a
(weak) decrease in the order quantity that maximizes Health’s utility function for any access
level - the decrease is strong if the absolute budget constraint was not originally binding. The
latter effects result not only in lower levels of social welfare - because the quantity ordered
is weakly smaller -, but if Health’s belief asymmetry is only with respect to the lower type
patients, or even with respect to both patient categories but decreasing at least as much
for the lower as for the higher type patients, then the probability of access being restricted
increases, as mentioned in Proposition 6g. On the other hand, when Health’s belief asym-
metry is only with respect to the higher type of patients, it will actually result in a higher
likelihood that full access will be preferred, as explained from Proposition 6f.
Proposition 6: When I = 2, let qh be a positive order quantity such that Sχh (q
h, 1) ≥
Sχh (q
h, 2); and Sχh (q + 1, 2) > S
χ
h (q + 1, 1).
a) If inequality (2.3.3) is satisfied, then qh is unique and given by equation (2.5.6).
qh = max
{
Q
∣∣∣∣( gβ1 − δ + g
)(
λ
A(Q, 2)
)
+
(
β1 − β2
β1 − δ + g
)
≥
(
A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)
A(Q, 2)
)(
1
1− θ
)}
(2.5.6)
b) β2 > δ is a necessary and sufficient condition for q
h to exist.
c) If β2 < δ, then Sh(Q, 1) > Sh(Q, 2), ∀ Q > 0.
d) If β2 = δ, then Sh(Q, 1) > Sh(Q, 2), for some finite Q > 0, and limP (Q,λ)→0 Sh(Q, 1) −
Sh(Q, 2) = 0.
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e) The value of qh is increasing in β1, g, δ, and decreasing in β2. The change in q
h with
respect to θ is ambiguous.
f) If b1 > β1 and b2 = β2, then q
h < q.
g) If (b1 − β1) ≤ (b2 − β2), then qh > q.
h) If (b1 − β1) > (b2 − β2) > 0, then the relationship between qh and q is ambiguous.
Despite these two modifications, it is important to stress that all previous results continue
to hold for the exogenous price-only case, with the aforementioned adjustments in notation.
In other words, here we have shown how the analyses presented in §2.3.3 and §2.4 collapse
into the exogenous price-only contract by simply modifying the transfer price and expected
health benefits parameters. Additionally, we have set the base model for the analysis of
endogenously defined contracting mechanisms designed by Pharma, which is the focus of
Chapter 3.
2.6 Conclusions
Chapter 2 has analyzed the joint access and coverage problem in the introduction process of
a new drug with multiple indications, where access level is defined as the subset of patient
categories that are eligible to receive the treatment under the health-payer’s reimbursement
scheme, and service level is defined as the probability that the order quantity purchased by
the health-payer is enough to meet patient demand during a sales period. We formulated a
model using the price and quantity newsvendor framework to understand how a health-payer
defines his optimal policy as a function of his decision making priority and the existing abso-
lute and relative cost constraints. The discussion has focused on the special situation when
the supply chain is vertically integrated, or equivalently from an analytical standpoint, where
the transaction price between the manufacturer and the health payer is exogenously deter-
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mined; such assumption best reflects those situations where external reference pricing is used.
From a methodological perspective, the first contribution is the finding of a unique cross-
ing point between the expected social welfare for the different levels of access that allows
us to quickly determine the optimal order quantity and access level under expected social
welfare maximization. Comparative statics and an extensive discussion has been included
to explain the direction of such threshold as a function of the cost and benefit parameters.
Second, for the case when the decision maker maximizes his expected net utility we achieve
a similar result by finding a threshold transfer price such that any transaction price higher
than the threshold will result in restricted access; through numerical experiments, we have
observed this value to be very close to the marginal health benefit of the type of patients with
lower health benefits. An additional, interesting property is that each of these thresholds
exists if and only if the other threshold exists as well, despite the fact that social welfare
does not depend on cost. Third, based on these two thresholds, we provide an efficient solu-
tion process which relates to the price and quantity newsvendor model studied in operations
management; our contribution to earlier analyses is the determination of the optimal solu-
tion when the choice of the optimal access level (which serves the same purpose as the retail
price in the operations literature) is discrete, the decision space is constrained by absolute
and relative cost constraints, and when the objective function can be to either maximize the
expected net utility (as traditional models in operations management do) or maximize social
welfare (which is the mandate for many of the relevant players in our context). Finally, we
have provided a heuristic for finding the optimal solution when there are more than two
patient types under minor assumptions which represent most of the feasible space.
From a policy-making perspective, we first identify situations of strong dominance of a
given access level policy, independent of the available budget. An important observation
is that a social welfare maximizer is prone to subsidizing patients whose expected benefits
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are lower than the transfer price as long as the available budget is sufficiently high, while
maximizing the health payer’s expected utility will not do so. This implies that markets
where external reference pricing is used to determine prices will be highly dependent on
their available budget (under social welfare maximization) and on relative health benefits,
demand size, and demand uncertainty (under Health’s utility maximization) to determine
the optimal policy, since these were the main drivers of the results of the two cases, corre-
spondingly, in §2.3.3. Also, we find that when access level is restricted under social welfare
maximization, then it will be restricted as well under net utility maximization; however,
the opposite is not necessarily true. Such situations occur due to either high transfer costs
(higher than the threshold value) relative to the benefit of the lower type patients, or to rel-
atively low budget constraints. Moreover, we find that the optimal order quantity is weakly
reduced under expected net utility maximization, even in the situations when the budget
is infinitely high or when the access decision remains unchanged relative to social welfare
maximization.
An interesting and necessary extension relates to the response function from the man-
ufacturer’s perspective. Endogenously setting the price, or entering into some risk sharing
agreement are the focus of Chapter 3. Additionally, the extension of our results to more
general demand distributions would be a useful validation of the intuition here provided;
however, we do expect the results to be qualitatively consistent for IGFR distributions.
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Chapter 3
Analyzing the value of three
endogenous contracting mechanisms
in the joint access and coverage
problem in health care
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 we have analyzed the decision-making process of a health-payer under a fixed
transfer price. However, pharmaceutical manufacturers also play an important role is set-
ting the conditions under which transactions will occur between themselves and the health-
payers. Motivated either by the increasing pressures held by the payers, or by selfish profit
maximization, a variety of mechanisms have been attempted in order to modify the status
quo. The financial risks associated to demand uncertainty and the asymmetry between the
health benefits claimed by the pharmaceutical manufacturers and those acknowledged by
the health-payers are two key reasons for the introduction of new drugs aimed at treating
chronic conditions to be rejected, delayed, or accepted under terms that negatively impact
the player with the lowest bargaining power. On top of the budget constraints that health-
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payers may have, the health benefit value they use in their calculations of cost-effectiveness,
expected social welfare, and expected total utility, has a high relevance on both the access
and service levels under which the drug is commercialized (if at all). By delaying introduc-
tion, health-payers wish to either reduce their uncertainty about the drug’s performance in
clinical practice, or negotiate a lower selling price with the manufacturer. Said manufacturer,
at the initial stage of negotiation has the option of either decreasing the selling price or ac-
cepting to commercialize a lower sales volume of the drug. If neither alternative is accepted
by the manufacturer, then she will collect more evidence hoping to increase her bargaining
power against health-payers in the future. Some of the main problems, however, are that
until the drug is accepted for introduction, the manufacturer is losing revenues, the patent
clock is ticking, and the patients are not able to receive what is supposed to be the most
appropriate treatment.
As a result risk sharing contracts have received increasing attention. Particularly in the
United Kingdom, the discussion in academic and political environments has been very ac-
tive. Pouvourville (2006) discussed the attractiveness of risk sharing contracts in managing
the uncertainty surrounding a product’s performance in real life and the credibility of the
claims by the manufacturers, while also providing some predictability for such manufactur-
ers. Carapinha (2008) highlighted the importance of integrating clinical, quality of life, and
financial outcome measures into a risk-sharing agreement as well as the challenges of pa-
tient compliance and inefficient delivery of health care services. He also comments on the
inconclusive evidence on the impact of risk sharing agreements on an individual patient’s
clinical and quality of life outcomes, and on their effectiveness in containing pharmaceutical
expenditure. This chapter attempts to add additional insight into the value and limitations
of three contracting mechanisms proposed by the manufacturer.
First we analyze the impact of endogenizing the transaction cost of the drug, and find
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situations when a health-payer maximizing his expected utility may be able to negotiate a
lower price, and achieve higher social welfare, than a health-payer who maximizes expected
social welfare. Second, we characterize the conditions under which Pharma is willing to build
capacity above Health’s initial commitment, and show that this type of contracts result in
a weak increase in both access level and expected social welfare. Third, we propose a new
performance-based mechanism that partially reduces the negative effects of asymmetric be-
liefs between Pharma and Health.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In §3.2, additional literature specific to the
proposed contracts is briefly addressed to complement the one presented in the previous
chapter. Section 3.3 solves the endogenous price-only contracts. Section 3.4 relaxes the
single ordering assumption and solves the capacity buffer contract under an exogenously set
transfer price. In section 3.5 Pharma offers a performance-based contract to Health to deal
with belief asymmetry. Concluding remarks are offered in §3.6.
3.2 Literature Review
The search for alternatives to manage demand and health outcome uncertainty in order to
make a better use of the available and continuously decreasing resources, has produced a large
volume of work in recent years, both theoretical and applied. From an applied perspective,
Pugatch, Healy, and Chu (2010) provide a survey of 27 agreements between manufactur-
ers and health payers implemented over the last two decades across five countries (United
Kingdom, Italy, Australia, Germany, and the United States) for drug treatments that would
have otherwise been rejected. They identify 4 mechanisms: cost caps and rebates (which are
driven by price), and patient monitoring and patient compliance (which are driven by perfor-
mance). It is worth mentioning that 16 out of the 27 agreements included some form of rebate
in the contract’s conditions. Espin, Rovira and Garcia (2011) analyze risk sharing schemes in
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Europe for oncology products, which they categorize as financially-based schemes, i..e, price-
volume agreements with paybacks or price reductions, and outcome-based schemes. They
find some form of risk sharing scheme in 7 countries: Portugal, France, United Kingdom,
Italy, Slovenia, Germany, and Lithuania. The main objectives of the agreements observed
were to control the budget, get additional data, or finance cost-effective medicines.
The contract proposed in §3.3 aims to represent the situations where reference pricing is
not used to determine the transfer price between the manufacturer and the health-payer. We
base our model on the analysis of price-only contracts by Lariviere and Porteus (2001) where
the conditions for the manufacturer’s objective function to be unimodal in the selling price
are defined in Theorem 1 (p. 296). The key differences are that in their model, they consider
the retail price to be fixed, and there are no absolute nor relative budget constraints for the
downstream party (the retailer in their model, the health-payer in ours). As a result, our
task is to develop a method for efficiently finding the optimal transfer price, incorporating
the aforementioned factors. By doing this, we also expand the works of Salinger and Am-
pudia (2011) and Kocabiyikoglu and Popescu (2011), providing a supply chain perspective
to the analysis of the price and quantity newsvendor model, where the the upstream party
is able to determine the transfer price. The main contribution is the added visibility of the
relationship between the transfer price-setting process and the downstream party’s optimal
decisions, as a function of the objective function and constraints faced by the latter.
The contract proposed in §3.4 goes back to the exogenous price assumption, but relaxes
the single order opportunity constraint of the classic newsvendor setting by allowing the
upstream party to overproduce, and therefore letting the downstream party to order above
and beyond its initial order quantity. The contract has its roots in two well known contracts
in the supply chain coordination literature. First, the quantity flexibility contracts (Tsay,
1999), where the buyer sends a purchasing signal of size q well before observing demand,
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and the manufacturer builds a stock of q(1 + α), the buyer is committed to purchase at
least q(1 − w), and the contract parameters are the selling price and the sales range pa-
rameters α > −w, and w ∈ [0, 1]. Second, the buyback contract (Pasternack, 1985) where
the manufacturer chooses selling price w and buyback rate b, which is the price paid by the
manufacturer to the buyer for every unit of overstock at the end of the demand period. Both
contracts coordinate the supply chain in a wide array of scenarios, but our contract is dif-
ferent both in its main objective and its decision variables. The proposed contract does not
explicitly guarantee a minimum capacity on the part of the manufacturer because symmetric
information is assumed regarding the manufacturer’s production costs; therefore the buyer
is able to anticipate the manufacturer’s optimal capacity. Additionally, in our model the
capacity is not necessarily bounded by the manufacturer’s incentive compatibility constraint
as in the quantity flexibility, but rather may be limited by Health’s constraints. Finally,
while selling KT units to the buyer at price w and repurchasing the excess units at price b
is similar to our approach of the buyer incurring a penalty for every unit ordered above its
initial order quantity, it is worth noting that the only decision variable that the manufacturer
has in our model is the total capacity, as price is considered to be exogenously determined.
As a result, our contract is not directly aimed at coordinating the inventory decision, but
rather seeks to understand the conditions under which the manufacturer will voluntarily
build inventory above and beyond the health payer’s initial order quantity when external
reference pricing is used as a mechanism to determine transfer payments between the players.
Regarding the contract proposed in §3.5, which is a performance-based contract, Gua-
jardo, Cohen, Kim and Netessine (2012) study the ability of performance based contracts in
a general setting to increase product reliability, and find that such reliability is increased due
to more frequent and more diligent maintenance activities induced by the optimal contract.
Our model, rather than allowing the exertion of efforts that may affect the distribution of
the realized health benefits, assumes that the manufacturer has private knowledge about the
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expected performance of the drug, and therefore we focus not on the ability to modify the
value of the product, but rather on the manufacturer’s ability to signal the ability to the
buyer. From the works of supply chain coordination using the newsvendor model, under
price-dependent demand in a seller-buyer relationship, Emmons and Gilbert (1998) show
that buy-back contracts with a fixed buy-back rate do not coordinate the chain; further,
considering a fixed payment per unit sold, buy-back contracts coordinate the chain but al-
locate zero profit to the supplier (Marvel and Peck, 1995; Bernstein and Federgruen, 2005).
Bernstein and Federgruen (2005) show that a buy-back contract coordinates the chain under
arbitrary profit allocation only if the buy-back rate and the wholesale price are adjusted as
a function of the retail price in what is referred to as “contingent buy-backs” or “discount
pricing”. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) show that revenue sharing may coordinate the chain
when the buyer selects the retail price, but similar to buy-backs, an arbitrary allocation
of profit requires the contract parameters to be contingent on the selling price. The main
limitation of these models within our setting is that they assume the “selling price” to be a
deterministic parameter while in our context after the prescription policy threshold is set,
the resulting health benefits are a random variable. This would be equivalent to being able
to select only the expected selling price, and setting the contract parameters accordingly.
This distinction about a random selling price - health benefits in our model - implies that
the player whose payoff function depends on the realized price holds a higher risk in the
contract, and that the contract parameters would need to be modified after the true price is
revealed. Needless to say, this raises concerns on how such a mechanism could be successfully
implemented in our setting. By considering different objective functions for the downstream
party - the health-payer - under a set of constraints relevant to the decision of introducing
a new drug, we provide additional light into the theoretical reach and applicability of risk
sharing contracts in health care.
This type of contracts has received increasing attention in recent years by the health
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economics community. Barros (2011) looks at the relationship between a pharmaceutical
manufacturer and a health-provider’s prescription behavior assuming a binary health out-
come and patient heterogeneity; he studies a risk sharing contract where the manufacturer
is reimbursed for the drug only when the treatment is successful, which leads to high list
prices and a higher than efficient prescription behavior, even though the latter effect may be
alleviated by appropriately setting a revision cost. The main differences with our model is
that Barros (2011) does not incorporate demand uncertainty and the prescriber experiences
no risk in the contract. On a related paper, Zaric and Xie (2009) analyze two contracts
in a two-period setting where the manufacturer sets the price for a drug seeking formulary
listing and exerts promotional effort that deterministically shapes the demand curve: in
one contract, the drug is listed in the payer’s formulary during period 1 and delisted in the
next period if cost-effectiveness is not achieved, and in the second contract, which is the
most relevant to our work, the manufacturer pays a rebate to the health-payer in each pe-
riod that cost-effectiveness is not achieved where the rebate amount is such that the payer’s
cost-effectiveness constraint binds. They find that no contract dominates, and provide a
numerical analysis to observe the effects of uncertainty, the willingness to pay threshold,
and the associated costs (or savings) derived from the drug’s introduction. The first dis-
tinction in our model is that we allow the size of demand to be uncertain, which creates an
inventory risk for the health-payer that becomes relevant for both his objective function and
his cost-effectiveness constraint. Second, our model does not consider the manufacturer’s
ability to influence the size of total incoming demand. Third, we explicitly model informa-
tion asymmetry with respect to the expected health outcome and allow the manufacturer
to take advantage of its informational advantage through the parameters of the contract
presented in §3.5. Fourth, the performance-based contract proposed here is similar in that a
rebate is also offered, but in our case the rebate is a fixed amount given by a per unit rebate
rate set by the manufacturer multiplied by the order quantity of the health-payer, while in
Zaric and Xie (2009), the rebate is such that realized net monetary benefits are zero (i.e.,
97
if realized outcomes are below the minimum level of acceptance, the rebate is such that the
cost-effectiveness constraint binds).
3.3 Endogenous price-only contracts
In this section we model the relationship between Pharma and Health when the former
is able to endogenously select the transfer price, which is assumed to be the only contract
parameter. This kind of contracts reflects more appropriately those cases where a negotiation
process occurs between the manufacturer and the health-payer so that the former observes
the parameters used by the latter in his calculations. We denote this setting with the symbol
η for endogenous. We will continue to use the notation presented in Chapter 2, and introduce
additional notation as needed. Pharma sells each unit of the drug to Health at endogenously
selected price w, in order to maximize its utility function:
Mη(w;Q, τ) = (w − c)Q, (3.3.1)
It will be useful to henceforth use the notation Q∗j,η (w) and τ
∗
j,η (w), j = S,H, to denote the
optimal decisions by Health as a function of the selling price w, when maximizing (S)ocial
welfare, or (H)ealth’s utility function. Also, observe the following definitions adapted from
Chapter 2 adjusting for this contracting scenario, as a function of the endogenously set w:
Q¯ητ (w) = max
{
Q
∣∣∣∣Q ≤ (Bh(τ)− δ + g)A(Q, τ)− gλw − δ ;Q > 0
}
,
Qητ (w) = max
{
Q
∣∣∣∣P (Q;λF (τ)) ≥ w − δBh(τ)− δ + g
}
.
Since Health’s problem remains unchanged with respect to Chapter 2, Pharma’s optimal
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decision satisfies:
w∗j,η ∈ arg max
(w)
{(w − c)Q∗j,η (w)}
subject to:
wQ∗j,η (w) ≤ Γ
−wQ∗j,η (w) +Bh(τ ∗j,η (w))A(Q∗j,η (w), τ ∗j,η (w)) + δ
(
Q∗j,η (w) − A(Q∗j,η (w), τ ∗j,η (w))
)
−g (λF (τ ∗j,η (w))− A(Q∗j,η (w), τ ∗j,η (w))) ≥ 0 , j = S,H
Q∗j,η (w), τ
∗
j,η (w) ∈ arg max
(Q,τ)

Sηh(Q, τ ;w) if j = S,
Hη(Q, τ ;w) if j = H,
(3.3.2)
Similar to what we have done earlier, we will present the solutions when expected social
welfare and Health’s expected utility are maximized, subject to the relevant constraints.
3.3.1 Case 1η: Maximizing expected social welfare
First we solve the situation when Health maximizes social welfare under the endogenously
determined price-only contract designed by Pharma. From Chapter 2, we know that Health
will purchase the largest order quantity it can afford for a given τ , and by setting the
selling price, Pharma is able to indirectly determine the access level and corresponding order
quantity.
In order to reduce the search space for the optimal selling price, w∗S,η, we define the
following possible solutions:
w¯ητ = max {w | H(Q, τ ; w) ≥ 0, for some Q > 0} ; (3.3.3)
w¯ητ,S ∈ arg max
(w)
{(w − c)Q∗S,η (w); Γ→∞} ; (3.3.4)
wητ = max {w | H(Q, τ ; w) ≥ 0 ; wQ = Γ, for some Q > 0} . (3.3.5)
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Figure 3.1: Relationship between w and Q¯ητ (w)
λ = 600; τ = 1;β1 = 1; g = 0.2; δ = 0; c = 0.3; Γ→∞
w¯η1 = 0.97962; Q¯
η
1 (0.97962) = 226; w¯
η
1,S = 0.94820; Q¯
η
1 (0.94820) = 250
To develop some intuition on the latter definitions, observe firstly w¯ητ , which acts as an
upper bound on the optimal selling price. When the budget is infinitely high - or simply too
high relative to the size of the population -, then the budget constraint becomes irrelevant
and w¯ητ represents the largest selling price for which Health can achieve a non-negative
expected utility function. Secondly, since Health is maximizing social welfare, Pharma may
have an incentive to decrease the price1 with respect to w¯ητ , thus increasing Health’s order
quantity, as long as the increase in total revenue is higher than the increase in production
costs. Mathematically, we have that w¯ητ,S may be rewritten as the selling price that solves
the following condition:
w¯ητ,S = max
{
w | (w − c)(Q¯ητ (w)) > (w − εS − c)(Q¯ητ (w−εS)))
}
,
where εS = min
{
ε | Q¯ητ (w−ε) = Q¯ητ (w) + 1
}
. (3.3.6)
Figure 3.1 shows how the selling price changes in order to achieve higher order quantities.
The definition of εS is simply the minimum decrease needed in the selling price in order to
increase the order quantity by 1 unit. Figure 3.2 shows how Pharma’s revenue changes as
the selling price is gradually decreased from its upper bound, in the unconstrained bud-
get situation. Notice how the marginal revenue quickly decreases until it converges to zero
1Note that any price higher than w¯ητ is infeasible.
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Figure 3.2: Effect of w on Pharma’s profits under social welfare maximization, as Γ→∞
λ = 600; τ = 1;β1 = 1; g = 0.2; δ = 0; c = 0.3
marginal change. When the budget constraint is reachable, wητ gives the highest price that
satisfies both constraints simultaneously, allowing Pharma to extract the maximum poten-
tial revenues Γ (or approaching Γ due to integrality of the order quantity) by selling as little
units as possible. If wητ exists, by construction any price higher than w
η
τ does not satisfy
the cost-effectiveness constraint, and any price lower than wητ (weakly) reduces Pharma’s
utility because total revenues can’t increase and production costs are nondecreasing due to
(weakly) larger order quantities. Proposition 7 formally summarizes the implications on the
optimal selling price offered by Pharma.
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Proposition 7: Assume τ ∗S,η = τ and Q¯
η
τ (w) exists for some w > c.
Then w∗S,η =

wητ if w
η
τ exists
w¯ητ,S otherwise
.
Note that w¯ητ,S ≤ w¯ητ and wητ ≤ w¯ητ ; also, note that wητ and w¯ητ,S can’t simultaneously exist,
and that the existence of w¯ητ > c is a necessary and sufficient condition for trade. While
Proposition 7 explains Pharma’s behavior for a given access level, recall that Pharma’s choice
of the selling price may modify the access and service levels selected by Health. In Theorem
1 we have defined the optimal order quantity for a given access level and selling price, which
in combination with Proposition 7 implies that all we need to find before fully determining
the solution is the optimal access level that Pharma wishes to induce in order to maximize
her utility function. This is explored in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3:
a) When qh exists, then:
a1) If wη1 exists, then τ
∗
S,η = 1.
a2) If wη1 does not exist and w
η
2 exists, then τ
∗
S,η =

1 if c >
wη2Q
∗
S,η (w
η
2)
−w¯η1,SQ∗S,η, (w¯η
1,S
)
Q∗
S,η (w
η
2)
−Q∗
S,η (w¯
η
1,S
)
2 otherwise
;
a3) If wη1 and w
η
2 do not exist, then τ
∗
S,η =

1 if c >
w¯η2,SQ
∗
S,η (w¯
η
2,S
)
−w¯η1,SQ∗S,η (w¯η
1,S
)
Q∗
S,η (w¯
η
2,S
)
−Q∗
S,η (w¯
η
1,S
)
2 otherwise
.
b) When qh does not exist, then τ ∗S,η = 1.
The intuition, and true relevance, of Theorem 3.a2 is that for full access to be preferred,
it must be not only that increasing access generates more revenues - i.e., w¯η2,SQ
∗
S,η (w¯η2,S)
>
w¯η1,SQ
∗
S,η (w¯η1,S)
, but also that the increased revenue per incremental amount of drugs sold
must be sufficiently large to justify the additional manufacturing cost; in other words, as c
goes to zero, Pharma is more likely to induce higher levels of access; Theorem 3.a3 follows a
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similar logic. Finally, notice that the results derived here allow for direct comparison when
wη1 doesn’t exist, instead of doing a complete enumeration over a range of feasible price and
quantity pairs.
3.3.2 Case 2η: Maximizing Health’s expected value function
In this subsection, we solve the situation where Health maximizes his expected value function
given the endogenously selected price-only contract designed by Pharma. Recall that under
endogenous price selection and social welfare maximization, Health chooses to increase the
access level whenever it is cost-effective to do so. However, when Health maximizes its utility
function, Pharma is no longer able to induce full access unless it allows Health to keep some
of the surplus. Specifically, in order to induce full access, Pharma will have to set a selling
price no larger than w˜, at which Health is indifferent between both access levels. We will
need the following additional definition before following a similar approach to the previous
subsection.2
w¯ητ,H ∈ arg max
(w)
{(w − c)Q∗H,η; Γ→∞} ; (3.3.7)
As before, it is possible that when the budget constraint is not active, Pharma will not
charge the highest feasible price, and instead will set it satisfying:
w¯ητ,H = max
{
w | (w − c)(Qητ (w)) > (w − εH − c)(Qητ (w−εH))
}
,
where εH = min
{
ε | Qητ (w−ε) = Qητ (w) + 1
}
.
(3.3.8)
Figure 3.3 shows how the selling price needs to change in order to increase the budget
2Lariviere and Porteus (2001) prove that the problem for a manufacturer selling to an unconstrained
profit maximizing newsvendor is concave for continuous distributions that satisfy the IGFR property (see
section 2.2 of their paper, pp. 295-296). Banciu and Mirchandani (2013) derive the conditions for this finding
to be valid for some discrete distributions (see pp. 926-928 of their paper), among which is included the
Poisson distribution assumed in our model.
103
Figure 3.3: Effect of w on Pharma’s profits under Health’s net utility maximization, as
Γ→∞
λ = 600; τ = 1;β1 = 1; g = 0.2; δ = 0; c = 0.3
unconstrained order quantity, starting from the upper bound. It is interesting, although
intuitive, to observe that for the combination of parameters used (which is the same as in
Figures 3.1 and 3.2), w¯η1,H = w¯
η
1 = 0.97962. This means that Pharma chooses the largest
possible price under which Health will not reject the contract. Although this is a common
result, it need not be so in general, as the optimal selling price is given by the process de-
scribed in equation (3.3.8). However, it does suggest that when τ = 1, Pharma will extract
(almost) all surplus from Health. More interestingly, Pharma may not be able to do so under
restricted access, as is explained in Proposition 8.
Proposition 8.1: Assume τ ∗H,η = 1. Then w
∗
H,η =

wη1 if w
η
1 exists
w¯η1,H otherwise
Proposition 8.2: Assume τ ∗H,η = 2. Then: w
∗
H,η =

min[w˜ , wη2] if w
η
2 exists
min[w˜ , w¯η2,H ] otherwise
The implications of the incentive problem are now evident, since Health indirectly uses
his ability to define the access level to reduce Pharma’s bargaining power if full access is to
be selected. As a result, the conditions under which Pharma has an incentive to set a selling
price that induces full access are now more restrictive compared to §3.3.1.
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Theorem 4:
a) When qh exists, then:
a1) If wη1 exists, then τ
∗
H,η = 1.
a2) If wη1 and w
η
2 do not exist and H
η(Qη2 (w˜), 2; w˜) ≤ 0,
then τ ∗H,η =

1 if c >
w¯η2,HQ
∗
H,η (w¯
η
2,H
)
−w¯η1,HQ∗H,η (w¯η
1,H
)
Q∗
H,η (w¯
η
2,H
)
−Q∗
H,η (w¯
η
2,H
)
2 otherwise
a3) If wη1 does not exist, and w
η
2 exists, and w˜Q
η
2 (w˜)
> Γ,
then τ ∗H,η =

1 if c >
wη2Q
∗
H,η (w
η
2)
−w¯η1,HQ∗H,η (w¯η
1,H
)
Q∗
H,η (w
η
2)
−Q∗
H,η (w¯
η
1,H
)
2 otherwise
a4) Else, then τ ∗H,η =

1 if c >
w˜Q∗
H,η (w˜)
−w¯η1,HQ∗H,η w¯1,H
Q∗
H,η (w˜)
−Q∗
H,η (w
η
1 )
2 otherwise
.
b) When qh does not exist, then τ ∗H,η = 1.
The conclusions from Theorem 4 are very interesting. On one hand, and as anticipated,
it is more likely that access will be restricted when Health maximizes his utility function
versus when he maximizes social welfare. But on the other hand, we note that if Pharma
selects price w˜, then Health’s expected utility function will be positive and even the expected
social welfare utility may be higher than when maximizing the latter was Health’s objec-
tive. The reason is that the utility maximizing formulation creates an artificial incentive
compatibility constraint in order for Health to prefer the full versus restricted access level,
preventing Pharma from extracting all the surplus, achieving a lower selling price compared
to social welfare maximization, and resulting in a larger order quantity and possibly larger
expected social welfare. Some situations where the latter could occur include a) when the
maximum allowable budget is large, the relative size of the patient population with lower
health benefits is relatively large and the difference in expected health benefits between the
two patient populations is low; or b) when capacity building and manufacturing costs are
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low, so that Pharma finds a sufficient incentive in the incremental revenue from higher access
levels.
3.4 Exogenous price contracts with capacity buffer al-
lowed
So far we have assumed that Pharma has no excess capacity, and therefore Health may only
order once per period. In this section we relax that assumption and we allow Pharma to
build a capacity buffer, K, above Health’s order quantity Q. In such a situation, when
demand exceeds Q, then Health can purchase up to K additional units, paying the per
unit selling price w to Pharma, and incurring a per unit penalty cost p > 0, which is
interpreted as a penalty for increasing the initial order size or for delaying the patient’s
treatment. It is assumed that Pharma incurs an incremental cost p for delivering units
above Q, and therefore is indifferent between selling a unit of the drug during the initial
order, or at a later point in time. The rest of the parameters are consistent with Chapter
2. Health has a per unit salvage value δ for purchased units in excess of the realized de-
mand, and when total capacity, defined KT , (Q + K), is exceeded by demand, a per unit
goodwill cost g is incurred. The transfer payment from Health to Pharma is redefined as
T (w,Q,K) = wQ+ (w+ p)(min(K , (D(λ, F (τ))−Q)+)). Pharma has no salvage value for
unsold units.
Additionally, we make a weak assumption to guarantee that risklessly purchasing a drug
for an incoming average patient is superior to incurring the goodwill cost of not meeting that
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patient’s demand. Mathematically, this is expressed as:
Bh(τ) + g − w − p ≥ 0. (3.4.1)
Intuitively, by purchasing a drug from the capacity buffer and administering it to the patient,
Health’s (possibly negative) margin is (Bh(τ)−w− p), to which we add the ’saved’ goodwill
cost g.
Next we formulate the exogenous price contract when Pharma is willing to incur part of
the inventory risk by being able to build excess inventory. We use the symbol ’κ’ to denote
exogenous price contracts with a positive capacity buffer allowed. Pharma’s expected profit
function is:
Mκ(K;Q, τ) = (w − c)Q+ w(A(Q+K, τ)−Q)+ − cK , (3.4.2)
which reduces to Mκ(K;Q, τ) = (w − c)(Q) when K = 0. The social welfare’s expected
utility function from Health’s perspective is:
Sκh(Q, τ ;K) = (Bh(τ) + g)A(Q+K, τ) + δ(Q− A(Q, τ))− gλF (τ) (3.4.3)
and Health’s expected utility function is:
Hκ(Q, τ ;K) = (Bh(τ) + g − w − p)A(Q+K, τ) + (p+ w − δ)A(Q, τ)
−(w − δ)Q− gλF (τ) (3.4.4)
To explain the formulation, notice that the salvage value δ is only relevant for the first
Q units. The health benefits and the goodwill costs only depend on KT . The penalty cost p
is only expected to be incurred for the difference between the expected administered drugs
when KT versus Q units are available. And the selling price w is deterministically incurred
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for the first Q units, and is expected to be incurred for the difference between the expected
administered drugs when KT versus Q units are available.
For j = S,H, when the selling price is exogenously determined and Pharma is allowed
to build a capacity buffer, define K∗j,κ (Q,τ) as Pharma’s optimal capacity buffer for Health’s
choice of Q and τ ; and Q∗j,κ (K) and τ
∗
j,κ (K) as Health’s optimal order quantity and prescription
policy threshold given Pharma’s choice of capacity buffer K. We begin by solving Pharma’s
problem for any Q and τ , i.e., K∗j,κ (Q,τ), j = S,H, and then proceed to find the equilibrium
solution (or in some cases, solutions).
Pharma’s Problem
In order to obtain a more intuitive characterization of the solution, we initially show some
necessary conditions for K∗j,κ (Q,τ) > 0 and then find upper bounds on the feasible quantity
that Health may purchase.
Lemma 10: For j = S,H, Q∗j,χ < QΓ is a necessary condition for M
κ(K∗j,κ;Q
∗
j,κ, τ
∗
j,κ) >
Mχ(Q∗j,χ, τ
∗
j,χ).
Lemma 10 marks an incentive compatibility constraint for Pharma, since it is only opti-
mal to build a positive buffer if it leads to an increase in the expected profits relative to the
exogenous price-only contract presented in Chapter 2. Therefore, in the rest of §3.4 we will
assume that the condition from Lemma 10 is satisfied.
Lemma 11: Define K¯T (τ) = arg max
K int
{wA(K, τ)− cK} to be the upper bound on Pharma’s
optimal total capacity. For a given access level τ , K¯T (τ) = max
{
K
∣∣ P (K,λF (τ)) > c
w
}
,
and K¯(Q,τ) , K¯T (τ) −Q.
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The notation K¯(Q,τ) defines Pharma’s upper bound for the optimal capacity buffer as a
function of the order quantity Q and access level τ . In other words, it shows the maximum
level of inventory risk that Pharma is willing to accept by comparing the expected revenue
of increasing the capacity buffer by 1 unit versus the corresponding (constant) deterministic
cost c. While Lemma 12 gives the total capacity that Pharma would build in an uncon-
strained setting, two situations may occur. The first one is that Health chooses an order
quantity larger than K¯T (τ) when Pharma’s relative understocking costs are lower than those
of Health; this will be formally shown when we solve Health’s problem under each decision
making criteria. The second situation is when Health’s constraints do not justify building
K¯T (τ), as is expressed below
Lemma 12: For any positive Q and K, let w(Q + K) + pK, be the largest possible realized
expenses for Health. a) KΓ (Q) = max
{
bKc
∣∣∣ K ≤ Γ−wQw+p } is the largest capacity buffer that
Health will be able to utilize given the budget constraint Γ and Pharma’s order quantity
choice Q; b)∂((Γ−wQ)/(w+p))
∂Q
= − w
w+p
∈ (−1, 0); c) ∆ , dw+p
p
e, is Health’s minimum order
quantity increase to trigger a 1 unit increase in the total quantity that satisfies the budget
constraint.
Understanding the intuition from Lemma 12 is crucial to our analysis. First, it sets an
upper bound on the feasible capacity buffer as a function of Q. Secondly, part b) explains
that for an increase of 1 unit in Q, KΓ (Q) decreases in no more than 1 unit. This implies that
the total capacity, KT = K +Q, that satisfies the budget constraint is non-decreasing in Q;
in fact increases in 1 unit for every ∆ units that Q increases, as is explained in Lemma 12c.
As such, KΓ (Q) represents Health’s participation constraint with respect to its total budget.
While for a fixed KT larger values of Q are more likely to satisfy the budget constraint, the
balancing effect is introduced in Lemma 13.
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Lemma 13: KE (Q,τ) = min
{
dKe
∣∣∣ A(Q+K, τ) ≥ (w−δ)Q+gλF (τ)−(w+p−δ)A(Q,τ)Bh(τ)−w−p+g } is the small-
est capacity buffer that Pharma would need to provide in order for Health’s cost-effectiveness
constraint to be satisfied.
Lemma 13, while not a direct counterpart for Lemma 12, does contribute to a balancing
effect in Health’s choices. One way to interpret it is that as Q increases, the increase in
Health’s expected utility function (both from the increased health benefits and from the de-
creased goodwill costs) of having the capacity buffer must be sufficiently large to overcome
the escalating expected overstocking costs. As Q continues to increase, the benefits achieved
by the buffer may not be sufficient due to the low probability of high values of realized de-
mand, or because the increase required in the buffer is larger than what the budget allows.
Integrating the results from this subsection, Proposition 9 provides Pharma’s best response
for given Q and τ .
Proposition 9: For j = S,H, assume Q∗j,χ < QΓ. a) 0 < KE (Q,τ) ≤ min(K¯(Q,τ), KΓ (Q)), is
a necessary condition for K∗j,κ > 0. b) KE (Q∗j,χ,τ∗j,χ) ≤ min(K¯(Q∗j,χ,τ∗j,χ), KΓ (Q∗j,χ)), is a suffi-
cient condition for K∗j,κ > 0. c) For given Q and τ , Pharma’s best response function when
K∗j,κ > 0, is delimited by: KE (Q,τ) ≤ K∗j,κ (Q,τ) = min(K¯(Q,τ), KΓ (Q)).
Health’s Problem
We now move to the analysis of Health’s problem. Before finding Health’s best response
strategy under each of his decision-making criteria, we need to derive some additional results.
In this respect, Lemma 14 finds the minimum order quantity necessary for Health’s budget
to not become a restriction on Pharma’s desired capacity buffer based on her own critical
fractile. Lemma 15 gives a sufficient condition for Health’s budget to prevent Pharma’s de-
sired capacity buffer from being built.
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Lemma 14: Q˘κτ = min
{
dQe
∣∣∣P (⌊Γ+pQw+p ⌋ ;λF (τ)) < cw ;Q < Γw }, is Health’s minimum or-
der quantity required for KΓ (Q) ≥ K¯(Q,τ).
Lemma 15: For j = S,H, if P
(⌊
Γ
w
⌋
;λF (τ)
)
> c
w
, then K∗j,κ (Q,τ) ≤ KΓ (Q) < K¯(Q,τ).
In other words, the two latter Lemmas provide a reference point for determining whether
the budget constraint will be binding or not. On one hand, if the budget is large, the price is
low, or Pharma’s overstocking cost is relatively large, then Pharma’s budget unconstrained
maximization solution will yield the total capacity available. On the other hand, if the bud-
get is low, the selling price and/or the penalty are high, or Pharma’s incentive to overstock
is high, then Health’s budget will restrict the capacity built and the resulting drug amount
available in the system.
3.4.1 Case 1κ: Maximizing expected social welfare
In this subsection we solve the access and service level decisions when Health’s objective
is to maximize expected social welfare, and Pharma is allowed to create an excess capacity
buffer. Recall that for K∗S,κ > 0, it must be that Q
∗
S,χ ∈ {Q¯χ1 , Q¯χ2}; otherwise Pharma has no
incentive to provide the buffer. Consequently, Health’s problem is expressed as follows:
max
(Q,τ)
(Bh(τ) + g)A(Q+K
∗
S,κ (Q,τ), τ) + δ(Q− A(Q, τ))− gλF (τ)
subject to:
KE (Q,τ) ≤ K∗S,κ (Q,τ) = min(K¯(Q,τ), KΓ (Q))
T (w,Q,K∗S,κ (Q,τ)) ≤ Γ
(Bh(τ) + g − w − p)A(Q+K∗S,κ (Q,τ), τ) + (w + p− δ)A(Q, τ)
−(w − δ)Q− gλF (τ) ≥ 0 (3.4.5)
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Notice that the objective function is increasing in the total quantity of drugs available,
which implies that Pharma’s and Health’s objectives are aligned in the same direction,
even though their participation constraints are in general different. In other words, both
players benefit from higher levels of available inventory (given the feasibility constraints).
Therefore we begin our formal analysis by using Q¯χτ as a reference point. Since we have
assumed Bh(τ) + g > w + p, then purchasing any order quantity K ex-post satisfies the
cost-effectiveness constraint, and we only need to check the absolute budget constraint for
feasibility. As was mentioned above, there exists the possibility that Pharma’s optimal ca-
pacity buffer will be zero. Proposition 10 provides such situations.
Proposition 10: Set τ ∗S,κ = τ . There are three scenarios that will result in K
∗
S,κ = 0.
i) If Q¯χτ ≥ QχΓ.
ii) If Γ−w−p
w
< Q¯χτ < Q
χ
Γ.
iii) If K¯T (τ) < Q¯
χ
τ < Q
χ
Γ.
Proposition 10 allows us to further characterize the space for which the capacity buffer
option is relevant. Conditions i) and ii) are related to the absolute budget constraint, so
that any feasible combination of an initial order quantity and a positive capacity buffer will
decrease social welfare when compared to the solution under the exogenous price-only con-
tract. Condition iii) shows the case where Health is willing to accept a higher inventory risk
than Pharma. This situation is more likely to occur as the selling price is relatively close to
the production cost and relatively far from the benefit Bh(τ), or when the goodwill cost g is
high for Health.
Next, we define limits on the feasible order quantity considering the possibility that
Pharma keeps an excess inventory stock.
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Definition 3:
a) Let Q¯κτ = max
{ bQc ∣∣(w − δ)Q− (w + p− δ)A(Q, τ) < (Bh(τ) + g − w − p)A(K¯T (τ), τ)
−(Bh(τ)− δ + g)A(Q¯χτ , τ) + (w − δ)Q¯χτ
}
, be Health’s largest order quantity that satisfies
the cost-effectiveness constraint for a fixed total capacity K¯T (τ).
b) Let Q¯κτ = max
{ bQc ∣∣(w − δ)Q− (w + p− δ)A(Q, τ) < (Bh(τ) + g − w − p)A(Q+KΓ (Q,τ), τ)
−(Bh(τ)− δ + g)A(Q¯χτ , τ) + (w − δ)Q¯χτ
}
, be Health’s largest order quantity that satis-
fies both the cost-effectiveness constraint and the budget constraint.
Definition 3a provides the largest order quantity that Health is able to purchase in ad-
vance, conditioning on the fact that Pharma will stock K¯T (τ) units. It is known that such
order quantity will be at least Q¯χτ ; the larger Q¯
κ
τ is, the higher the probabilities that the bud-
get constraint will not be binding. In a similar vein, Definition 3b defines the largest order
quantity that Health is able to purchase without violating the constraints. Note that on one
hand, such quantity may be larger than Pharma’s choice of K¯T (τ), in which case Pharma
would not build any excess stock. On the other hand, it is also possible that Q¯κτ < K¯T (τ),
which would imply that purchasing K¯T (τ) is not feasible, and therefore the budget constraint
will limit the total inventory available in the system. Lemma 16 incorporates the previous
results to explain the behavior of the expected social welfare function, and Proposition 11
finds the optimal order quantity and capacity buffer for a given access level.
Lemma 16:
a) For a fixed τ and KT , S
κ
h(Q, τ ;K) is weakly increasing in Q.
b) For a fixed τ and Q, Sκh(Q, τ ;K) is increasing in K.
c) Assume Q˘κτ ≤ Q¯κτ . Then, for fixed τ , Sκh(Q, τ ;K) is non-decreasing in Q for Q ≤ Q¯κτ .
d) Assume Q˘κτ > Q¯
κ
τ . Then, for fixed τ , S
κ
h(Q, τ ;K) is increasing in Q for Q ≤ Q¯κτ .
e) Assume Q˘κτ does not exist. Then, for fixed τ , S
κ
h(Q, τ ;K) is increasing in Q for Q ≤ Q¯κτ .
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Proposition 11: Fix τ ∗S,κ = τ .
a) If Q˘κτ exists and Q˘
κ
τ < Q¯
κ
τ , then: Q
∗
S,κ =

Q¯κτ if δ > 0[
Q˘κτ , Q¯
κ
τ
]
otherwise
;
and K∗S,κ = K¯(Q,τ) ≤ KΓ (Q)
b) Otherwise, Q∗S,κ = Q¯
κ
τ and K
∗
S,κ = KΓ (Q) < K¯(Q,τ).
It is interesting to note that when δ = 0, there are multiple equilibrium between Health’s
order quantity and Pharma’s capacity buffer K. However, this does not represent a problem
since Pharma will build the same total capacity regardless of which equilibrium realizes, i.e.,
since the total capacity for Pharma is constant, Pharma’s capacity building choice is inde-
pendent of Health’s order quantity. The role of Health’s order quantity, Q, will be therefore
to allocate demand risk. As Q increases, Pharma’s risk decreases, Health’s risk of overstock-
ing increases, and Health’s total expenditures may either decrease or increase because as the
initial order quantity decreases, the number of units for which Health expects to pay the
penalty p increases. Also interesting is that when either δ > 0, or Q˘κτ > Q¯
κ
τ , or Q˘
κ
τ does not
exist, the equilibrium solution is unique for a given access level and the budget constraint
is the limiting condition. To complete the analysis, we turn to the problem of finding the
optimal access level.
Proposition 12: When I = 2, let qκ be a positive order quantity such that Sκh(q
κ, 1) ≥
Sκh(q
κ, 2); and Sκh(Q, 2) > S
κ
h(Q, 1), ∀ Q > qκ.
a) β2 > δ is a necessary and sufficient condition for q
κ to exist, and if equation (2.3.3) is
satisfied and qκ exists, it is unique and given by equation (3.4.6).
(
g
β1 − δ + g
)(
λ
A(Q+K, 2)
)
+
(
b1 − b2
b1 − δ + g
)
=
(
A(Q+K, 2)− A(Q+K, 1)
A(Q+K, 2)
)(
1
1− θ
)
(3.4.6)
b) If β2 < δ, then S
κ
h(Q, 1) > S
κ
h(Q, 2), ∀ Q > 0.
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c) If β2 = δ, then S
κ
h(Q, 1) > S
κ
h(Q, 2), for some finite Q > 0, and limP (Q,λ)→0 S
κ
h(Q, 1) −
Sκh(Q, 2) = 0.
d) The value of qκ is increasing in β1, g, δ, and decreasing in β2. The change in q
κ with
respect to θ is ambiguous.
e) If δ > 0 and KT is fixed, then the value of q
κ is decreasing in K; and for K > 0, qκ < qh .
f) If δ = 0, then qκ = qh.
The key results from Proposition 12 are: that when δ = 0, only KT (and not the relative
sizes of Q and K) is relevant in determining expected social welfare and the crossing point
between the two access level options; and when δ > 0, the total inventory available in the
system that is required to achieve full access is lower when Pharma offers a capacity buffer
in the contract, versus the situation of an exogenous price-only contract. This should not
be confused with the result introduced in Lemma 16a, such that for a fixed available inven-
tory level in the system, social welfare decreases as K increases. Instead, the intuition here
is that for a fixed available inventory level in the system, as the capacity buffer increases,
the crossing point between the two access level curves moves to the left because for a given
service level the restricted access option benefits more from the salvage value than the full ac-
cess option. Having this in mind, the choice of the optimal access level can now be expressed.
Proposition 13:
a) If τ ∗S,χ = 1, then

τ ∗S,κ = 2 if ∃
{
Q | qκ ≤ Q+KE (Q,2) ≤ Q+KΓ (Q)
}
,
τ ∗S,κ = 1 otherwise ;
b) If τ ∗S,χ = 2, then τ
∗
S,κ = 2.
The first takeaway is that in the buffer capacity contract, access level can only increase
relative to the exogenous price-only contract. The second takeaway involves the situations
when the access level will be increased. We have already shown that when τ ∗S,χ = 1 and
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Q∗S,χ = Q¯
χ
1 , it must be that S
χ
h (q
χ, 1) = Sχh (q
χ, 2) < 0; this happened because either the
budget constraint, Γ, didn’t allow for Qχ
2
to be purchased, or Qχ
2
didn’t exist. If we are in
the first case, it follows that Q+KΓ (Q) < Q
χ
2
. This means that access is likely to be increased
when: p is low such that the difference between QχΓ and Q + KΓ (Q) is not too large; and
overstocking cost is relatively large and therefore Health can benefit from a low initial order
quantity Q without incurring too many understocking costs by leveraging on KΓ (Q). If we
are in the second case, there is no Qχ
2
to use as a reference, but the intuition about Health
ordering a quantity as low as possible ex-ante to avoid overstocking costs without drastically
increasing its understocking costs, continues to hold.
3.4.2 Case 2κ: Maximizing Health’s expected utility function
In this subsection, we analyze the situation where Health maximizes his expected utility
function under the exogenous price contract with capacity buffer. The problem Health
solves is:
max
(Q,τ)
(Bh(τ) + g − w − p)A(Q+K∗H,κ (Q,τ), τ) + (p+ w − δ)(A(Q, τ))− (w − δ)Q− gλF (τ)
subject to:
KE (Q,τ) ≤ K∗H,κ (Q,τ) = min(K¯(Q,τ), KΓ (Q))
T (w,Q,K∗H,κ (Q,τ)) ≤ Γ
(Bh(τ) + g − w − p)A(Q+K∗S,κ (Q,τ), τ) + (w + p− δ)A(Q, τ)
−(w − δ)Q− gλF (τ) ≥ 0 (3.4.7)
When maximizing social welfare, we established that Health could be indifferent between
choosing multiple order quantities as long as the total capacity available remain unchanged
and δ = 0. This can no longer be the case when Health maximizes its utility function, as is
expressed in Lemma 17.
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Lemma 17: a) Qκτ = max
{
Q
∣∣∣ P (Q;λF (τ)) > w−δw+p−δ } to be Health’s optimal order quantity
when K →∞ for a given τ . b) Qκτ < Qχτ . c) lim
(w+p)→(Bh(τ)+g)
Qκτ = Q
χ
τ .
If K → ∞, Lemma 17 describes Pharma’s choice problem between purchasing units in
advance assuming the inventory risk, versus purchasing units at a higher price after demand
realization, in case it is needed. However, as it has been stated Pharma’s optimal capacity
buffer is bounded by her own incentive compatible critical fractile and by Health’s budget
and cost-effectiveness constraints.
Proposition 14: Fix τ ∗H,κ = τ .
a) Q∗H,κ = Q
κ
τ + α¯∆, if ∃ α¯ ∈ N>0, where
α¯ = max
α
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (Bh(τ) + g − w − p)
Qκτ+α∑
x=Qκτ+1
P (Qκτ + α∆ +KΓ (Qκτ+α∆);λF (τ)) >
α∆(w − δ)− (w + p− δ)
Qκτ+α∆∑
x=Qκτ+1
P (x;λF (τ)) ; K¯(Qκτ+α∆,τ) ≥ KΓ (Qκτ+α∆) ≥ KE (Qκτ+α∆,τ)
.
b) Else if α¯ has no solution, then Q∗H,κ =

Qκτ if KE (Qκτ ,τ) ≤ min[K¯(Qκτ ,τ) , KΓ (Qκτ )],
Qκτ = 0 otherwise
Proposition 14 explains that Pharma’s capacity buffer may be limited by the budget con-
straint, even though under an infinite supply assumption - and assuming a feasible solution
exists -, Health would initially order Qκτ units for access level τ . Still, as was proven in
Lemma 12, Health can increase the total number of drugs that can be purchased given Γ by
increasing his initial order quantity. In these situations, Proposition 14 explains that Health
will only buy more than Qκτ units, if the increase in KT results in a larger expected utility.
As before, the optimal capacity buffer will be bounded by the minimum buffer required to
maintain cost-effectiveness, and the maximum buffer for which Pharma is willing to inter-
nalize the inventory risk.
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For determining the optimal prescription policy threshold, we haven’t been able to find a
threshold value on the selling price as in the price-only contracts and therefore at this point
direct comparison would be required. It is worth mentioning though that opposed to the
case where Health is maximizing expected social welfare, here it is possible that the optimal
decision is to restrict access for some parameter combinations that resulted in full access for
the exogenous price-only contract. For instance, consider the situation where w < w˜, Γ
w
is
slightly higher than Qχ2 , c is low, and Bh(2) + g ∼ w + p; then Health may receive little
benefit from a buffer capacity contract under full access, but may increase its profits under
restricted access by leveraging on Pharma’s incentive to keep a high inventory availability.
The situation where access level is increased under a capacity buffer contract can occur for
instance when Γ and g are large, and τ is small, so that Bh(2) + g  w + p, and Health
capitalizes on the low understocking probability.
3.5 Performance-based contracts
In this section we analyze performance-based contracts as a mechanism aimed at reducing
belief asymmetry between the players. We use a model very similar to the one used so far
in Chapters 2 and 3, but instead of considering multiple patient categories, we consider a
single category for which the health benefits are uncertain and explicitly model the infor-
mation game between the players. It is important to understand that doing so does not
imply that the access level decision is ignored for this contract; rather, and as it should be
evident by the end of the section, Health’s decision making criteria will remain unchanged in
relation to Chapter 2, such that the only modification will be on the parameter he uses for
the expected health benefits. Additionally, from an implementation perspective, we believe
it is more sensible to provide a guarantee on the performance of the drug on a type by
type basis, i.e., Pharma may choose to offer a performance-based contract for patients of
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type 1 and 3, but not for patients of type 2, even if the drug is administered to all three types.
In consequence, our previously used notation can be somewhat simplified, since the fol-
lowing analysis is applicable to any patient type. The setting consists of a pharmaceutical
manufacturer, hereafter Pharma, who offers to sell a new drug to a health-payer at exoge-
nously determined per unit price w. Let the demand, D, be a random variable following a
Poisson distribution with parameter λ. Let p(x;λ) = λ
x
x!
e−λ, be the probability that exactly
x patient arrivals occur during the period; and let P (x;λ) =
∞∑
j=x
p(j;λ) be the complement
of the Poisson CDF. Pharma announces the expected health benefit b for the drug, but
Health chooses to use the certainty equivalent β < b for his calculations. The reasons why
Health would choose the value β rather than b include the uncertainty about the real present
and future value of a drug’s therapeutic innovation, the lack of solidity of the results pre-
sented by the manufacturer, or the replicability of those results in clinical practice. At this
point we allow negotiation between the players to occur. We assume that Pharma holds an
informational advantage about the drug’s expected health benefits during clinical practice
in the patient population serviced by Health. Specifically, Pharma holds a private belief pi
that the per patient realized health benefits will be b, and a belief (1− pi) that the realized
health benefits will be β. An alternative formulation would assume Pharma’s beliefs to be
distributed over a continuous range. However, since the implementation of an insurance
policy tends to be binary (see e.g., Pugatch et al., 2010) such that a rebate is paid when the
health benefit is below a specified threshold value, then pi would represent Pharma’s belief
that the minimum threshold value for a patient will be reached. For completeness, recall
that the health benefit has been defined as the product of the incremental value of the health
gains received by a patient and the health-payer’s ceiling ratio; i.e., the incremental value
derived from the drug’s administration times the health-payer’s maximum willingness-to-pay
for that value.
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Figure 3.4: Sequence of decisions and events
The order of events in the model is depicted in Figure 3.4 and described next. (1)Pharma
announces health benefits b, and per unit selling price w. Health acknowledges health ben-
efits β. (2)Pharma has the option to offer Health a performance-based contract {γ, r;m}
where: m is the exogenously set minimum number of administered drugs in order for the
contract to be executed; γ is an endogenously set factor which serves as a guarantee that the
average health benefits for the patient population who receive the drug (or a sample of the
population) will be at least bγ+β(1−γ); and r is the per unit rebate from Pharma to Health
when the administered drugs are at least m and the average health benefit for the sampled
patients is less than β + (b − β)(γ). (3)Health selects order quantity Q of drugs which are
then manufactured by Pharma at cost c.3 (4)Demand is realized and the health benefits are
measured for a sample of size m from the pool of patients who receive the drug treatment.
Let G(x) be the normal cumulative distribution function of the realized health benefits from
the sample population, which has mean mpi and variance mpi(1− pi), and let the fixed cost
of verification to the manufacturer be v(m), which is increasing in m. A rebate is paid if
the corresponding contract’s conditions are satisfied.4 Excess drugs may be salvaged at a
per unit value δ, which may be interpreted either as the opportunity cost or as a discounted
3Since we assume symmetric knowledge about the demand distribution and Health’s decision making
parameters, the assumption of the manufacturing and ordering decisions to be simultaneous versus sequen-
tial will not create a difference, and therefore we avoid the manufacturer’s capacity term KT to prevent
unnecessary notation.
4It is assumed that mpi > 5 and mpi(1− pi) > 5. This allows us to approximate the binomial distribution
which would be used to calculate the probability of at least γm patients with a health outcome of b, through
the normal distribution. For completeness, let it be known that using the binomial, the probability of the
realized health benefit being higher than the threshold (β+ (b−β)γ) is expressed:
m−bγmc∑
x=0
(
m
x
)
(pi)m−x(1−
pi)x.
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sale to a secondary market; to avoid trivial problems, assume δ < c < β. If D(λ) > Q, a per
unit cost, g, is accrued to Health for each patient arrival which does not receive the drug
treatment due to a stock-out. To keep integrality, we will use bxc and dxe as the floor and
ceiling functions, respectively. Except where it has been otherwise specified, all players are
assumed to hold symmetric information about functional forms and parameters.
Define A(Q) , E [min[Q , D(λ)]] to be the expected quantity of administered drug treat-
ments; E[max[0 , Q − D(λ)]] = (Q − A(Q)), to be the expected leftovers for Health; and
E [max[0 , D(λ)−Q]] = λ − A(Q), to be the expected quantity of understocked units of
the drug at the end of the period. Also, let T (w, γ, r) denote Health’s transfer payment to
Pharma as a function of the contract parameters. Pharma remains a profit maximizer, and
Health’s priority may be to either maximize expected social welfare, or maximize his entire
expected utility function (i.e., social welfare minus the transfer from Health to Pharma).
However, we should observe that Health has no way of trusting Pharma. As a result we
define Health’s objective function, regardless of his priority, to be the smallest of the ex-
pected outcomes when the drug’s performance is either as guaranteed by Pharma, or as
originally assumed by Health. We denote this contract structure with the symbol ρ. The
manufacturer’s expected profit is:
Mρ(γ, r; Q) = (w − c)Q− rQP (m;λ)G (γm)− v(m), (3.5.1)
where notice that P (m;λ)G (γm) represents the probability of rebate.
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The social welfare expected utility function is:
Sρ(Q; γ, r) = min

Slow(Q; γ, r) = (β − δ + g)A(Q) + δQ− gλ,
if the health benefits are low,
Shigh(Q; γ, r) = (β + (b− β)(γ)− δ + g)A(Q) + δQ− gλ,
if the health benefits are high,
Since Shigh(Q; γ, r) ≥ Slow(Q; γ, r), then:
Sρ(Q; γ, r) = (β − δ + g)A(Q) + δQ− gλ
Health’s expected utility function is:
Hρ(Q; γ, r) = min

Hlow(Q; γ, r) = (β − δ + g)A(Q)− (w − δ)Q− gλ + rQP (m;λ),
if the health benefits are low,
Hhigh(Q; γ, r) = (β + (b− β)(γ)− δ + g)A(Q)− (w − δ)Q− gλ,
if the health benefits are high,
In addition, two types of constraints are included in our analysis: a budget constraint:
wQ ≤ Γ, (3.5.2)
where Γ is an exogenous upper limit on Health’s expenses for the drug under analysis; and
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the cost-effectiveness constraints:
Hlow(Q; γ, r ) ≥ 0, (3.5.3)
Hhigh(Q; γ, r ) ≥ 0 (3.5.4)
which guarantee that the expected net benefits derived from the drug’s approval are above
some minimum threshold. Next, we map Health’s optimal order quantity as a function of
the contract’s design, and analyze how it is affected by the contract parameters. Then we
solve for Pharma’s optimal contract.
3.5.1 Health’s Problem
Case 1ρ: Maximizing expected social welfare
In this subsection we adapt the previously obtained results from the exogenous price-only
contract (or equivalently, from the integrated chain) to the performance-based contract when
Health is maximizing the expected social welfare. In order to do so, we use the same mech-
anism that was derived in Chapter 2 to find the potential optimal quantities as a function
of the contract parameters. First, Lemma 18 defines the possible optimal order quantities
under social welfare maximization.
Lemma 18:
a) Q¯ρhigh = max
{
bQc
∣∣∣Q ≤ (β+(b−β)γ−δ+g)A(Q)−gλw−δ ;Q ≥ 0}.
b) Q¯ρlow = max
{
bQc
∣∣∣Q ≤ (β−δ+g)A(Q)−gλw−δ−rP (m;λ) ;Q ≥ 0}.
c) Q∗S,ρ = min
[
QΓ, Q¯
ρ
low , Q¯
ρ
high
]
.
As was the case under the simple contracts presented earlier, at optimality either the bud-
get constraint or the cost-effectiveness constraint will be binding (or very close to binding,
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because of integrality). Notice that when Health maximizes social welfare, our assumption
of Health maximizing the minimum of the the two possible outcomes is irrelevant; this is
because Health will purchase as many drugs as his constraints allow it to. This marks the
difference here versus the analysis in Chapter 2, since Health’s lack of trust in Pharma im-
plies that the cost-effectiveness constraint must be satisfied both if the health benefits are as
guaranteed by Pharma, and if the health-benefits are as Health had initially acknowledged.
Recall that even when the latter occurs, the rebate is not guaranteed since demand must
be at least m for the contract to be called upon. As a result, either r must be sufficiently
large or m, which is exogenous, sufficiently small so that the largest feasible order quantity is
increased in a significant way. The next results explains how the contract parameters affect
the feasible region for Health’s optimal order quantity.
Lemma 19: a) Q¯ρhigh is weakly increasing in γ; b) Q¯
ρ
high is independent of r; c) Q¯
ρ
low is inde-
pendent of γ; d) Q¯ρlow is weakly increasing in r. e) Q
∗
S,ρ is weakly increasing in γ and r.
Lemma 19 shows that as the value of the contract parameters increases, the largest fea-
sible order quantity weakly increases. Intuitively, in the low benefits scenario as r increases
and everything else is kept constant, then the expected lump sum transfer increases, which
may allow for larger order quantities to be feasible. Similarly, in the high benefits scenario
as γ increases and everything else is kept constant, the health benefit that Health expects to
see for each unit of administered drugs increases; while for the same Q the utility function
will increase, such difference may be large enough to allow the purchase of a larger quantity.
Case 2ρ: Maximizing Health’s expected utility
In this subsection we adapt the previously obtained results to the performance-based con-
tract when Health is maximizing his expected utility function. To do so, we follow the same
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mechanism as above, taking into account that there will be a limiting order quantity for each
combination of parameters. Lemma 20 defines the feasible optimal order quantities under
Health’s expected utility maximization.
Lemma 20:
a) Qρhigh = max
{
bQc
∣∣∣P (Q;λ) > w−δβ+(b−β)γ−δ+g }.
b) Qρlow = max
{
bQc
∣∣∣P (Q;λ) > w−δ−rP (m;λ)β−δ+g }.
c) Q∗H,ρ = min
[
QΓ, Q
ρ
low , Q
ρ
high
]
.
The first two parts of Lemma 20 yield the budget unconstrained order quantity that max-
imize Health’s total utility function under the high and low scenarios, respectively. Lemma
20c then provides a parallel result to that of Chapter 2, since the optimal order quantity for
a given access level will be given by the smallest of QΓ, and the order quantity that maxi-
mizes Health’s objective function; the obvious difference is that by considering two possible
scenarios, there are two (possibly overlapping) curves, each of them with its own maximum
value. Lemma 21 explains how the order quantity that maximizes the curve under each
scenario changes as a function of the contract parameters.
Lemma 21: a) Qρhigh increases in γ; b) Q
ρ
high is independent of r; c) Q
ρ
low is independent of
γ; d) Qρlow is increasing in r; e) Q
∗
H,ρ weakly increases in γ and r.
Now that Health’s decision making criteria has been established, we proceed to analyze
Pharma’s problem of optimally designing the performance based contract.
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3.5.2 Pharma’s Problem
In this subsection we derive the optimal parameters of the performance-based contract from
Pharma’s perspective. Since the following results apply for both of Health’s decision-making
criteria, we use the letter j = S,H to denote the expressions in a consistent manner without
being repetitive.
Proposition 15: a) r∗j,ρ (γ) =
(
A(Q∗j,ρ)
Q∗j,ρ
)(
b−β
P (m;λ)
)
(γ); b) γ∗j,ρ (r) =
(
Q∗j,ρ
A(Q∗j,ρ)
)(
P (m;λ)
b−β
) (
1
r
)
.
Proposition 15 states the optimal relationship between the contract parameters in order to
avoid offering Health unnecessarily benevolent conditions in the contract that can’t be com-
pensated by larger order quantities. In other words, it implies that when the performance-
based contract is implemented, then at optimality Q¯ρlow = Q¯
ρ
high, under social welfare maxi-
mization; and Qρlow = Q
ρ
high, under Health’s expect utility maximization. If that was not the
situation, then one of the constraints would have a positive shadow price created by either a
guarantee γ, that could be decreased (decreasing the probability of paying a rebate), or by
a rebate rate r that could be decreased (decreasing the value of the rebate in case the guar-
antee is not satisfied), in both cases without inducing a decrease in Health’s order quantity.
Furthermore, this balancing relationship allows us to reformulate Pharma’s problem as that
of a single decision variable as is expressed next.
Lemma 22: At optimality, Pharma’s problem under a performance based contract may be
rewritten as a single variable problem, and is given by equation (3.5.6):
M(γ; Q∗j,ρ) = (w − c)Q∗j,ρ − A(Q∗j,ρ)(b− β)(γ)G(γm) (3.5.5)
Unfortunately we can’t obtain the explicit solution for the parameters, but Proposition
15 gives the conditions that need to be satisfied by the optimal guarantee factor γ, and
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this can be used to obtain the optimal rebate rate r. Similarly, we are unable to determine
analytically whether Pharma has an incentive to truthfully reveal her private information.
Intuitively though, as m becomes large, the sample mean will approach the true mean, and
setting γ = pi would imply paying a rebate with approximately a 50% probability. As a
result, we expect that under this contract’s structure, Pharma will tend to understate its
private information, or not provide any information at all. The latter situation occurs when
the condition from Corollary 3 is not satisfied.
Corollary 3: Define Q∗j,χ as Health’s optimal order quantity under exogenous price-only
contract with parameter w. Pharma can benefit from the performance based contract only
if:
(w − c)
(
Q∗j,ρ −Q∗j,χ
Q∗j,ρ
)
> r∗j,ρG(γ
∗
j,ρm)P (m;λ) +
v(m)
Q∗j,ρ
.
Corollary 3 gives the necessary condition for the performance based contract to take
place. If this is not met, then Pharma can simply set a rebate rate equal to zero, and the
system will behave as in an exogenous price-only contract scenario.
3.6 Conclusions
Chapter has presented three mechanisms that the upstream player, Pharma, may use in order
to increase her profits relative to the exogenous price-only contract presented in Chapter 2.
These contracts are an enedogenous price-only contract; a capacity buffer under exogenous
transfer price; and a performance-based contract under exogenous price.
For the endogenous price-only contract, we find a very interesting situation. The manu-
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facturer has an incentive to increase the price and decrease order quantity as long as total
profits keep increasing, and therefore the cost-effectiveness constraint tends to be binding or
very close to binding under social welfare maximization. In fact, when the optimal access
is limited, both social welfare and expected utility maximization yield extremely similar, or
even equal, results; Pharma extracts all of Health’s surplus. However, when the health payer
maximizes his expected utility, the manufacturer is not able to induce full access and extract
all of the health payer’s surplus simultaneously because of the threshold price mentioned
earlier. This implies that if the manufacturer wishes her product to be considered available
to a larger fraction of the patient population, then she must reduce the price, which under
some parameter combinations, may even result in a larger order quantity than that obtained
by social welfare maximization because of the incentive compatibility constraint imposed by
comparing the objective function under the different access levels. This result is a potential
argument for why some markets allow the manufacturers to set prices freely and then act as
profit maximizing entities. In short, according to the model, utility maximizing may be in
some cases a more efficient tool for achieving social welfare than social welfare maximization
itself.
After that, the buffer capacity contract was introduced to include Pharma’s willingness
to adopt some of the inventory risk. However, we have kept our distance from the infi-
nite inventory assumption by considering Health’s cost-effectiveness and budget constraints,
which along with Pharma’s incentive compatibility constraint, determine the optimal capac-
ity buffer. We find that this contract is most useful to the manufacturer when the budget
constraint under price-only contracts is not binding and the manufacturer’s per unit over-
stocking/understocking cost ratio is much lower than that of the health payer. However,
when Health’s budget is large, the buffer capacity contract will result in a lower initial order
quantity by Health compared to the exogenous price-only contract, implying that Pharma’s
certain revenue will be strictly lower if access level remains unchanged. For the health payer
and the patients, the buffer capacity contract will be most useful when demand uncertainty
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is high, goodwill cost is high, and the available budget is relatively large. Finally, we find
that under social welfare maximization, the buffer capacity contract can’t decrease access
level nor available inventory relative to the exogenous-price only contract; however when the
health payer maximizes its expected utility, access level and inventory available can either
decrease or increase.
In the end, we have proposed a novel performance-based contract where the pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturer has the option to increase the health-payer’s willingness to pay for a given
drug by offering a partial guarantee on the average realized health benefits. While other
similar contracts have been studied and implemented, the particularities of the approach
here developed is that given the manufacturer’s informational advantage, the health-payer
must base its decisions on the possibility that every contracting scenario may realize. As a
result, if Pharma sends a signal indicating a high level of trust on her originally announced
health-benefit, then she will also need to offer Health a large rebate as collateral. From this
perspective, and while we cannot prove it analytically, the manufacturer is not expected to
send a reliability signal that is higher than her privately held knowledge when the variance of
Pharma’s private information is high, because doing so would increase the probability that
the rebate will need to be paid. In short, the health payer can only calculate his expected
utility based on his own perception of the health benefits and the manufacturer’s signals,
and bases his decisions on the scenario that imposes the tightest constraints; but the man-
ufacturer has visibility on the probability that each scenario may occur so that if she were
completely confident that her announced health benefit will be equal to the realized benefit,
then she could set an extremely large rebate without any negative consequences. Another
interesting property of this contract is its attempt to distance itself from the so-called cost-
containment initiatives and become a truly risk sharing mechanism. For example, without
the need to alter the initial selling price, both the manufacturer and the health payer benefit
from a successful outcome: the payment to the manufacturer increases due to the possibil-
ity of charging the initially negotiated price and selling a larger than initially negotiated
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order quantity, cost-effectiveness is maintained, and drug availability increases. In terms of
the downside risks for the players, the manufacturer assumes most of the risk from lower
than expected health benefits, while the payer assumes the risk relative to the size of the
demand. It is worth discussing the implementability of this contract when multiple patient
categories can be treated by the same drug, and explain why the access level decision was
not included in this model. The situations where it is not expected to add value are when
the budget surplus from Health is low so that the manufacturer’s risk acceptance can’t be
rewarded with a larger revenue stream, and when the cost of verification is large. As for
the exclusion of the access level decision, the main reason is that a fair assessment of the
drug’s performance would require the proportion of patients from each category within the
sample to be the same as in the population. This situation is on one part harder to control,
and additionally would lay an additional layer of risk on the manufacturer’s utility function,
as it would be dependent on the realized distribution of patient arrivals which is prone to
being manipulated by an unethical health-payer. Instead, the belief is that this contract
design should be implemented for a single category of patients per drug (even if, and per-
haps specially when, the drug is administered to multiple categories), and that this category
should be the one where the health-payer’s trust in the manufacturer’s announced health
benefits is low and the manufacturer’s level of confidence is high. In such situations, the
contracting mechanism can allow for increases in access and service level by increasing the
range of order quantities for which cost-effectiveness is achieved, and in general increasing
the health-payer’s expected utility function. Furthermore, since manufacturers tend to lose
patients’ and prescribers’ goodwill following negative health outcomes, it is considered un-
likely for this type of contracts to be viciously implemented.
Last, it is true that a policy-maker or a pharmaceutical manufacturer may implement
the contracts here analyzed in a simultaneous manner. Our analysis does not show any evi-
dence against doing so. Rather, we have attempted to identify the virtues and shortcomings
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of each contract, and we do not expect that these results will change qualitatively when
interaction exists. However, analytically tracking the simultaneous implementation of these
policies does not appear to result in any clear intuition. Taking a simulation approach to
test the theories here presented under contract interaction may prove to be an interesting
research opportunity.
The final Chapter will depart from the decision of whether to serve a fraction or the
entirety of the population, and instead will focus on whether service will be provided to
different patient categories through a single product, or through differentiated products.
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Chapter 4
Pulling, pooling, and contracting in
the presence of heterogeneous
consumers: implications of supply
chain design on innovation, coverage
and profits
4.1 Introduction
Consumer heterogeneity, which has been at the center of our discussions, can often be mea-
sured either subjectively (e.g., an individual’s favorite color, movie, or tourist destination)
or objectively (e.g., a bidders’ maximum willingness to pay in a Vickrey auction or the
health outcome of patients after receiving a drug treatment with multiple therapeutic ap-
plications). Organizations have tried to somehow incorporate the value that their clients
(i.e., their target population) perceive from the products and services these organizations
provide. However, since value is often not easily observable or accurately captured, much
of the operations literature’s focus has been on maximizing profits by determining optimal
133
levels of supply typically considering demand to be stochastic, and sometimes even price de-
pendent, but not explicitly considering the specific preferences of individuals. The economics
literature has tried to acknowledge such heterogeneity in consumers’ valuations by measur-
ing the resulting social surplus created by the demand and supply equilibrium, however it
often ignores demand stochasticity and the corresponding inventory risk. The recent theory
of revenue management is an attempt to efficiently allocate supply taking into account the
heterogeneity in consumers’ valuations, for example, by implementing reservation values for
each consumer category. However, there are some settings where first-come first-serve is the
only implementable allocation policy due to operational, technological, or ethical reasons.
As a result, it is not clear what the optimal supply levels should be when demand for a
given product is partitioned into consumer segments with distinct observable valuations of
the good and where both the demand’s size and order of arrivals are stochastic. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to model the mentioned conditions simultaneously
to obtain operational results.
The scope of the chapter is therefore on a good that is either sold at different prices to
different consumers depending on the consumers’ category (e.g., medical attention provided
to incoming insured and uninsured patients); or equivalently, where different consumer cate-
gories pay the same price for the good but value it differently and the player who delivers the
good observes and internalizes consumer surplus (e.g., fully subsidized drugs that can treat
both terminal and stage 2 cancer patients, providing different QALY’s to each of these two
patient categories). It is important to consider that the distinction in valuations need not
be caused by differences in the taste or willingness to pay of the consumers; but it may also
originate from a good that has multiple applications, each intended for a separate consumer
category and providing a different outcome for each category even when demand is inelastic
with respect to price.
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In order to be consistent with the rest of the dissertation, the model is motivated within a
healthcare setting, but the conclusions of the paper can be adapted to more general contexts
as is illustrated in the last section, as long as the following assumptions are met:
A1: There is heterogeneity in the consumers’ valuations of the good (i.e., different types of
consumers exist), and both the type of consumer and the consumer’s valuation are observ-
able.
A2: The player who decides the inventory stock (or capacity level) of the good either is able
to price-discriminate between consumer types (e.g., through membership cards), or sells at
a unique price to all types of consumers but observes and internalizes their surplus.
A3: The exact order of arrivals of the consumers is ex-ante unknown, but there is some
probabilistic knowledge about it.
A4: No inventory (or capacity) can be reserved and the goods are provided to consumers on
a first-come first-serve basis (i.e., if an incoming consumer demands the good and the good
is available, then the consumer’s demand must be satisfied).
In a newsvendor-type demand process with two observable types of consumers, we use a
separable demand function composed by two categories of patients who consume the same
drug: an initial category (incumbent) of stochastic size and a second category (entrant) of
either deterministic or stochastic size which may or may not realize as a function of R&D
efforts. When the efforts are successful and the entrant category realizes, we show that
accounting for the heterogeneity in consumers’ types in combination with the stochastic
order of arrivals creates an increase in the optimal order quantity that is either larger or
smaller than the size of the newly created demand, but never the same even if the size of
the additional demand is deterministic. Intuitively, when the size of the entrant category is
deterministic, the variance of the demand’s size is unaffected (hence, there is no inventory
pooling effect), but the possibility that the incumbent category consumes drugs that are in-
tended for the entrant category modifies the understocking cost, affecting the order quantity
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for the stochastic part of the demand; we refer to this phenomena as the inventory pulling
effect since the category of patients that composes the stochastic portion of the demand
pulls inventory from a stockpile that was intended for a different category. In this setting,
the chapter’s first key contribution is that depending on which category of consumers (the
stochastic or the deterministic) obtains higher benefits from the drug, then either having a
single common channel that treats multiple patient categories, or having separate channels
exclusively dedicated to each patient category, maximize total welfare, create the maximum
incentives to exert innovation effort, and reduce total inventory levels compared to the in-
efficient selection in the event that the innovation efforts are successful; comparative statics
are presented to show the determinants of the distortion in the order quantity due to the
pulling effect. The second contribution is to analyze the incentive misalignment in a verti-
cally disintegrated supply chain under the model’s stated assumptions, and show that under
exogenous price-only contracts, the direction of the incentives for innovation efforts changes
and the manufacturer always prefers the inefficient channel structure; a contract design is
proposed in the extensions to deal with this issue. Thirdly, we formulate and implicitly solve
the case where the inventory pooling and pulling effects interact, and the effects on inventory
and system’s welfare. Since closed-form solutions are not reachable, numerical experiments
are presented to further our intuition.
The chapter proceeds as follows. We first present a review of relevant literature. Section
4.3 introduces the model in the context of marginal innovations of a drug in a vertically
integrated supply chain involving a pharmaceutical manufacturer and a health-payer, where
the latter delivers the drug to the patients. §4.3.2 solves the case where the two demand
categories are independently served through dedicated channels and in §4.3.3 we introduce
the pulling effect by forcing a single inventory stock to serve the entire market. Section 4.4
departs from vertical integration and allows exogenously determined price-only contracts to
be signed between the manufacturer and the health-payer. Section 4.5 presents some numeri-
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cal results. Extensions to the basic model are included in §4.6, and the interaction of pooling
and pulling effects is modeled in Section 4.7. §4.8 concludes with managerial implications
and brief descriptions of the application of the model into other contexts.
4.2 Literature Review
Products that have multiple applications or that are valued differently by separate consumer
segments are not uncommon but have been narrowly studied in the operations management
literature, particularly when reservation is not allowed.1 While the literature on optimal
effort levels under uncertain conditions is extensive both in the economics and operations
fields, we distinguish that given our approach of the innovation effort in the presence of
heterogenous consumers, our model is closest to Glass (2001). She examines quality im-
provement efforts in a competitive environment when consumers value quality differently.
By analyzing the interaction between quality and price-setting, she finds that allowing the
firm to select price results in price-discrimination with higher quality-adjusted prices for
consumers than those achieved through minimum quality intervention. However, such in-
tervention reduces the firm’s incentives to invest in quality. We observe a similar behavior
in the vertically separated chain such that the design option selected by the manufacturer
is not efficient from a global system perspective, but imposing the efficient design reduces
the manufacturer’s innovation efforts. Additionally, in our model we account for demand
stochasticity to capture the inventory implications of each effort decision.
With respect to such inventory decisions, the immediate reference is the literature around
pooling effects and consolidation. In his seminal work, Eppen (1979) shows that consolidat-
ing supply for multiple demand sources that follow a normal distribution always leads to a
1There is extensive work on revenue management and the calculation of reservation levels as a function
of demand’s arrival rate and willingness to pay. However, the assumptions required in those models are in
conflict with this chapter’s motivation, eliminating their applicability, and are therefore not discussed here.
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decrease in inventory costs relative to a decentralized setting where each demand source is
satisfied by a dedicated inventory stock. This happens due to the firms ability to aggregate
uncertainty and more efficiently match supply and demand. The results from Eppen have
been expanded to cover more general distributions, as well as being the inspiration for em-
pirical work incorporating behavioral factors (see Gerchack and He, 2003, and Alfaro and
Corbett, 2003, for reviews).
Our model shares some commonalities with the models of the competitive (e.g., Lippman
and McCardle, 1994) and substitution (e.g., Parlar, 1988) newsvendor in that there are two
sources of demand that can consume the good from two separate stockpiles. However, we
depart from such works in two fundamental ways. First, a common assumption in those
models is that the selling price of the good is independent of the source of demand. Second,
in both models customers will consume their own stockpile before they attempt to consume
the competitor’s stockpile. In our first setting where one of the sources of demand is of de-
terministic size, consuming from the competing stockpile would only occur if the stochastic
source of demand occurred before realization of the deterministic demand. As a result, while
in Lippman et al., 1994, perfect substitutability never leads to a decrease in total inventory,
in our model this may happen when the demand source with highest uncertainty generates
a higher revenue from the good’s consumption.
There are some recent works that consider customer heterogeneity in the inventory de-
cisions but do not satisfy our allocation rule. Deshpande, Cohen and Donohue (2003) study
the optimal inventory rationing policy in a continuous replenishment setting for two demand
classes that differ in their arrival rates and shortage costs. Under their allocation scheme,
the first come first serve allocation rule is assumed only until a threshold level of on-hand
inventory is reached, at which point demand for the lower class is backordered. As is ex-
plained in this chapter, excluding demand classes after they have been considered eligible is
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not always a feasible option, which is the key assumption that distinguishes our model. In
other words, while their model keeps the threshold as a decision variable, in our model we
fix a threshold of minus infinity as a restriction, so that first-come first-serve is always the
allocation mechanism. Alptekinoglu, Banerjee, Paul and Jain (2012) also have a motivation
very close to ours but follow a different solution approach. In their model, they recognize the
existence of customer heterogeneity, but rather than assuming a different marginal revenue
from selling to different customers, they solve the problem when a pool of inventory (equiv-
alent to our formulation of a single channel) is used to serve customers with varying service
level requirements, in order to find the minimum inventory level and the optimal allocation
policy that would satisfy all customers. Their model is more extensive in that they consider
multiple allocation policies while we assume that customers are provided the good on a first
come first serve basis, which is the constraint that drives our counterintuitive results. Also,
instead of focusing on achieving a minimum service level, the goal of this chapter is to pro-
vide insights on the drivers and service level of the optimal supply chain design, as opposed
to limiting it to be a single a pool.
Finally, Swinney (2012) explores the effects of pooling on customer purchasing behav-
ior where forward looking consumers anticipate end-of-season clearance sales and the firm
chooses to sell in two markets through a separated selling strategy or a pooled selling strat-
egy, which is an approach almost parallel to ours, but with a different focus. He assumes that
prices are time-dependent, rather than demand-dependent, and concentrates the analysis on
the change in consumer’s optimal time to purchase as a function of the selling strategy. The
operational benefits of pooling in his model are consistent with the literature, but finds that
when margins are low and demand is positively correlated, having a separated selling strat-
egy may be optimal, and that when consumers are strategic a pooling strategy may decrease
consumer welfare by increasing competition during high price periods and increasing the
probability of understocks during the clearance period. While his results are driven by the
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consumers’ expectation on the available inventory at different times, our model also finds
that a pooling strategy may hurt social welfare, and that pooling is not necessarily on the
manufacturer’s nor the system’s best interest.
4.3 The Model
4.3.1 General Set-up
We model a two-stage, single period supply chain where a profit-maximizing pharmaceu-
tical manufacturer, hereafter Pharma, offers to sell a new (prescription) drug to a utility-
maximizer health-payer, hereafter Health, through some take-it or leave-it contract arrange-
ment. We consider the health-payer to be interested in the health benefits obtained by the
recipients (i.e., patients) of the new drug, and assume that if a contract is signed between
Pharma and Health, then both players must honor the contract.
Our focus on healthcare, and more specifically the context of prescription drugs which
treat chronic diseases, stems both from its fit with the proposed scope and from its empirical
testability in future research. Drugs often apply to more than one category of patients or
have more than one indication, and all the potential “consumers” of the drug “compete” to
gain access to the same inventory stock. The earlier stated assumptions are met: (1) patients
from different categories (e.g., stage 2 and terminal stage cancer patients) are expected to
obtain a different and measurable expected health-benefit (i.e., value) by consuming the
same drug; (2) regardless of the category of patient that consumes the drug, the health-
payer pays a unique unit price to the pharmaceutical manufacturer and if there is a patient
co-payment, it is also independent of the patient’s category; moreover, for moral, political or
economic reasons, health-payers want to make sure that their health investments generate
a positive health-benefit on the intended population so that the inclusion of the drug can
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be considered cost-effective; (3) the frequency and category of patient arrivals are stochas-
tic, but historical data can be used to develop a probabilistic estimation; and (4) because
of ethical reasons, an individual that qualifies for a drug’s treatment (given a pre-defined
prescription policy threshold) can’t be denied the treatment on the basis of the possible
future arrival of a patient with higher expected health-benefits derived from the same drug
treatment; the contracts with the insurer (public or private) only discuss eligibility, which is
independent of available stock.
In terms of the empirical testability of the propositions here stated, note that a patient’s
change in health as a result of a given medical treatment can be, at least to some extent,
measured and translated into economic terms2. An a priori estimation of the benefits from
following a medical treatment contingent on the patient’s conditions can also be estimated,
which means both that a cost-effectiveness analysis can be performed to decide if the patient
should be treated with the drug, and that a patient’s lost surplus from taking a late treat-
ment or alternative option as opposed to the primary drug treatment can be calculated. All
this implies that the parameters of the model can be empirically estimated enhancing the
applicability of the results.
In stage 1, let e ≥ 0 be the effort exerted by Pharma directly aimed at increasing demand
for its drug in an additive form, i.e., by investing in R&D activities to achieve marginal inno-
vations so that the drug’s therapeutical applications are expanded to a new patient category.
The cost to Pharma of exerting e is C(e), which is assumed to be increasing and convex in
the effort level, and let C(0) = 0. In addition to being a common assumption in newsvendor
models, a convex cost of effort may represent the greater financial risks, or the increased
administration and coordination complexity, associated with higher levels of effort. Before
the beginning of stage 2, the players observe whether the innovation efforts were successful
2QALY’s and DALY’s are typical units of measurement. The appropriateness of each is beyond this
paper’s scope. The interested reader is referred to Airoldi and Morton (2009) for a recent and rich discussion.
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or not. Let x be a binary random variable that takes the value 1 if the innovation efforts, e,
accomplish their goal, which occurs with probability g(e), and 0 otherwise, with probability
(1−g(e)). Assume g(0) = 0, g(1) ≤ 1, g′(e) ≥ 0, and g′′(e) ≤ 0. Assuming the probability of
a successful effort to be non-decreasing and concave in the effort level allows us to guarantee
concavity of the objective function. It is more than intuitive that increasing effort will not
decrease the probability of the effort being successful; and regarding concavity, it represents
how initial efforts can make a large impact, but the marginal impact becomes smaller and
smaller as the effort level increases.
In stage 2, after observing x, Pharma offers a contract to Health.3 If accepted, and before
demand for the drug is realized, Health orders quantity Q of the drug which immediately
after is produced by Pharma at constant marginal cost c. Let D(ε, e) = ε + Nx, be the
total quantity of incoming patients (each representing a unit demand) who show-up in order
to get treated, either with the drug or with an outside option. ε is a random variable that
lies within the interval [0, λ] with probability distribution Ψ( · ) and density ψ( · ), where
Ψ( · ) is IGFR and is exogenous to efforts;4 and N is the deterministic number of additional
patients that could benefit from taking the drug if the innovation efforts are successful.5
To differentiate the patient categories and facilitate notation later on, let Sa be the subset
of patients from the total demand population, D, for whom the drug can provide positive
health benefits, denoted βa, before e is exerted (i.e., the “incumbent” category of patients).
Similarly, let Sb be the subset of patients from the total demand population, D, for whom
the drug can provide positive health benefits, denoted βb, only after, and if, the innovation
efforts are successful (i.e., the “entrant” category of patients that realizes only when x = 1).
Sa ∩ Sb = 0, and |Sa| + |Sb| = D, where |y| denotes the cardinality of y. For simplicity in
3Note that even under advance contract committments, Health would not be bound to his committed
order quantity unless x = 1; therefore Pharma has no possibility of misrepresenting the value of x.
4IGFR: increasing generalized failure rate. The generalized failure rate is the product of a continuous
random variable and its hazard rate, i.e., xψ(x)1−Ψ(x) is weakly increasing in x|Ψ(x) < 1.
5In §4.7 we allow for the size of the entrant category of patients to be stochastic.
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Figure 4.1: Sequence of decisions and events
the analysis we also define Qa (Qb) as the order quantity that corresponds to the stochastic
(deterministic) part of the demand; and Q = Qa + Qb. When both patient categories are
served by the same channel and there is excess demand, then patients gain access to the
drug on a first-come first-serve basis. The timing is depicted in Figure 4.1. There are no
holding costs, and any excess inventory has no salvage value nor incurs any additional cost of
disposal. Common knowledge is assumed among the players regarding all functional forms
and cost parameters.
In what follows we will characterize the solution to the model introduced above under two
vertical arrangements: Integrated chain, and disintegrated chain with an eXogenous price-
only contract; and with two different supply chain designs: Multiple dedicated distribution
channels, and a Single distribution channel. When used as a superindex on the decision
variables, they will denote the optimal solution for that particular scenario.
4.3.2 Multiple channels under vertical integration
We first analyze the situation where each patient category is served through a different
channel. This can be interpreted as a drug that is marketed under a different brand name,
packaging, or delivery method for each consumer category, or as perfectly separated channels
where each patient category is served only at its corresponding dedicated channel. In either
case, it is assumed that the drugs in each channel have an identical cost structure, and that
there is zero substitutability across channels. The problem corresponding to the patients
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belonging to Sa is:
ZMISa (Qa) = −cQa + βa
(∫ Qa
0
ξψ(ξ) dξ +
∫ λ
Qa
Qaψ(ξ) dξ
)
(4.3.1)
The first term is the cost of producing the drug, and the second term is the expected health-
benefits achieved through the drugs that are given to patients. Since the problem is concave,
taking the first-order condition we obtain:6
(βa)
[
1−Ψ (QMIa )]− c = 0
⇒ QMIa = Ψ−1
(
1− c
βa
)
(4.3.2)
For the patients belonging to Sb, the problem in the second stage is deterministic:
ZMISb,2(Qb) = βb min[Qb, Nx]− cQb , (4.3.3)
and clearly:
QMIb =

N if x = 1
0 otherwise
(4.3.4)
Next, recall that E[x] = g(e); therefore E[QMIb ] = Ng(e), and the problem in the first
stage is:
ZMISb,1(e; Q
MI
b ) = −C(e) + (βb − c)Ng(e) (4.3.5)
The first term is the cost of exerting effort and the second term is the expected benefit
6This is the basic newsvendor formulation. The second order condition is ∂
2
∂Q2Z
MI
Sa
(Qa) = −βaΨ′
(
QMIa
) ≤
0, which guarantees concavity.
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minus the production cost generated from the drugs that are given to patients. The objective
is clearly a concave function as it is, by definition, the sum of two concave functions. Taking
the first-order condition with respect to the effort level we obtain:
C ′(eMI) = (βb − c)Ng′(eMI) (4.3.6)
The results presented so far are standard knowledge in the operations management lit-
erature. Summarizing, the expected quantity of drugs available is: QMIa + Ng(e
MI), the
actual quantity of drugs available after observing the outcome of the exerted effort will be:
QMI = Q
MI
a +Q
MI
b .
4.3.3 Single channel under vertical integration
Now consider the case of a single decision-maker when both patient categories compete on a
first-come first-serve basis to gain access to the same inventory of the drug, i.e., when there
is a single channel that serves both patient categories. As usual, we solve the problem by
backwards induction. Instead of solving for Q, we can solve for Qa, taking into account that
QSIa = Q
SI − xN .7 In the second stage, after the realization of x which is a function of the
efforts e, the single decision-maker solves:
ZSI2 (Q) = −cQ+
∫ Qa
0
[βaξ + βbxN ]ψ(ξ) dξ
+ Q
∫ λ
Qa
[
βa
(
ξ
ξ + xN
)
+ βb
(
xN
ξ + xN
)]
ψ(ξ) dξ (4.3.7)
The first term in the objective function is the cost of producing the drug’s order quantity.
The second term is the health-benefits obtained by patients belonging to Sa and Sb when
the available inventory is sufficient to cover all the demand. The third term captures the
7Recall that x = 0 if the innovation is unsuccessful, and x = 1 if the innovation is successful.
145
situation when the stochastic part of the demand (i.e., the inflow of patients belonging to Sa)
exceeds the drug quantity Qa intended to cover that demand; as a result, there is a positive
probability that patients from Sa will consume the drugs intended to satisfy patients from
Sb; this probability depends on the relative sizes of the demand coming from patients of each
category. We introduce the definition of such phenomena as an inventory pulling effect since
the category of patients that composes the stochastic portion of the demand pulls inventory
from a stockpile that was intended for the category of deterministic size.
To provide additional intuition about the last term in (4.3.7), consider the following.
Since there is no information about the order of arrivals, then for a given realized demand,
the order of arrivals is completely random. For example, if x = 1 and D = N + d > Q, then
the expected fraction of patients who receive the drug that belong to type b (i.e., the fraction
of demand which belongs to Sb and arrives within the first Q patients) is (N/(N + d)), and
the expected number of type b patients who receive the drug is the number of drugs available
times the fraction of drugs allocated to Sb patients: Q (N/(N + d)). Since the value of d is
stochastic, the formulation needs to integrate over all values of d ≥ Q.
Define QSI ∈ arg max ZSI2 (Q). Therefore:
QSI =

QSIa,1 +N if x = 1
QSIa,0 otherwise
(4.3.8)
Using backwards induction, the first order condition for the optimal order quantity is as
follows:
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When x = 1:
(βa)
[
1−Ψ (QSIa,1)]− c+ (βb − βa)∫ λ
QSIa,1
xN
ξ + xN
ψ(ξ)dξ = 0 (4.3.9)
When x = 0:
(βa)
[
1−Ψ (QSIa,0)]− c = 0 (4.3.10)
The proof for equations (4.3.9) and (4.3.10) is provided in the Appendix. A straightfor-
ward, yet important to notice, result is that QSIa,0 = Q
MI
a , which means that when effort is
unsuccessful the order quantity in the system is independent of the channel structure; this
follows by direct comparison of (4.3.2) and (4.3.10). A second interesting observation that
is also consistent with previous results in the literature is that if βa = βb, then the optimal
order quantity is exactly the same as in the case of multiple channels; this follows because the
last term in (4.3.9) becomes zero, and the equation collapses into (4.3.2). While we cannot
get a closed form solution for QSIa,1 when βa 6= βb, we can take advantage of the fact that the
problem is concave in the order quantity. Namely, we can observe whether the total order
quantity increases or decreases with respect to the dedicated channels case by observing the
sign of the slope when we replace QSIa,1 with Q
MI
a into equation (4.3.9). These results are
summarized in Proposition 16.
Proposition 16: a) When x = 0, QSI = QMI . b) When x = 1 and βa = βb, then Q
SI = QMI .
c) When x = 1 and βa > βb, then Q
SI < QMI . d) When x = 1 and βa < βb, then Q
SI > QMI .
Proposition 16a simply states that when there is only one category of consumers, the
optimal order quantity is the same as in the multiple channels structure, as was expected.
Similarly, Proposition 16b states that even if two patient categories exist, when the benefit
received by members of both populations are equivalent (or considered as equivalent), then
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the order quantity is also the same as in the multiple channels case. More interestingly,
Proposition 16c says that when a second patient category exists and the benefit obtained by
a member belonging to the second category is lower than that obtained by a member from
the first category, the buyer will increase its inventory in a proportion lower than the increase
in expected demand (i.e., (QSI < QMIa +xN)), for reasons other than the pooling effect. The
intuition is that the pulling effect creates an externality on the consumption of the drug for
the patients belonging to Sb, which is ignored in the case of independent monopolies. As a
result, the relative weight that the decision-maker allocates to understocking for the stochas-
tic part of the demand (i.e., patients ∈ Sa) decreases because in case of excess demand,
members from the first category may pull inventory from the second category, thus resulting
in a lower total order quantity. Finally, Proposition 16d states the opposite scenario, so that
when the benefits obtained by a member from the second category are greater than those
of the first category, then the relative cost of excess demand is larger because of the same
pulling effect, thus resulting in a larger total quantity, even if both demands are managed
by the same profit maximizer. For the decision-maker, the pulling effect implies that the
quantity of drugs manufactured and the resulting expected quantity of patients treated will
be higher (respectively, lower) for a single drug that treats multiple patient categories than
for multiple category-specific drugs when the category of patients with less demand stochas-
ticity receives higher (respectively, lower) benefits from the drug. While the relevance of
this observation will become more apparent in following sections, for the moment it further
adds to the discussion between marginal innovations of existing compounds (e.g., a single
product, or product line extensions) versus new drugs development (e.g., multiple products
or product differentiation).
A crucial aspect to notice at this point is that the changes in the optimal order quantities
at stage 2 do not depend on how much effort was exerted at stage 1; they only depend on
whether the effort was successful or not (i.e., x = 0 or x = 1). Having made this point
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explicit, let us look at how the demand increasing efforts are affected by the pulling effect.
In the first stage, the problem that the single decision-maker solves is:
ZSI1 (e; Q
SI) = −C(e)− c[g(e)(QSIa,1 +N) + (1− g(e))QSIa,0]
+g(e)
[∫ QSIa,1
0
[βaξ + βbN ]ψ(ξ) dξ
+ (QSIa,1 +N)
∫ λ
QSIa,1
[
βa
(
ξ
ξ +N
)
+ βb
(
N
ξ +N
)]
ψ(ξ) dξ
]
+(1− g(e))
[∫ QSIa,0
0
βaξψ(ξ) dξ + Q
SI
a,0
∫ λ
QSIa,0
βaψ(ξ) dξ
]
subject to:
QSI ∈ arg max ZSI2 (Q) (4.3.11)
The only variations in the objective function of the first stage relative to the second stage
are that: (1) the innovation effort cost is now included (in stage 2, this was considered a
sunk cost); and (2) x is still a random variable and dependent on the decision-maker’s choice
of e, which impacts the expected order quantity. Although closed form solutions for the level
of effort can’t be obtained either - because the optimal order quantity can’t be plugged in
equation (4.3.11) -, the first order condition can be expressed as follows (if needed, see details
in the proof of Proposition 17 in the Appendix):
∂ZSI1 (e; Q
SI)
∂e
= −C ′(e)− g′(e) (ZSI2 (QSIa,0))∣∣x=0 + g′(e) (ZSI2 (QSIa,1 +N))∣∣x=1 = 0(4.3.12)
This structure is sufficient to determine whether the incentives to exert effort have increased
or decreased relative to the multiple channels structure, based on the change in profit gen-
erated when the efforts are successful. This first result is expressed in Lemma 23.
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Lemma 23:
a)Suppose x=0. Then ZSI2 (Q
SI) = ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(QMIb ).
b) Suppose x=1. Then:
b1) if βa = βb, then Z
SI
2 (Q
SI) = ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(QMIb );
b2) if βa > βb, then Z
SI
2 (Q
SI) > ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(QMIb );
b3) if βa < βb, then Z
SI
2 (Q
SI) < ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(QMIb ).
Part a of Lemma 23 is trivial because when x = 0, then ZMISb,2(Q
MI
b ) = 0, and from
Proposition 16, the order quantity in the system will be the same under any structure be-
cause there will be only one patient population. Part b, however, does benefit from a more
elaborate explanation. Observe that the total health benefits derived from the deterministic
portion of the demand can’t be higher than βbN , and by definition, Q
MI
a minimizes the cost
of uncertainty in the multiple channel scenario for patients of type a. Notice then that there
are two ways in which the value of the objective function can increase. One is to reduce
inventory costs, and the other is to increase the health benefits achieved by the patients. If
under a single channel structure, the inventory was set equal to QMI , then patients from Sa
are guaranteed at least a private stock of QMIa , because those from Sb will not consume more
than N drugs. Therefore setting QSI < QMI (alternatively, QSI > QMI) because βa > βb
(alternatively, βa < βb) is intended to take advantage from (alternatively, restrict) the pulling
effect. Another way to see this is that given excess demand under the single channel struc-
ture, then for every patient belonging to Sb who does not get the drug, which happens when
a patient from Sa arrives first and receives the drug instead, a net margin of (βa − βb) is
generated. On one hand, when the margin is positive, i.e., βa > βb, expected health benefits
for the same inventory level increase, also increasing net utility; since it has been shown that
QSI < QMI under these circumstances, the explanation is that the total inventory is lowered
compared to the dedicated channels up to the point where the decrease in purchasing costs
is no longer justified by the health benefits achieved thanks to the pulling effect. On the
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other hand, when the margin is negative, i.e., βa < βb, expected health benefits for the
same inventory level decrease, also decreasing net utility; lowering the total inventory would
increase the negative consequences of the pulling effect, and since it has been shown that
QSI > QMI under these circumstances, it must be that both inventory costs are rising and
health benefits are dropping compared to the dedicated channels case. The inventory then
is increased up to the point where the increase in purchasing costs is no longer justified by
the savings achieved by limiting the pulling effect. In summary, since profits always increase
(respectively, decrease) in SI with respect to MI when βa > βb, (respectively, βb > βa), then
the incentives to exert innovation effort are higher (respectively, lower) in SI. The result is
summarized in Proposition 17.
Proposition 17: a) When βa = βb, then e
SI = eMI . b) When βa > βb, then e
SI > eMI . c)
When βa < βb, then e
SI < eMI .
Proposition 17 provides interesting managerial implications. First, Proposition 17a says
that when the benefits are equivalent to both populations, then the channel structure has no
effect on the effort level. However, when βa > βb, (alternatively βa < βb), Proposition 17b
(alternatively, Proposition 17c) states that innovation efforts will increase (decrease) despite
the fact that the total inventory decreases (increases). This is because of the decreased (in-
creased) inventory cost and the reallocation of the available inventory created by the pulling
effect.
Theorem 5: (a) if βa > βb, having a single sales channel for all patient categories maximizes
expected total welfare; (b) if βa < βb, having separate sales channels for each consumer cate-
gory maximizes expected total welfare; and (c) in both cases, the efficient channel structure
maximizes innovation efforts and in the event of a successful innovation, results in (weakly)
less coverage with respect to the one that would be achieved under the inefficient channel
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structure.
Theorem 5 summarizes the chapter’s first key contribution. The first takeaway is that the
design of the efficient channel structure depends on which patient category obtains higher
benefits from the drug. Theorem 5a implies that when the marginal benefits for the entrant
population of consumers are lower than those of the incumbent consumers’ population, then
it is more efficient to serve both populations with a unique multi-purpose product rather
than serving each population with a specific product. Another implication is that even if a
single channel is used to distribute the drug to both patient categories, if the order quantity
is chosen based on independent forecasts and then put together, then the single channel
will order a higher than efficient order quantity. Theorem 5b describes the opposite case,
such that when the entrant population has a higher valuation of the product than the in-
cumbent population it is efficient that each population manages its own inventory stock (or
equivalently, that a different product serves each population), rather than keeping a common
inventory (equivalently, a single product). Finally Theorem 5c states that choosing the most
efficient channel structure increases the probability that a drug that treats the second cate-
gory of patients exists, but when the efforts are successful and the drug does exist, then total
quantity of drugs available in the system will be (weakly) lower than under the inefficient
channel structure.8
8Although it may be obvious to the reader, it is worth mentioning that even though expected utility will
be higher given the choice of the efficient channel, the realized utility may not be so. The most explicit
example is when the effort is unsuccessful. Since the level of effort exerted is higher under the efficient
channel, then so is the cost of such effort. Therefore, if despite higher effort levels, x = 0, then the utility
generated at stage 2 will be the same for both structures (Lemma 23a), but the cost of effort incurred at
stage 1 will be higher under the efficient channel design (Proposition 17), resulting in a lower total utility.
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4.4 Exogenous price-only contracts
In this section, assume that Pharma sells the drug to Health at some exogenously deter-
mined price w, where min[βa, βb] > w > c. As before, we will first analyze the problem
under multiple channels where each channel is used to satisfy a different patient category,
and then we’ll extend the analysis to the single channel case.
4.4.1 Multiple Channels with Exogenous Price (MX)
The problem for Health’s channel that is in charge of treating the incumbent population is:
HMXSa (Qa) = −wQa + βa
(∫ Qa
0
ξψ(ξ) dξ +
∫ λ
Qa
Qaψ(ξ) dξ
)
(4.4.1)
Compared to the integrated supply chain arrangement, Health now replaces the manu-
facturing cost c with the transfer price w in its objective function. Taking the first-order
condition:
QMXa = Ψ
−1
(
1− w
βa
)
(4.4.2)
By direct comparison, we can observe that QMXa < Q
MI
a , which is also a known result
in the literature due to double marginalization. As for Health’s channel serving the patients
belonging to Sb, the problem is:
HMXSb,2 (Qb) = βb min[Qb, Nx]− wQb (4.4.3)
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where clearly:
QMXb =

N if x = 1
0 otherwise
(4.4.4)
In the first stage, the problem for Pharma is:
MMX(e) = −C(e) + (w − c)(QMXa +Ng(e))
subject to:
QMXa = Ψ
−1
(
1− w
βa
)
(4.4.5)
The first term is the cost of exerting effort and the second term is the marginal profit
generated from the drugs that are sold to Health. Taking the first-order condition we obtain:
C ′(eMX) = (w − c)Ng′(eMX) (4.4.6)
In summary, the only difference is the double-marginalization effect, which will decrease
the order quantity and the effort exerted, relative to the vertically integrated chain.
4.4.2 Single Channel with Exogenous Price (SX)
The problem for Health is:
HSX(Q) = −wQ+
∫ Qa
0
[βaξ + βbxN ]ψ(ξ) dξ
+ Q
∫ λ
Qa
[
βa
(
ξ
ξ + xN
)
+ βb
(
xN
ξ + xN
)]
ψ(ξ) dξ
(4.4.7)
As before, we solve for Qa instead of Q, recalling that Q
SX
a = Q
SX − xN . Define
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QSX ∈ arg max HSX(Q). Therefore:
QSX =

QSXa,1 +N if x = 1
QSXa,0 otherwise
(4.4.8)
Using backwards induction, the first order condition for the optimal order quantity is as
follows:
When x = 1:
(βa)
[
1−Ψ (QSXa,1 )]− w + (βb − βa)∫ λ
QSXa,1
xN
ξ + xN
ψ(ξ)dξ = 0 (4.4.9)
When x = 0:
(βa)
[
1−Ψ (QSXa,0 )]− w = 0 (4.4.10)
Once more, it is straightforward to observe that given w > c, then both QSXa,1 < Q
SI
a,1, and
QSXa,0 < Q
SI
a,0. The problem for Pharma is:
MSX(e; QSX) = −C(e) + (w − c) (g(e)(QSXa,1 +N) + (1− g(e))QSXa,0 )
subject to:
QSX ∈ arg max HSX(Q) (4.4.11)
Taking the first-order condition we obtain:
C ′(eSX) = (w − c) (g′(eSX)(N +QSXa,1 −QSXa,0 ) (4.4.12)
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We now begin our analysis of the supply chain’s design incentive misalignment under the
vertically separated chain.
Lemma 24: a) When x = 0, QSX = QMX . b) When x = 1 and βa = βb, then Q
SX = QMX . c)
When x = 1 and βa > βb, then Q
SX < QMX . d) When x = 1 and βa < βb, then Q
SX > QMX .
Lemma 24 shows that the results from the previous section regarding the impact of the
pulling effect on the optimal order quantity carry on to the case when there is vertical
separation and the players contract through exogenously determined price-only contracts.
However, the direction of the results in the first stage are no longer consistent with §4.3, as
is expressed in Proposition 18.
Proposition 18: a) If βa = βb, then e
SX = eMX ; b) If βa > βb, then e
SX < eMX ; c) If βa < βb,
then eSX > eMX .
Proposition 18 shows an important difference when the players act separately. In the ver-
tically integrated setting from the previous subsection, the effort decision was made based on
the system’s profits. In the case when the innovation effort was successful, the incremental
profits were higher (respectively, lower) when βa > βb, (respectively, βb > βa), recalling that
this occurred as a consequence of lower (respectively, higher) total order quantities. How-
ever, in the current contracting setting, Pharma makes her effort decision based only on the
quantity of drugs that she sells and not necessarily on the benefits that are transferred to
the population of patients. Comparing between the channel structures, Proposition 18b and
Proposition 18c say that the intensity of Pharma’s effort are not aligned with the net util-
ity consequences. Namely, Proposition 18b, (respectively, Proposition 18c) says that when
βa > βb, (respectively, βa < βb), Pharma will have less (respectively, more) incentives to exert
innovation effort when there is a single channel versus when there are multiple channels; but
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using the results from section 4.3, Pharma’s optimal decisions result in a higher probability
of the innovation being successful if the inefficient channel structure is in place. A second
way of interpreting the results is that if the efficient channel structure is imposed by some
external agent, then Pharma’s efforts will be lower than if she were allowed to operate under
an inefficient channel structure. The conclusions from this section are written in Theorem 6
and serve as the motivation to explore a risk sharing contract that links Pharma’s payoff to
the realized benefits of the drug, which is the topic of section 4.6.
Theorem 6: Under exogenous price-only contracts, (a) the pharmaceutical manufacturer
benefits, on expectation, from selecting the inefficient channel structure; and (b) selecting the
inefficient channel structure provides the pharmaceutical manufacturer with higher incen-
tives to exert innovation effort and increases the probability that a second patient category
exists.
4.5 Numerical Studies
To gain additional intuition, we have run numerical studies, for which some graphs are
presented next. In addition to confirming the direction of the pulling effect which was ana-
lytically proven, we are able to gain additional insights on the key drivers that determine the
required adjustment in the optimal order quantity as a result of the aforementioned pulling
effect. First, from Figure 4.2, we find that the required adjustment on the order quantity,
whether it is upwards or downwards, increases in the size of the population with determinis-
tic demand, N .9 The intuition is that a higher relative size of N increases the ability to pull
drugs from the deterministic portion of the stock and therefore: when βa > βb, the pulling
effect reduces the inventory stocking needs (so the decrease in the order quantity is greater
as N increases). Alternatively, when βa < βb, there is a need to restrict the pulling effect,
9Recall that when βa = βb, or when x = 0, it has been shown that no adjustment is made.
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which is achieved by increasing the inventory stock; in such situation, the increase in the
order quantity is greater as N increases, i.e., as the severity of the pulling effect increases.
Secondly, from Figure 4.3 we confirm that the change in the optimal net utility also increases
as the size of N increases. The explanation is a consequence of the changes in the optimal
order quantity; the larger the profit impact of moving from a dedicated to a single channel
arrangement, the larger the correction in the order quantity will tend to be.
Third, Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show (from top to bottom) the relative change in utility, the
relative change in the order quantity, and the absolute change in the order quantity. We
can observe that when βb > βa, the required adjustment (which is upwards) increases as
βb increases. The logic is that the higher the relative value of βb, the more important it
becomes to prevent the pulling effect, and therefore a larger adjustment is needed. On the
complementary part, when βb < βa, the required adjustment (which is downwards) decreases
as βb increases. This occurs because when βb is very small, the desired pulling effect will be
large, but as βb grows, the deterministic benefit becomes more desirable, and it is no longer
optimal to reduce so much the total order quantity, i.e., the adjustment becomes smaller.
A summarizing way to interpret the relationship between βa and βb is that for fixed βa,
when the difference in the expected health benefits from patients belonging to Sa and Sb is
low, then the relevance of the pulling effect decreases, reducing the need to distort the order
quantity. This is consistent with equation 4.3.10 which defines the optimal order quantity
under a single integrated channel, QSIa , since the magnitude of the slope (the first order
derivative) increases with the difference between the benefits from each category.
Fourth, Figures 4.6 and 4.7 provide the relationship between the effort levels exerted at
stage 1, depending on whether the design is that of a single or dedicated channels. These
results are traced back to the previous figures which showed if the change in utility when
x = 1 is positive or negative relative to the dedicated channels structure. Since the latter
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Figure 4.2: Changes in the optimal order quantity, given x = 1
ε ∼ Uniform [0, 100]; c = 1.5
159
Figure 4.3: Changes in optimal net utility for different values of N , given x = 1
ε ∼ Uniform [0, 100]; c = 1.5
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Figure 4.4: Changes across βa
ε ∼ Uniform [0, 100];N = 100; c = 1.5
relationship depends only on whether betaa ≷ βb, then the effort levels are driven by the
same mechanics. As the net increase in the single channel versus the dedicated channels
design, derived from x = 1, is positive then eSI/eMI > 1 ⇒ eSI > eMI . Figures 4.6 and
4.7 describe this behavior for two specific functional forms of g(e) and C(e). However, the
results evidently hold as long as the conditions described in the model setup hold.
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Figure 4.5: Changes across βb
ε ∼ Uniform [0, 100];N = 100; c = 1.5
Finally, it’s worth mentioning that as can be observed from the figures, the relative
adjustment in terms of quantity, and specially in terms of expected utility, may be quite
considerable. Therefore, the optimal choice of the design of the supply chain is likely to have
a relevant impact both on consumers, and on the player selecting the design and supplying
the good to be consumed. Motivated by this, the next section proposes some alternatives to
correct the incentive misalignments arising in the vertically disintegrated chain, as well as
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Figure 4.6: Changes in the relative effort levels across βb (example 1)
ε ∼ Uniform [0, 100];N = 100; c = 1.5; g(e) = e;C(e) = e2/2
Figure 4.7: Changes in the relative effort levels across βb (example 2)
ε ∼ Uniform [0, 100];N = 100; c = 1.5; g(e) = e1/2;C(e) = e2
extending the applicability of the results by relaxing some of the previous assumptions.
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4.6 Extensions to the Model
4.6.1 Coordinating the supply chain design
At the end of the exogenous price analysis, it was noted that a social planner would be
faced with a complicated decision in terms of choosing the optimal supply chain design. For
example, if βa > βb, then it has been established that the optimal design is to have a single
channel that can benefit from the pulling effect. However, the probability of the second pa-
tient category materializing is contingent on Pharma’s efforts, but Pharma has no incentive
neither to choose the efficient supply chain design, and even if it is imposed, to exert the
level of effort that would benefit the supply chain. One option, while not a very advisable
one, is for the social planner to allow the establishment of the inefficient supply chain design
in order to provide the manufacturer with higher incentives to exert innovation effort, and
therefore increase the probabilities of achieving a higher access level, even if it comes at a
larger than optimal cost. A second option aimed at providing the manufacturer with the
right incentives to innovate without sacrificing the efficient choice of the supply chain design
is provided next based on a simple lump sum fee.
A social planner is offered with two basic options in order to modify the manufacturer’s
incentives: impose a tax T , or offer a reward R. Suppose βa > βb; then Pharma prefers to
have multiple channels, which would waste the benefits from the pulling effect. The first
option is to tax the manufacturer a lump sum amount T ∗m for every additional channel used
(e.g., a fixed fee for every new brand registry). The alternative option is to offer the manufac-
turer a reward R∗s for every additional application of a single existing good (e.g., rewarding
marginal innovations in health care, or offering a discount on the registration process for
additional therapeutic applications of a drug).
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Proposition 19:
Assume βa > βb. Define T
∗
m = M
MX(eMX ;QMX)−MSX(eSX ;QSX) = R∗s > 0.
a) Both taxing T ∗m, or rewarding R
∗
s, coordinate the supply chain design decision.
b) By taxing T ∗m, then (e
MX |T = T ∗m) = (eSX |T = 0) < (eMX |T = 0).
c) By rewarding R∗s, then (e
SX |R = R∗s) = (eMX |R = 0) > (eSX |R = 0).
The main takeaway from Proposition 19 is that while there is more than one simple, im-
plementable alternative to coordinate the supply chain design, each alternative can be used
to affect the level of efforts exerted. Notice that the conditions in Proposition 19b coordinate
the chain, but induce the inefficient effort level; the tax only allows Health to take advantage
of the pulling effect in case the efforts are successful, but the probability of those efforts
being successful is lower than the case where no tax exists and Pharma chooses a multiple
channels design. In Proposition 19c, both the supply chain decision and the effort level are
chosen efficiently; this occurs because by offering a fixed reward for marginal innovations of
the same product, then the expected benefit for Pharma derived from a successful innovation
effort is the same regardless of the design choice.
Additionally, the contract could include a revenue sharing scheme or any other form of
inventory coordinating mechanism in order to avoid the presence of double-marginalization.
Such problem is vastly studied in the literature (see Cachon, 2003) and their inclusion here
would add no theoretical value. For complementarity, Proposition 20 looks at the situation
where βa < βb. In such case, Pharma prefers a single channel structure, while the social
planner prefers to have multiple channels to avoid the pulling effect. Under such a case, the
social planner could establish a tax, T ∗s , for multiple applications of the same product, or
offer a reward, R∗m, for the introduction of new, dedicated or differentiated products.
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Proposition 20:
Assume βa < βb. Define T
∗
s = M
SX(eSX ;QSX)−MMX(eMX ;QMX) = R∗m > 0.
a) Taxing T ∗s and rewarding R
∗
m both coordinate the supply chain design decision.
b) By taxing T ∗s , then (e
SX |T = T ∗s ) = (eMX |T = 0) < (eSX |T = 0).
c) By rewarding R∗m, then (e
MX |R = R∗m) = (eSX |R = 0) > (eMX |R = 0).
4.6.2 Design Dependent Cost Functions
An assumption of the model is that the cost of innovation is independent of the supply chain
design, which we relax to some extent here. On one hand, economies of scale could suggest
lower costs of innovation for single channel designs, in addition to the set-up cost for intro-
ducing new products in a multiple channels case. On the other hand, innovation effort in
a single channel design may be considered more expensive due to the lower probabilities of
finding additional applications for a single product, and having multiple dedicated channels
may reduce the uncertainty in the effort’s efficacy or can increase the possibility of finding
subsidies. Proposition 21 presents the scenarios for which the results still apply, even under
different cost functions.
Proposition 21: Define CM(·) as the cost of exerting innovation effort in a multiple channels
design. Define CS(·) as the cost of exerting innovation effort in a single channel design.
a) If CM(e) > CS(e), and βa > βb, the efficient design remains a single channel design.
b) If CM(e) < CS(e), and βa < βb, the efficient design remains a multiple channels design.
c) If CM(e) = CS(e) +K, where K is a constant, then the optimal level of effort is the same
under both designs, but the efficient supply chain design may change.
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4.6.3 Binary success probabilities
In the model we have defined the probability of success to be non-decreasing and concave in
the level of effort. It is possible that the innovation effort is of the “win-all lose-all” type,
i.e, a threshold level of effort needs to be incurred in order for the second patient category to
realize, so that the probability of success is 0 for efforts below the threshold, and x for any
effort level equal to or above the threshold, where x ∈ (0, 1). Based on the continued interest
on this situation, it was considered important to point out that the formulation used allows
for such circumstances, and that in those cases the optimal effort will be either equal to zero
(if at the threshold the marginal costs exceed marginal benefits) or equal to the threshold
(otherwise).
4.7 When Pulling meets Pooling
Throughout the analysis it has been assumed that the additional demand created by the
innovation efforts is deterministic. This was done in order to cleanly observe the impact
of the inventory pulling effect on the optimal order quantity and the innovation effort. In
order to observe the combined effects of pooling and pulling, for j = a, b, let εj be a normal
distributed random variable with mean µj and variance σ
2
j , where Ψj(·) and ψj(·) are used
to denote the distribution and probability density functions, respectively. Assume εa and εb
are independent and uncorrelated, and that the coefficient of variation is sufficiently small
so that Ψj(0) = 0, j = a, b. Recall that the demand for type b patients is contingent on
e and is only realized when x = 1. We also define the random variable Θ = ε1 + xε2,
which is conditional on the outcome of the innovation effort and has a conditional normal
distribution function Φ(· | 1) and density φ(· | 1) when x = 1, and conditional normal
distribution function Φ(· | 0) , Ψa(·), and density φ(· | 0) , ψa(·), when x = 0. The goal is
then to observe the impact on the total drug order quantity and the incentives for innovation
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effort. We do so by following the procedure shown in section 4.3 (i.e., we assume vertical
integration).
4.7.1 Multiple Channels with stochastic demands
We use superindex (MS), referring to Multiple channels with Stochastic size demands, to de-
note the optimal solutions in this subsection. Notice first that by providing different markets
with different goods (i.e., the equivalent setting to §4.3.2) both the pulling and the pooling
effects are suppressed and we obtain a solution slightly different to that presented earlier,
where the only adjustment is that a critical fractile must be calculated for the new category of
patients. For j = a, b, let Qj be the drug order quantity to satisfy demand from patients ∈ Sj.
The problem for satisfying the demand from patients belonging to Sa is:
ZMSSa (Qa) = −cQa + βa
(∫ Qa
0
ξψa(ξ) dξ +
∫ ∞
Qa
Qaψa(ξ) dξ
)
(4.7.1)
Taking the first order condition:
QMSa = Ψ
−1
a
(
1− c
βa
)
(4.7.2)
It is clear that when x = 0, then QMSb = 0, Then, the problem in stage 2 is only relevant
when x = 1, in which case the decision-maker solves:
ZMSSb,2(Qb) = −cQb + βb
(∫ Qb
0
ξψb(ξ) dξ +
∫ ∞
Qb
Qbψb(ξ) dξ
)
x (4.7.3)
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Taking the first order condition:
QMSb =

Ψ−1b
(
1− c
βb
)
if x = 1
0 otherwise
(4.7.4)
As a result, the problem in stage 1 for the decision-maker planning to serve patients
belonging to category Sb is:
ZMSSb,1(e; Qb) = −C(e) + (βb − c)E[QMSb ]
subject to:
E[QMSb ] = g(e)Φ
−1
(
1− c
βb
)
(4.7.5)
The first term is the cost of exerting effort and the second term is the expected benefit minus
the production cost generated from the drugs that are given to patients. Notice that we take
into account the order quantity that realizes when x = 1 times the probability that x = 1.
Taking the first-order condition we obtain:
C ′(eMS) = (βb − c) Ψ−1b
(
1− c
βb
)
g′(eMS) (4.7.6)
4.7.2 Single channel with stochastic demands
If a single channel is used to satisfy both categories, then both pooling and pulling will occur
and the decision-maker solves the following problem which we denote with the superindex
(SS), referring to Single channel with Stochastic size demands. Again, we solve by backwards
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induction. In the second stage, after the realization of x, the cost of effort is sunk and the
single decision-maker solves:
ZSS2 (Q) = −cQ+
∫ Q
εa=0
∫ Q−ξ
0
(βaξ + βbxη)ψa(ξ)ψb(η) dη dξ
+
∫ Q
εa=0
∫ ∞
Q−ξ
Q
(
βa
(
ξ
ξ + xη
)
+ βb
(
xη
ξ + xη
))
ψa(ξ)ψb(η) dη dξ
+
∫ ∞
εa=Q
∫ ∞
0
Q
(
βa
(
ξ
ξ + xη
)
+ βb
(
xη
ξ + xη
))
ψa(ξ)ψb(η) dη dξ (4.7.7)
Breaking down equation (4.7.7), the first line includes the cost of purchasing Q units, and
the revenue when the total demand doesn’t exceed Q. The second and third lines calculate
the revenue captured when demand exceeds the available inventory. On the second line, the
demand derived from type a patients is not enough to exceed the available inventory on its
own, and so the second integral considers those cases where demand of type b patients is
sufficiently large to generate a stockout. On the third line, the demand derived from type
a patients is enough to exceed capacity, and therefore all possible realizations of patients of
type b are considered. For visibility purposes, the second and third line can be merged as is
shown in equation (4.7.8). Notice that taking ξ as the realized value of the type a patients,
when (Q − ξ) > 0, the second line in (4.7.8) captures the second line in (4.7.7); and when
(Q− ξ) ≤ 0, the second line in (4.7.8) captures the third line in (4.7.7).
ZSS2 (Q) = −cQ+
∫ Q
εa=0
∫ Q−ξ
0
(βaξ + βbxη)ψa(ξ)ψb(η) dη dξ
+
∫ ∞
εa=0
∫ ∞
max[0,Q−ξ]
Q
(
βa
(
ξ
ξ + xη
)
+ βb
(
xη
ξ + xη
))
ψa(ξ)ψb(η) dη dξ (4.7.8)
We believe that (4.7.7) and (4.7.8) are useful for illustration purposes. However, from this
point forward, it becomes easier to continue the analysis by working with the joint probability
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distribution, which is conditional on the value of x. We then rewrite the objective function
at stage 2 as follows:
ZSS2 (Q) = −cQ+ (1− x)(βa)
(∫ Q
0
θφ(θ | 0) dξ +
∫ ∞
Q
Qφ(θ | 0) dθ
)
+x
(∫ Q
Θ=0
(βaE[εa | Θ = θ, x = 1] + βbE[εb | Θ = θ, x = 1])φ(θ | 1) dθ
+
∫ ∞
Θ=Q
Q
(
βaE[εa | Θ = θ, x = 1] + βb (E[εb | Θ = θ, x = 1])
θ
)
φ(θ | 1) dθ
)
(4.7.9)
where
E[εa | Θ = θ, x = 1] =
∫ θ
εa=0
ξψb(θ − ξ)ψa(ξ) dξ , (4.7.10)
E[εb | Θ = θ, x = 1] = θ −E[εa | Θ = θ, x = 1] =
∫ θ
εb=0
ηψa(θ − η)ψb(η) dη . (4.7.11)
Notice that when x = 0, the second and third lines of (4.7.9) are equal to zero, and when
x = 1, the value of the first line is simply (−cQ). Additionally, it is instructive to point
out that in (4.7.9), the third line (which captures the situations where total demand exceeds
Q) includes a denominator θ inside the integral, unlike the equation’s second line (which
captures the situations where total demand is lower than Q). The reason is simple. On one
hand, the realized health benefits in the demand scenarios captured in the second line is
independent of the order of arrivals because there are no stockouts; on the other hand, the
realized health benefits in the scenarios captured in the third line do depend on the order
of arrivals, and therefore the total arrivals must be normalized in order to determine the
expected allocation of the Q drugs to type a and type b patients.
171
Define QSS ∈ arg max(Q) ZSS2 (Q). Therefore:
QSS =

QSSa,b if x = 1
QSSa,0 otherwise
(4.7.12)
Taking the first order condition of (4.7.9) conditional on x = 0 yields10:
QSSa,0 = Φ
−1
(
1− c
βa
∣∣∣∣ 0) (4.7.13)
Lemma 25: QSSa,0 = Q
MS
a .
Lemma 25 states that when x = 0, the optimal order quantity is independent of whether
the system’s design has a single channel or dedicated channels. As expected, this is consistent
with the results from §4.3 given that x = 0 even though the second category is now stochastic.
Taking the first order condition of (4.7.9), conditional on x = 1 yields11:
∫ ∞
Θ=QSSa,b
(
βaE[εa | Θ = θ, x = 1] + βb (E[εb | Θ = θ, x = 1])
θ
)
φ(θ | 1) dθ − c = 0 (4.7.14)
10The proof for equation (4.7.13) is provided in the Appendix.
11The proof for equation (4.7.14) is provided in the Appendix.
172
Replacing (4.7.10) and (4.7.11) into (4.7.14), we simplify the expression as follows:
∫ ∞
Θ=QSSa,b
(βb − βa)
(∫ θ
εb=0
ξψa(θ − ξ)ψb(ξ) dξ
)
θ
+ βa
φ(θ | 1) dθ = c
βa
(
1− Φ (QSSa,b | 1))+ ∫ ∞
Θ=QSSa,b
(βb − βa)
(∫ θ
εb=0
ξψa(θ − ξ)ψb(ξ) dξ
)
θ
φ(θ | 1) dθ = c
βa
(
1− Φ (QSSa,b | 1))+ (βb − βa)∫ ∞
Θ=QSSa,b
(
(E[εb | Θ = θ, x = 1])
θ
)
φ(θ | 1) dθ = c(4.7.15)
or alternatively:
βb
(
1− Φ (QSSa,b | 1))+ (βa − βb)∫ ∞
Θ=QSSa,b
(
(E[εa | Θ = θ, x = 1])
θ
)
φ(θ | 1) dθ = c(4.7.16)
A remarkable finding is the similarity in the structure between equations (4.7.15) and
(4.7.16), and equation (4.3.9). Once again, as we did in §4.3, we observe that when βa = βb,
the second term in (4.7.15) and (4.7.16) becomes zero and our model collapses into the fa-
miliar newsvendor result from the operations management literature. In fact, by assuming
demand for group Sb to be deterministic, equation (4.7.10) also collapses into (4.3.9). Note
then that the only relevant distinction with respect to §4.3 is that now both populations
are stochastic, and from the pooling effect literature, we know that the variance of the dis-
tribution of total demand Φ(· | 1) is less than the sum of the variances of the distributions
Ψa(·) and Ψb(·); it is equally well known that the pooling effect pushes the optimal order
quantity closer to the total mean. Our key contribution is that when βa 6= βb, there is a
second effect captured by the second term in either equation (4.7.15) or (4.7.16); we have
coined this behavior as the pulling effect, and its impact on the optimal order quantity is
consistent with the results from §4.3. This is summarized in Lemma 26.
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Lemma 26: Fix the value of βa. a) When βb = βa, then Q
SS
a,b = Φ
−1
(
1− c
βa
)
. b)
When βa > βb, then Φ
−1
(
1− c
βb
)
< QSSa,b < Φ
−1
(
1− c
βa
)
. c) When βb > βa, then
Φ−1
(
1− c
βa
)
< QSSa,b < Φ
−1
(
1− c
βb
)
.
Lemma 26 provides intuitive bounds on the optimal order quantity. As an illustration,
consider the case where βa > βb. (4.7.15) explains that the optimal order quantity will be
lower than Φ−1
(
1− c
βa
∣∣∣ 1), because the type a patients benefit from stochastically pulling
from the additional inventory that is created for type b patients. Similarly, (4.7.16) explains
that the optimal order quantity will be higher than Φ−1
(
1− c
βb
∣∣∣ 1), because the pulling
effect of type b patients taking inventory from type a patients wants to be restricted.
Lemma 26 uses therefore the same logic as Proposition 16 in order to analyze the pulling
effect in isolation. Unlike §4.3, here we cannot say whether the optimal order quantity in-
creases or decreases as we move from multiple dedicated channels to a single channel design.
The reason is that the pulling and pooling effects may push the optimal order quantity in
different directions. However, the truly relevant conclusion we are able to make is that when
βa 6= βb, then the pulling and pooling effects are two distinct forces which act simultaneously
to affect the order quantity. This also means that contrary to “conventional wisdom”, having
a single channel (or pooled system) may not be optimal compared to dedicated channels,
even in a basic setting as the one we propose where there are no incremental costs to pooling
demand.
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In the first stage, the decision-maker solves:
ZSS1 = max
(e)
−C(e)− c{(1− g(e))QSSa,0 + g(e)(QSSa,b)}
+(1− g(e))βa
{∫ QSSa,0
0
ξψ(ξ) dξ +
∫ λ
QSSa,0
QSSa,0ψ(ξ) dξ
}
+g(e)
{∫ Q
Θ=0
(βaE[εa | Θ = θ] + βbE[εb | Θ = θ])φ(θ) dθ
+
∫ ∞
Θ=QSSa,b
QSSa,b
(
βaE[εa | Θ = θ] + βb (E[εb | Θ = θ])
θ
)
φ(θ) dθ ,
}
subject to:
QSSa,0 ∈ arg max
(Q)
ZSS2 |x=0
QSSa,b ∈ arg max
(Q)
ZSS2 |x=1 (4.7.17)
Again, we can rewrite as follows:
ZSS1 = max
(e)
−C(e)− c{(1− g(e))QSSa,0 + g(e)(QSSa,b)}
+(1− g(e))βa
{∫ QSSa,0
0
ξψ(ξ) dξ +
∫ λ
QSSa,0
QSSa,0ψ(ξ) dξ
}
+g(e)
{∫ QSSa,b
Θ=0
(βaE[εa | Θ = θ, x = 1] + βbE[εb | Θ = θ, x = 1])φ(θ | 1) dθ
+
∫ ∞
Θ=QSSa,b
QSSa,b
(
βaE[εa | Θ = θ, x = 1] + βb (E[εb | Θ = θ, x = 1])
θ
)
φ(θ | 1) dθ
}
subject to:
QSSa,0 ∈ arg max
(Q)
ZSS2 |x=0
QSSa,b ∈ arg max
(Q)
ZSS2 |x=1 (4.7.18)
The first two terms represent the costs of exerting innovation effort and producing the
drug’s order quantity, respectively. The third term is the health-benefits obtained by pa-
tients belonging to Sa when the innovation efforts are unsuccessful. The last terms represent
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the case when the innovation efforts are successful and so both pulling and pooling occur:
the first double integral considers the probability that total demand doesn’t exceed total
supply, and the second double integral considers the cases where total demand exceeds total
supply and shows the corresponding split of the available inventory in response to the first-
come first-serve rule; The last two double integrals represent the health benefits obtained by
patients belonging to Sb with an interpretation of the terms inside the brackets analogous
to the ones for patients belonging to Sa.
4.8 Conclusions
In this final part of the analysis, our focus has shifted away from the design of the contract
in an attempt to understand the effect of patient heterogeneity on the optimal supply chain
design strategy. An important contribution is not only the ability to determine the efficient
supply chain design simply in terms of the relative health benefits of the patient categories
(or from a more general perspective, based on the relative valuations), but also the oper-
ational implications of having a single common stock versus multiple dedicated stocks to
serve heterogenous demand. Even though the perspective of a social welfare maximizer was
not explicitly modeled, the results implicitly provide the necessary grounds for discussion;
in other words, the operational tradeoff between efficiency and availability allows us to get
additional insights from a strategic perspective as a function of the decision-maker’s priority.
As a result, to close this chapter and the analytical component of the dissertation, other
situations to which this chapter’s results can be relevant are briefly sketched.
Case 1: Turning “lemon” markets into “cherries”
Consider a pharmaceutical manufacturer that sells its drug through a distributor in coun-
try Alpha and is evaluating whether to also introduce the drug in country Beta. Doing so
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would require the manufacturer to go through a costly evaluation process in order to get its
drug approved for consumption in country Beta, whose willingness to pay for the drug is
different from Alpha’s. There is a probability that the drug doesn’t get approved in Beta,
but if it does, then the demand forecast at that location is expected to be extremely accurate
(ı.e., demand variance ' 0). Based on our results, if the pharmaceutical manufacturer sells
the drugs through a unique distributor to both countries who supplied them on a first-come
first-serve basis, then on top of the incremental order quantity corresponding to country
Beta’s demand, the order quantity that the distributor will order to satisfy demand in coun-
try Alpha will increase in relation to the quantity ordered when the drug would sell only
in country Alpha. As a result, the pharmaceutical company has more incentives to invest
in getting its drug accepted for sale in country Beta when there exists a unique distribu-
tor because that will result in a larger quantity of drugs being sold compared to the case
where there was a different distributor in each country (assuming the distributors do not
trade among them, or do not consider the possibility of mutual trade when they decide the
order quantity). We can even take our conclusions one echelon upstream and consider two
pharmaceutical manufacturers (namely, Px and Py) with drugs equivalent in their cost struc-
ture and expected health benefits (i.e., valuation) and that are distributed through a single
health-payer (e.g., a single NGO that purchases malaria drugs for all African countries); we
can then say that the total quantity of drugs produced and sold will be higher under the
single-manufacturer single-distributor configuration than if Px had a monopoly in country
Alpha and Py had a monopoly in country Beta; further, the first manufacturer (incumbent)
to sell in any of the differentiated countries has the largest incentive to get its drug also
accepted in an additional country because of the positive externality created on its initial
market(s) resulting from acceptance into a new market. This suggests important benefits
for the manufacturers of dealing with suppliers who do aggregate demand forecasts, and
also important benefits for consumers in less attractive markets from market consolidation
both at the distributor and the manufacturer level. We also believe that our results moti-
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vate and should be incorporated into the design of donor coordination mechanisms aimed at
guaranteeing sufficient installed production capacity by drug manufacturers and increasing
coverage in developing countries.
Case 2: Consolidation of health services providers
Consider a health insurance company that is vertically integrated so that it is also a
health services provider. If this company is in charge of serving both its insured patients
(who are charged for only a fraction of the received treatment cost) and incoming patients
who have no insurance (who are charged for the full cost of the received treatment cost),
then it will build more capacity (i.e., in terms of manpower, have a larger staff of physicians
and nurses; in terms of installations, have more beds, special equipment, operating rooms; in
terms of inventory, have a larger stock of drugs in its pharmacy) than if two exclusive health
service providers existed: one that treated the insured population, and one that treated the
uninsured population. Further, the single provider will have a larger incentive to invest in
marketing activities to create a base of insured members than the incentives that a service
provider that treated only its own patients would have. This example raises questions on the
ways in which the mix of public-private health providers should be established, particularly
in developing countries where access is a big issue.
Case 3: Coupon distribution and inventory planning
Consider a product sold at retail outlets for which demand is relatively stable. The
product’s manufacturer wishes to reach a new customer segment and distributes a large
number of discount coupons at the local colleges. The number of students who will attempt
to use their coupons is not known, and the manufacturer must choose whether to limit the
exchange of the coupons to a few retail outlets, or to allow the coupons to be exchanged at
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any location. On one hand, if the goodwill cost of losing new potential customers if ignored,
then the efficient design choice is to limit the exchange to specific (almost dedicated) out-
lets. On the other hand, if product availability is preferred to revenues, and the goodwill
cost of understocking for a client belonging to the stable demand is ignored, then allowing
the coupons to be exchanged at any retail outlet is the best option.
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Chapter 5
Final Comments
This dissertation has analytically studied the introduction process of a new drug sold by a
pharmaceutical manufacturer to a health-payer. It has looked into the decisions of these two
players considering the setting’s particular characteristics, of which the most relevant have
been found to be: i) the heterogeneity in the health benefits received by different patient
categories who are eligible to receive the drug; ii) the heterogeneity in the health-payer’s
decision-making priority and constraints; iii) the uncertainty and information asymmetry
with respect to the expected health benefits; and iv) the uncertainty about the size of the
demand and the order of arrivals between patient categories.
The focus of the thesis has been two-fold. On the first part, Chapters 2 and 3 pay spe-
cial attention to the effect of the contract design on the players’ decisions and the resulting
levels of profit, expenses, and drug availability for the manufacturer, health-payer, and the
patients, respectively. The main findings are the requirements for achieving higher access
levels depending on the health-payer’s priority, the ability that the manufacturer has to
extract a health-payer’s available budget without necessarily increasing social welfare when
maximizing the latter is the payer’s main goal, and the (incidental) upper bound on the sell-
ing price that is created when the payer’s priority is to maximize its own value function and
the manufacturer is interested in achieving higher levels of access. These findings suggest
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that the willingness to subsidize patient categories with low efficacy levels through the high
efficacy levels of other patients consuming the same drug may result in high per-treatment
expenditures for the payer, low service levels, and higher profitability for the manufacturers.
Two more contracts are analyzed where the selling price is not a decision variable. The ca-
pacity buffer contract is appropriate to represent the circumstances where the manufacturer
is willing to hold an important portion of the inventory risk. We find that this contract
tends to increase access level and is most beneficial when the manufacturer has a relatively
low overstocking cost - as opposed to the health-payer -, the cost of understocking for the
health-payer is large, and the available budget is sufficient to cover the increased costs of
smaller, more frequent inventory orders. The last contract analyzed is a performance based
agreement between the players which has highest value when the health payer has little
trust in the manufacturer’s announced health benefits, and the manufacturer holds private
information that increases her reliability on her own product.
On the second part of the dissertation, the main objective is to determine if the existence
of patient heterogeneity can have an influence on the supply chain design strategy, and more
specifically on whether a pooled versus a separated stocking strategy is more convenient. In
a two-patient categories environment, where one category is of stochastic size and the other
is deterministic, we find that: i) the optimal design depends exclusively on the relative health
benefits obtained by each patient category; ii) the difference between the optimal levels of
inventory for each design option is a function of what has been coined here as a pulling
effect; iii) in a vertically integrated chain, the efficient supply chain design always has less
inventory than the inefficient design and provides higher incentives for innovation; and iv) in
a vertically separated chain, the upstream player (the manufacturer) prefers the inefficient
design, and the efficient design provides the manufacturer with less incentives to innovate
than the inefficient design. Last, an attempt to model two stochastic categories was made -
in addition to exploring other simple extensions to the basic model -, where even though the
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determination of the optimal solution was considered analytically intractable, the analysis
revealed a structure similar to the one causing the pulling effect in the basic model, thus
allowing for limited findings when the pulling and pooling effects interact.
Finally, it is important to mention other research avenues that can be extended as a
result of this work, and for that purpose, it may be appropriate to divide them into empir-
ical and analytical projects. For the first category, a logical next step is to try and obtain
data to validate the models, obtain additional insights, and be able to make better grounded
recommendations to public policy-makers. The new pharmaceutical price regulation scheme
that will become active in 2014 in the United Kingdom represents a great opportunity to
run pilot studies that can allow us to determine which factors are truly relevant in the
decision-making process. Similarly, risk sharing agreements based on the capacity buffer
and the performance based contracts could be developed in real life. On an idea unrelated
to the health care sector, and leveraging on the preliminary findings for the interaction of
pulling and pooling effects, the availability of data related to the distribution of discount
coupons and the associated capacity utilization/inventory availability could open new areas
of research.
As for modeling, the options available are large. A first approach would be the ex-
pansion of the analysis presented here by combining different contracting scenarios. For
instance, allowing the selling price to be endogenously determined in the capacity buffer and
performance-based contract could offer interesting results. A key assumption in this work
is the distribution of demand which was assumed to be Poisson distributed for most of the
contracting scenarios due to the properties of a split Poisson process that allowed for better
tractability of the demand distribution for different access levels. Expanding the results
to more general distributions would be a valuable contribution. Another assumption that
can be relaxed in order to obtain more general results is that of having only two patient
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categories. Preliminary work around this issue suggests that a heuristic based on bundled-
pairwise comparison and stopping rules can be developed. While in the setting described
in the dissertation, the problem is not critical as the number of patient categories per drug
treatment is usually sufficiently small, the application of the model in other contexts (such
as the price and quantity newsvendor) might benefit from such developments. Finally, more
general extensions include the presence of competition at different echelons of the supply
chain and the incorporation of the health-provider and his role in the supply chain.
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Appendix 1: Proofs for Chapter 2
Proof of Lemma 1:
Recall Sς(Q, τ) = (B(τ)− δ+ g)A(Q, τ) + δQ− gλF (τ). The first term is nondecreasing
∀ Q, and increasing for at least some Q > 0; the second term is strictly increasing in Q; and
the third term is independent of Q. Therefore the function is increasing in Q.
About concavity, note that A(Q, τ) =
Q∑
x=1
P (x;λF (τ)). Therefore,
A(Q+ 1, τ)−A(Q, τ) = P (Q+ 1;λF (τ)) < P (Q;λF (τ)) = A(Q, τ)−A(Q−1, τ), ∀ Q ≥ 1,
which implies that the first term in the social welfare function has diminishing returns from
increasing Q. Since the second and third terms have no second-order effects, concavity is
guaranteed.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Follows directly from Lemma 1 since the extra term is linear in Q.
Proof of Proposition 1:
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First, note the following limits:
lim
Q→0
S(Q, τ) = −gλF (τ)
lim
Q→∞
S(Q, τ) = [B(τ)− δ][λF (τ)] + δQ
Therefore:
lim
Q→0
S(Q, 1)− S(Q, 2) = gλ(1− θ) ≥ 0
lim
Q→∞
S(Q, 1)− S(Q, 2) = [B(1)− δ][λθ]− [B(2)− δ][λ] ≷ 0
As a result, for S(Q, 2) > S(Q, 1), the curves must cross for at least one value of Q > 0.
Suppose S(Q, 1) = S(Q, 2), for some Q > 0. We then obtain the following equality which
results in equation (2.3.4):
[B(1) + g − δ][A(Q, 1)] + δQ− gλF (1) = [B(2) + g − δ][A(Q, 2)] + δQ− gλF (2)
[B(1) + g − δ][A(Q, 1)]− gλθ = [B(2) + g − δ][A(Q, 2)]− gλ
gλ[1− θ]− g[A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)] =
[b1θ + b2(1− θ)][A(Q, 2)]− b1A(Q, 1)− δ[A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)]
gλ[1− θ]− g[A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)] =
b1[A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)]− [b1 − b2][1− θ][A(Q, 2)]− δ[A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)]
[1− θ][gλ+ (b1 − b2)A(Q, 2)] = [b1 − δ + g][A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)](
g
b1 − δ + g
)(
λ
A(Q, 2)
)
+
(
b1 − b2
b1 − δ + g
)
=
(
A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)
A(Q, 2)
)(
1
1− θ
)
To generalize the latter, suppose there is no integer quantity that satisfies the latter
equation. Then:
q = max
{
Q
∣∣∣∣( gb1 − δ + g
)(
λ
A(Q, 2)
)
+
(
b1 − b2
b1 − δ + g
)
≥
(
A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)
A(Q, 2)
)(
1
1− θ
)}
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Next, since A(Q, 2) is increasing in Q, the left-hand side of the inequality inside (2.3.4) is
decreasing in Q, ∀Q > 0. Consider the following limits:
lim
Q→0
(
A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)
A(Q, 2)
)(
1
1− θ
)
= 0,
lim
Q→∞
(
A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)
A(Q, 2)
)(
1
1− θ
)
= 1.
These limits imply that if there exists at least one crossing point, then the number of crossing
points (or points where the dominance of social welfare curves between access levels changes)
must be odd; moving forward, changes in dominance are referred to as crossing points. Next,
notice A(Q,2)−A(Q,1)
A(Q,2)
= 1 − A(Q,1)
A(Q,2)
. To show that the crossing point is unique, it suffices to
show that the right-hand side in (2.3.4) is monotonic in Q, i.e., it must be that: A(Q,1)
A(Q,2)
, is
non-increasing in Q. First we show that A(Q+ 1, 1)− A(Q, 1) ≤ A(Q+ 1, 2)− A(Q, 2):
A(Q+ 1, 1)− A(Q, 1) =
Q+1∑
x=1
P (x;λθ)−
Q∑
x=1
P (x;λθ)
= P (Q+ 1;λθ)
≤ P (Q+ 1;λ)
=
Q+1∑
x=1
P (x;λ)−
Q∑
x=1
P (x;λ)
= A(Q+ 1, 2)− A(Q, 2)
Let x = P (Q+1;λθ) and y = P (Q+1;λ)−x. We need that A(Q,1)
A(Q,2)
≥ A(Q,1)+x
A(Q,2)+x+y
= A(Q+1,1)
A(Q+1,2)
.
Doing some algebra:
A(Q, 1)A(Q, 2) + xA(Q, 1) + yA(Q, 1) ≥ A(Q, 1)A(Q, 2) + xA(Q, 2)
y ≥ x
(
A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)
A(Q, 1)
)
Replacing x and y, we obtain P (Q + 1;λ) − P (Q + 1;λθ) ≥
(
A(Q,2)−A(Q,1)
A(Q,1)
)
P (Q +
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1;λθ). Doing some more algebra, and replacing A(Q, τ) = λF (τ) − λF (τ)P (Q;λF (τ)) +
QP (Q + 1;λF (τ)) (from: Hadley and Whitin (1963), Appendix 3, equation 6), we obtain
the following inequality expressed in equation (2.3.3): θ ≥
(
1−P (Q;λ)
1−P (Q;λθ)
)(
P (Q+1;λθ)
P (Q+1;λ)
)
. When
(2.3.3) is satisfied, it follows that S(·, 1) and S(·, 2), Q > 0, can cross at most once. The
necessary and sufficient condition for the crossing to occur is given by the following limit:
limQ→∞ S(Q, 1)− S(Q, 2) < 0⇒ [B(1)− δ][λθ]− [B(2)− δ][λ] < 0⇒ δ < b2. It follows
that for part c), if δ > b2, S(Q, 1) > S(Q, 2), ∀ Q > 0 and setting a tighter prescription
policy threshold is a dominant strategy for any positive order quantity. Part d) is simply
the boundary condition.
Finally, for part e), notice the following derivatives. For the goodwill cost,
∂
∂g
((
g
b1 − δ + g
)(
λ
A(Q, 2)
)
+
(
b1 − b2
b1 − δ + g
))
=(
b1 − δ
(b1 − δ + g)2
)(
λ
A(Q, 2)
)
−
(
b1 − b2
(b1 − δ + g)2
)
> 0,
because b2 > δ when q exists, and
(
λ
A(Q,2)
)
> 1, therefore the first term is larger than
the second term. Since the left-hand side of (2.3.4) increases in g, then the order quantity
must be increased to increase the right-hand side and keep the equality. Following similar
arguments: for the salvage value,
∂
∂δ
((
g
b1 − δ + g
)(
λ
A(Q, 2)
)
+
(
b1 − b2
b1 − δ + g
))
=(
g
(b1 − δ + g)2
)(
λ
A(Q, 2)
)
+
(
b1 − b2
(b1 − δ + g)2
)
> 0.
For the relative benefit of the lower type category,
∂
∂b2
((
g
b1 − δ + g
)(
λ
A(Q, 2)
)
+
(
b1 − b2
b1 − δ + g
))
= − 1
b1 − δ + g < 0.
196
For the relative benefit of the higher type category, we rearrange the initial inequality so
that
(
gλ
A(Q, 2)
)
+ (b1 − b2) =
(
A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)
A(Q, 2)
)(
1
1− θ
)
(b1 − δ + g)
Taking derivatives:
∂
∂b1
(
gλ
A(Q, 2)
+ (b1 − b2)
)
= 1.
∂
∂b1
(
A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)
A(Q, 2)
)(
b1 − δ + g
1− θ
)
=
(
A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)
A(Q, 2)
)(
1
1− θ
)
.
Recall that
(
A(Q,2)−A(Q,1)
A(Q,2)
) (
1
1−θ
)
is less or equal to 1, and increasing in Q. Therefore, to
balance the increase of 1 unit in the left-hand side of the equation, Q must be increased by
more than 1, i.e., q increases in b1.
For the proportion of the patient population that is of type i = 1, using equation 6 from
Appendix 3 in Hadley and Whitin (1963):
∂
∂θ
(
A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)
A(Q, 2)
)(
1
1− θ
)
=
(
1
1− θ
)[(
1− A(Q, 1)
A(Q, 2)
)(
1
1− θ
)
− ∂
∂θ
(
A(Q, 1)
A(Q, 2)
)]
=
[
1
(1− θ)A(Q, 2)
] [(
A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)
1− θ
)
− ∂A(Q, 1)
∂θ
]
=
[
1
(1− θ)2A(Q, 2)
]
[−λ (P (Q;λ)− θP (Q;λθ)) +Q (P (Q+ 1;λ)− P (Q+ 1;λθ))
+λ(1− θ) (P (Q;λθ)− p(Q+ 1;λθ))] ≷ 0.
Proof of Lemma 3:
By definition, if QςΓ ≥ Qς , then Qς satisfies both constraints and therefore at least one
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feasible solution exists. To complete the proof, if QςΓ < Q
ς , then Z(Q, τ) < 0 for Q ≤ QςΓ,
i.e., all order quantities (if any) that satisfy the cost-effectiveness constraint do not satisfy
the budget constraint.
Proof of Lemma 4:
We can rearrange the system’s expected utility function as: Z(Q, τ) = (B(τ)−δ)A(Q, τ)−
g(λF (τ)−A(Q, τ))−(c−δ)Q. Since λF (τ) ≥ A(Q, τ), a necessary condition for Z(Q, τ) ≥ 0
is (B(τ)− δ)A(Q, τ) ≥ (c− δ)Q, and since Q ≥ A(Q, τ), then B(τ) ≥ c is a necessary con-
dition.
Proof of Lemma 5:
First, recall that by definition: Qς
τ
≤ Q¯ςτ , τ = 1, 2.
For part a1.1, suppose Q¯ς1 = q, and S(q, 1) = S(q, 2). Then Z(Q¯
ς
1, 1) = Z(q, 1) =
Z(q, 2) ≥ 0 → Qς
2
≤ q. But if Qς
2
< q, then S(q, 1) > S(q, 2), which is a contradiction.
Therefore, Q¯ς1 = q = Q
ς
2
. By definition, Qς
1
≤ Q¯ς1 and Qς2 ≤ Q¯ς2, which completes the first
ordering possibility.
For part a1.2, suppose Q¯ς1 = q, but S(q, 1) > S(q, 2). Then Z(Q¯
ς
1, 1) = Z(q, 1) >
Z(q, 2) ≥ 0 → Qς
2
≤ q. Since the case of Qς
2
= q is covered in a1.1, then the other pos-
sibility is Qς
2
< Q¯ς1 = q. Next suppose that, Q
ς
1
> Qς
2
; this is a contradiction because
S(0, 1) ≥ S(0, 2), and Qς
2
< Qς
1
only if q ≤ Qς
2
, which is a contradiction. Finally, Q¯ς2 < Q¯
ς
1
would be a contradiction as it would require a second crossing point. Therefore the other
possibility is the ordering: Qς
1
≤ Qς
2
< Q¯ς1 = q ≤ Q¯ς2.
198
For part a2, if Q¯ς1 > q, then Z(Q¯
ς
1, 1) < Z(Q¯
ς
1, 2) ⇒ Q¯ς1 ≤ Q¯ς2. For a2.1, if Qς1 < q,
then Z(Qς
1
, 1) > Z(Qς
1
, 2), and due to (A1), Qς
1
≤ Qς
2
. Qς
2
= q is clearly feasible, and it
would automatically imply Qς
1
= Qς
2
= q. For a2.2, if q = Qς
2
, then it must also be that
Qς
1
= q = Qς
2
, which is already included in a2.1. Therefore, suppose q < Qς
2
; since Q¯ς1 > q,
the only possibility is that Z(Qς
1
, 1) < Z(Qς
1
, 2)⇒ Qς
1
≥ Qς
2
.
For part a3, if Q¯ς1 < q, then 0 > Z(q, 1) ≥ Z(q, 2) < 0⇒ Qς1 6= q 6= Q¯ς2. For part a3.1, if
Qς
2
> q, then it has been established that Qς
τ
≤ Q¯ςτ , τ = 1, 2. For part a3.2, if Q¯ς2 ≤ Q¯ς1 < q,
then Z(Q, 1) > Z(Q, 2) ∀ Q ≤ Q¯ς2 ⇒ Qς1 ≤ Qς2 ≤ Q¯ς2. Finally, for a3.3 there is the possibility
that Qς
2
= Q¯ς2 < q. If Q¯
ς
1 < Q
ς
2
, then q > Qς
2
is a contradiction.
For part b, when a finite q does not exist, Z(Q, 1) > Z(Q, 2) ∀Q > 0. Since Q¯ς1 < Q¯ς2
would require a crossing point, it must be that Qς
1
≤ Qς
2
≤ Q¯ς2 ≤ Q¯ς1.
Proof of Theorem 1:
Theorem 1-a assumes that q exists. We will prove Theorem 1-a2, -a4, and -a5, and then
Theorem 1-a1, and -a3 follow by complementarity.
For Theorem 1-a2, first suppose QςΓ ≥ Q¯ς2, and recall that Q¯ς2 ≥ Qς2.
On one hand, consider q ≤ Qς
2
; then Q¯ς2 < q is a contradiction, and when Q
ς
Γ ≥ Q¯ς2 ≥
q, ∃ {Q |Z(Q, 2) ≥ 0; Z(Q, 2) ≥ Z(Q, 1); QςΓ ≥ Q ≥ q} under which τ = 2 is weakly pre-
ferred.
On the other hand, consider q > Qς
2
; then if q ≤ Q¯ς2, then ∃ {Q |Z(Q, 2) ≥ 0; Z(Q, 2) ≥
Z(Q, 1); QςΓ ≥ Q ≥ q} and τ = 2 would be preferred, which proves that Q¯ς2 < q is a nec-
essary condition; further, when q > Q¯ς2, from Proposition 1, @ {Q |Z(Q, 2) ≥ 0; Z(Q, 2) >
Z(Q, 1); Q < q}, proving the sufficient condition. Recall from Lemma 1 that S(Q, τ) is
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increasing in Q; then τ ∗S,ς = 1 is strictly preferred, and Q
∗
S,ς = min{QςΓ , Q¯ς1} is the unique
order quantity.
Next for Theorem 1-a3, suppose that QςΓ < Q¯
ς
2.
On one hand, consider q ≤ Qς
2
; the argument is the same as above.
On the other hand, consider q > Qς
2
; then if q ≤ QςΓ, then ∃ {Q |Z(Q, 2) ≥ 0; Z(Q, 2) ≥
Z(Q, 1);QςΓ ≥ Q ≥ q} and τ = 2 would be preferred, which proves that QςΓ < q is a nec-
essary condition; further, when q > QςΓ, from Proposition 1, @ {Q |Z(Q, 2) ≥ 0; Z(Q, 2) >
Z(Q, 1); Q < q}, proving the sufficient condition. Since S(Q, τ) is increasing in Q, then
τ ∗S,ς = 1 is strictly preferred, and Q
∗
S,ς = min{QςΓ , Q¯ς1} is the unique order quantity.
The proof for Theorem 1-a4 is very similar. We split the analysis into two possibilities:
either (min{Q¯ς2 , QςΓ} ≥ Qς2 > q), or (min{Q¯ς2 , QςΓ} > q ≥ Qς2).
First suppose that QςΓ ≥ Q¯ς2.
On one hand, consider Qς
2
> q; then Q¯ς2 ≤ q is a contradiction. Alternatively, when
QςΓ ≥ Q¯ς2 ≥ Qς2 > q, ∃ {Q |Z(Q, 2) ≥ 0; Z(Q, 2) > Z(Q, 1); QςΓ ≥ Q > q} under which
τ = 2 is preferred, satisfying the necessary condition for an optimal solution. To complete
the proof, notice from Proposition 1 that @ {Q |Z(Q, 1) ≥ Z(Q, 2); Q > q}. Using Lemma
1, τ ∗S,ς = 2 is strictly preferred, and Q
∗
S,ς = Q¯
ς
2 is the unique order quantity.
On the other hand, consider q ≥ Qς
2
; then if q ≥ Q¯ς2 ≥ Qς2, then @ {Q |Z(Q, 2) ≥ 0; Z(Q, 2) >
Z(Q, 1), QςΓ ≥ Q ≥ q} and τ = 1 would be weakly preferred, which proves that Q¯ς2 > q
is a necessary condition; further, when q < Q¯ς2, from Proposition 1, @ {Q |Z(Q, 1) ≥
Z(Q, 2); Q > q}, and ∃ {Q |Z(Q, 2) ≥ 0; Z(Q, 1) < Z(Q, 2); QςΓ ≥ Q > q}, proving the
sufficient condition. By use of Lemma 1, τ ∗S,ς = 2 is strictly preferred, and Q
∗
S,ς = Q¯
ς
2 is the
unique order quantity.
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Next suppose that QςΓ < Q¯
ς
2.
On one hand, consider Qς
2
> q; then if QςΓ < Q2, @{Q |Z(Q, 2) ≥ 0; Q ≤ QςΓ}; this im-
plies that QςΓ ≥ Q2 is a necessary condition. To complete the proof, notice that when
Q¯ς2 > Q
ς
Γ ≥ Qς2 > q, then Z(q, 2) ≥ 0, and therefore ∃ {Q |Z(Q, 2) ≥ 0; Z(Q, 2) >
Z(Q, 1); QςΓ ≥ Q > q}, but @ {Q |Z(Q, 1) ≥ Z(Q, 2); Q > q}. Using Lemma 1, τ ∗S,ς = 2 is
strictly preferred, and Q∗S,ς = Q
ς
Γ is the unique order quantity.
On the other hand, consider q ≥ Qς
2
; then if q ≥ QςΓ, then from Proposition 1, @ {Q |Z(Q, 2) >
Z(Q, 1);QςΓ ≥ Q} which proves the necessary condition that QςΓ > q; further, when q < QςΓ,
∃ {Q |Z(Q, 2) ≥ 0; Z(Q, 2) > Z(Q, 1); QςΓ ≥ Q > q}, but @ {Q |Z(Q, 1) ≥ Z(Q, 2); Q > q},
proving the sufficient condition. Using Lemma 1, τ ∗S,ς = 2 is strictly preferred, and Q
∗
S,ς = Q
ς
Γ
is the unique order quantity.
For Theorem 1-a5, we need to analyze the remaining cases, i.e., min{Q¯ς2 , QςΓ} = q ≥ Qς2.
The condition is necessary because when q exists, all cases not involving (min{Q¯ς2 , QςΓ} =
q ≥ Qς
2
) have already been proven to have a unique solution. To prove sufficiency, suppose
QςΓ ≥ Q¯ς2 = q ≥ Qς2. Clearly Z(Q¯ς2, 2) = Z(q, 2) = Z(q, 1) and for x > 0, 0 > Z(q + x, 2) >
Z(q + x, 1), therefore S(q, τ) > S(Q, τ), 0 < Q 6= q. Alternatively, suppose Q¯ς2 ≥ QςΓ = q ≥
Qς
2
. Then S(Qς
2
, 2) ≤ S(q, 2) ≤ S(Q¯ς2) ≥ 0, and for x > 0, S(q, 1) > S(q − x, 1).
Theorem 1-b follows directly from Proposition 1.
Proof of Corollary 1:
Follows directly from previous results when only one access level policy is considered.
Proof of equation (2.3.9):
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We find the largest order quantity for which the system’s expected utility function is
increasing, that is:
0 ≤ Z(Q, τ)− Z(Q− 1, τ) = −(c− δ) + (B(τ)− δ + g) (A(Q, τ)− A(Q− 1, τ))
= −(c− δ) + (B(τ)− δ + g) (P (Q;λF (τ)))
⇒ P (Qςτ ;λF (τ)) ≥
c− δ
B(τ)− δ + g > P (Q
ς
τ + 1;λF (τ))
Proof of Proposition 2:
Recall that Z(Q, τ) = S(Q, τ) − cQ, and that δ < b2 is a sufficient condition for q to
exist. We will make use of limits to show the connection between the crossing point q and
c˜. First we show that if there is a feasible solution, then for c > B(2), Z(Qς1, 1) > Z(Q
ς
2, 2).
lim
c→B(2)+
Z(Qς2, 2) = −(c−B(2))Qς2 − (B(2)− δ) (Qς2 − A(Qς2, 2))
−g (λ− A(Qς2, 2)) < 0,
lim
c→B(2)+|Z(Qς1,1)≥0
(Z(Qς1, 1)− Z(Qς2, 2)) > 0,
The condition that Z(Qς1, 1) ≥ 0 is necessary because when Z(Qς1, 1) < 0 and c > B(2)
simultaneously, there doesn’t exist a feasible solution.
At this point we state b2 > δ as a necessary condition for c˜ to exist. Recall from Propo-
sition 1 that when b2 ≤ δ, there is no crossing point between the expected social welfare
curves; since the system’s expected utility curves are equal to the expected social welfare
curves minus a linear cost, then b2 ≤ δ would imply that restricted access dominates, i.e.,
that Z(Qς1, 1) > Z(Q
ς
2, 2). Therefore, the existence of c˜ implies the existence of q.
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Next, we show that when c→ δ+, the overstocking cost approaches zero and Z(Qς1, 1) <
Z(Qς2, 2).
lim
c→δ+|δ<b2
(Qς1) =∞
lim
c→δ+|δ<b2
(Qς2) =∞
lim
c→δ+|δ<b2
(Z(Qς1, 1)− Z(Qς2, 2)) = (B(1)− δ)(λθ)− (B(2)− δ)(λ)
= −λ(1− θ)(b2 − δ)
< 0,
This means that as long as b2 > δ, i.e., as long as q exists, then there is at least one value
of c for which Z(Qς1, 1) = Z(Q
ς
2, 2), and that such value will lie in the range (δ , B(2)). This
proves that the existence of q implies the existence of c˜.
Finally, note that the order quantity Qςτ decreases in the magnitude of the critical frac-
tile, and that for a unit change in the critical fractile, the change in the order quantity
increases in the parameter of the Poisson distribution. Therefore we analyze the change of
the critical fractile that determines the unconstrained optimal order quantity. Observe that
∂(c−δ)/(B(1)−δ+g)
∂c
= 1
B(1)−δ+g <
1
B(2)−δ+g =
∂(c−δ)/(B(2)−δ+g)
∂c
. Therefore Qς2 is more sensitive to
changes in c than Qς1. Since the margin of an administered unit of a drug is fixed for a given
access level policy, then
∂(Z(Qς1,1)−Z(Qς2,2))
∂c
< 0 is sufficient to prove uniqueness of c˜.
Proof of Proposition 3:
When QςΓ ≥ max{q , Qς2}, then τ = 2 is a feasible solution. Therefore, if QςΓ ≥ Qς2 and
c < c˜, then from Proposition 2, it would be optimal to set τ = 2; therefore c > c˜ is both
a necessary and sufficient condition for τ ∗H,ς = 1. If max{q , Qς2} < QςΓ < Qς2, then QςΓ
maximizes the system’s expected utility given τ = 2, and such utility, Z(QςΓ, 2) ≷ Z(Qς1, 1);
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therefore c > c˜ is a sufficient condition to guarantee restricted access, but it may or may not
be necessary.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Theorem 2 follows directly from the results shown in Propositions 1, 2 and 3.
For part a1, if QςΓ < q ≤ Qς2, then τ = 2 is feasible but is dominated by τ = 1, by
Proposition 1. If QςΓ < Q
ς
2
< q, then τ = 2 is not feasible. If c > c˜, then restricted access
dominates, by Proposition 2.
Part a2 is given by the complement of Proposition 3-a, and part a3 follows directly from
Proposition 2-b.
For part a4, recall from Proposition 2 that c = c˜ ⇐⇒ Z(Qς1, 1) = Z(Qς2, 2). Therefore,
in order to be indifferent, it must be that bQς2c is a feasible solution, ⇒ bQς2c ≤ QςΓ.
For part a5, when bQς2c > QςΓ ≥ max{q , Qς2} and c < c˜, then Z(Qς1, 1) ≷ Z(QςΓ, 2) <
Z(Qς2, 2), therefore the result is ambiguous.
Part b follows directly from Proposition 1, since Z(Qς1, 1) = S(Q
ς
1, 1)−cQς1 > S(Q, 2)−cQ,
for any Q > 0.
Proof of Corollary 2:
For parts a and b, we show that Theorem 2-a2 is a subset of Theorem 1-a3. From
Theorem 1-a3, min{Q¯ς2 , QςΓ} ≥ max{q , Qς2} is a necessary condition for τ ∗S,ς = 2. First, if
Q¯ς2 ≤ QςΓ, then Q¯ς2 ≥ max{q , Qς2 ⇒ QςΓ ≥ max{q , Qς2. Therefore, we just need to prove that
the set of parameters that jointly satisfy (QςΓ ≥ Qς2), and (c < c˜), is a subset of the set of
parameters that satisfy (QςΓ ≥ max{q , Qς2}). Suppose Qς2 < Qς2; since Z(Qς2, 2) ≥ Z(Q, 2) for
any Q 6= Qς2 and Z(Q, 2) is concave in Q, this is a contradiction; therefore Qς2 ≥ Qς2. Next,
suppose Qς2 < q; then Z(Q
ς
2, 1) > Z(Q
ς
2, 2) ⇒ Z(Qς1, 1) > Z(Qς2, 2) ⇒ c > c˜. Therefore, it
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must be that either Qς2 ≥ q or that c > c˜. Therefore, (QςΓ ≥ Qς2)∪(c < c˜)⇒ min{Q¯ς2 , QςΓ} ≥
max{q , Qς
2
}, but not the other way around. Additionally, the conditions from Theorem 2-a3
which create indifference in the decision maker with respect to the access level policy were
included in Theorem 1-a4, where the full access policy was the unique solution; also the set
of parameters that satisfy Theorem 2-a4 and result in τ ∗H,ς = 1 due to the budget constraint
further reduce the set of parameters that achieve τ ∗H,ς .
For part c, consider the case when τ ∗S,ς = 2 and τ
∗
H,ς = 1, then Q
∗
H,ς ≤ Q∗S,ς , where
Q∗H,ς = Q
∗
S,ς only if Q
ς
1 = Q
ς = QςΓ. Next consider the case where τ
∗
S,ς = τ
∗
H,ς . Then,
for τ = 1, 2, if QςΓ ≤ Qςτ ⇒ Q∗S,ς = Q∗H,ς = QςΓ; alternatively, if QςΓ > Qςτ ⇒ Q∗S,ς =
min{QςΓ, Q¯ςτ} > Qςτ = Q∗H,ς .
Proof of Lemma 6:
Let I = 3, and first assume that q1,2 ≤ q2,3. There are two associated possibilities which
would contradict the Lemma. Suppose for the first option, that q1,2 ≤ q2,3 < q1,3, which
would imply S(q1,2 + 1, 3) < S(q1,2 + 1, 1) < S(q1,2 + 1, 2); since S(·, 1) and S(·, 2) can’t cross
more than once, then the access level curve with τ = 3 can’t cross the access level curve with
τ = 2 before crossing the access level curve with τ = 1; hence q1,3 < q2,3. Suppose for the
second option that q1,3 < q1,2 ≤ q2,3, and recall that S(0, 3) ≤ S(0, 2) ≤ S(0, 1), therefore
the access level curve with τ = 3 can’t cross the access level curve with τ = 1 before either
crossing the access level curve with τ = 2, or q1,2 existing before. Therefore, if q1,2 ≤ q2,3, it
must be that q1,2 ≤ q1,3 ≤ q2,3.
The argument is parallel when it is assumed that q1,2 > q2,3. The proof for any three
consecutive access levels then follows by induction.
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Proof of Lemma 7:
Let I = 3. For part a, suppose q2,3 < q1,3 < q1,2. Then for any x > 0, x < q1,2,
S(q1,2 − x, 1) > S(q1,2 − x, 2), and S(q1,3 + x, 3) > S(q1,3 + x, 1). Since q1,3 < q1,2, then
S(Q, 2) < max{S(Q, 1), S(Q, 3)}, for any Q > 0.
For part b), suppose q1,2 < q1,3 < q2,3. Then S(q1,2−x, 1) > S(q1,2−x, 2) > S(q1,2−x, 3);
also, for small ε > 0, S(q1,2+ε, 2) > S(q1,2+ε, 1) > S(q1,2+ε, 3); next, S(q1,3+ε, 2) > S(q1,3+
ε, 3) > S(q1,3 + ε, 1); and finally for any y > 0, S(q2,3 + y, 3) > S(q2,3 + y, 2) > S(q2,3 + y, 1).
The proof for any three consecutive access levels follows by induction.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We only need to prove that if qi,i+1 ≤ qi+1,i+2, for i = 1, . . . , I − 2, then if qˆ = qi,i+1,
then (i+ 2) cannot be an optimal solution. Note that for x > 0, x < QςΓ, S(Q
ς
Γ − x, i+ 1) >
S(QςΓ−x, i+ 2), and Q > QςΓ is not a feasible solution. The algorithm then extends directly
from Theorem 1 and Lemma 7-b.
Proof of Lemma 8:
First, note that c˜i−1,i is increasing in bi. Therefore, since bi < bi+1, i ≥ 1, then c˜i−1,i >
c˜i−1,i+1. Second, by the same principle, c˜i−1,i is increasing in bi−1. Therefore, since bi−1 >
bi, i ≥ 2, then c˜i−1,i+1 > c˜i,i+1. Putting the two results together, c˜i−1,i > c˜i−1,i+1 > c˜i,i+1.
Proof of Lemma 9:
Follows directly from Proposition 2b.
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Proof of Proposition 5:
Follows directly from Lemma 9 and Theorem 2.
Proof of Proposition 6:
The parts a) - e) are fully equivalent to Proposition 1, where only b1 is replaced with β1,
and b2 is replaced with β2.
Part f) follows directly from the fact that q is increasing in b1 and decreasing in b2.
Therefore, when β1 < b1 is the only change, the crossing point decreases.
For part g), if β2 < b2 is the only change, clearly the crossing point increases due to
Proposition 1e, and Proposition 6e. Even if both categories decrease their expected health
benefits by the same amount, then the effect caused by the decrease in category 1 is lower
than that caused by the decrease in category 2. To see this, replace β1 = b1−(b2−β2)+x, x ∈
[0, b2 − β2) into the left hand side of the inequality in (2.3.4), which is:
(
g
b1 − δ + g
)(
λ
A(Q, 2)
)
+
(
b1 − b2
b1 − δ + g
)
When x = 0, we obtain:
(
g
b1 − (b2 − β2)− δ + g
)(
λ
A(Q, 2)
)
+
(
b1 − b2
b1 − (b2 − β2)− δ + g
)
where the numerators are the same as those in (2.3.4), and the denominators are lower,
therefore requiring an increase in the order quantity to bring balance back to the equation.
When b2− β2 > x > 0, the denominator is still decreased because (b2− β2)− x > 0, and the
numerator in the second term is increased by x, therefore the logic remains, completing the
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proof for part g).
(
g
b1 − (b2 − β2) + x− δ + g
)(
λ
A(Q, 2)
)
+
(
b1 − b2 + x
b1 − (b2 − β2) + x− δ + g
)
Finally, when b2−β2 < x, the direction of the change is ambiguous because the numerator
in the second term would decrease relative to (2.3.4), resulting in part h).
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Appendix 2: Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of equation (3.3.3)
For a fixed τ and Q, ∂H(Q,τ ;w)
∂w
= −Q < 0. And for ε > 0, Qη
τ(w)
≤ Qη
τ,(w+ε)
and
Q¯ητ(w) ≥ Q¯ητ(w+ε) Therefore, for fixed τ , ∃ w¯ητ = {w | H(Q, τ ; w) ≥ 0 for at least one value of
Q; and H(Q, τ ; w + ε) < 0,∀ Q.
Proof of equation (3.3.4)
For a fixed τ and Q, ∂H(Q,τ ;w)
∂w
= −Q < 0. And for ε > 0, Qη
τ(w)
≤ Qη
τ,(w+ε)
and
Q¯ητ(w) ≥ Q¯ητ(w+ε) Therefore, for fixed τ , ∃ w¯ητ = {w | H(Q, τ ; w) ≥ 0 for at least one value of
Q; and H(Q, τ ; w + ε) < 0,∀ Q.
Proof of equation (3.3.5)
For a fixed τ and Q, ∂H(Q,τ ;w)
∂w
= −Q < 0. And for ε > 0, Qη
τ(w)
≤ Qη
τ,(w+ε)
and
Q¯ητ(w) ≥ Q¯ητ(w+ε) Therefore, for fixed τ , ∃ w¯ητ = {w | H(Q, τ ; w) ≥ 0 for at least one value of
Q; and H(Q, τ ; w + ε) < 0,∀ Q.
.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Notice that the existence of wητ depends entirely on the budget constraint being rele-
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vant or not to Health under a given access level. The proof is then given by equations
(3.3.3) - (3.3.6). First, if wητ exists, then T (w
η
τ , Q
∗
S,η (wητ )
+ 1) > Γ ≥ T (wητ , Q∗S,η (wητ )), and
T (w,Q∗
S,η (wητ )
) > Γ ≥ T (wητ , Q∗S,η (wητ )) for any w > wητ . Therefore revenues for Pharma can’t
increase, and manufacturing costs can only be reduced by increasing the selling price which
has been shown to be infeasible. Second, if wητ does not exist, then by definition w¯
η
τ,S satisfies
both constraints and maximizes Pharma’s utility function for a given τ ∗S,η.
Proof of Theorem 3:
For part a1), if wη1 exists, then inducing full access would require a price w < w
η
1, which
would result in a larger order quantity and therefore larger costs; since wη1 already achieves
the highest revenue Γ, Pharma’s profits strictly decrease by inducing full access.
For parts a2) and a3), the optimal selling price for a given access level and a set of
parameters is given from Proposition 7; so we must compare Pharma’s profits for each
induced access level. For example, in part a2), restricted access is preferred iff (w¯η1,S −
c)Q∗
S,η (w¯η1,S)
> (wη2 − c)Q∗S,η (wη2). The same direct comparison applies for a3).
For part b), it is certain from Proposition 1 that Health will choose to restrict access
regardless of Pharma’s choice of the selling price.
Proof of Proposition 8:
This proof makes use of equation (2.5.5), which defines w˜. See Chapter 2 for further
references on it.
For Proposition 8.1, i.e., when the access level is most restrictive, the mechanics are ex-
actly the same as in Proposition 7.
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For Proposition 8.2, i.e., when τ = 2 is a feasible solution for some w, then (Hη(Qη2 (w), 2; w) <
Hη(Qη1 (w), 1; w)) |w>w˜, and the only way to induce Health to increase access is by setting
w ≤ w˜, such that (Hη(Qη2 (w), 2; w) ≥ Hη(Qη1 (w), 1; w)) |w≤w˜.
When wη2 exists we can consider two possibilities. If w˜Q
η
2 (w˜)
> Γ, then w˜ is not a feasible
selling price, and w˜ > wη2 = w
∗
H,η, given full access. Else if w˜Q
η
2 (w˜)
≤ Γ, then wη2 ≥ w˜ = w∗H,η.
When wη2 does not exist, recall H
η(Qη2(w¯
η
2,H), 2; w¯
η
2,H) ≥ 0; so if Hη(Qη1 (w˜), 1; w˜) =
Hη(Qη2 (w˜), 2; w˜) < 0, then w˜ > w¯
η
2,H and Pharma does not need to artificially reduce its
selling price to induce higher access. Else if Hη(Qη1 (w˜), 1; w˜) = H
η(Qη2 (w˜), 2; w˜) ≥ 0, then
w˜ ≤ w¯η2,H , and Pharma loses some potential profit due to Health’s ability to restrict access
in order to maximize the expected utility function.
Proof of Theorem 4:
The proof follows directly from the proof in Proposition 8 and the argument is parallel
to that of Theorem 3.
Proof of Lemma 10:
From (3.4.2) , if Q∗j,χ = QΓ, i.e., if the budget constraint is binding in the exogenous
price-only contract, then (w − c)Q∗j,χ > (w − c)Q, ∀ Q 6= Q∗j,χ, i.e., Pharma can’t increase
its revenues nor reduce its costs by setting a positive buffer.
Proof of Lemma 11:
Using the condition expressed in Lemma 10, for j = S,H, given that K∗j,κ > 0, Pharma’s
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objective function can be rewritten as Mκ(K∗j,κ;Q
∗
j,κ, τ
∗
j,κ) = wA(KT , τ) − cKT − w(Q∗j,κ −
A(Q∗j,κ, τ
∗
j,κ)). Following the proof from Lemma 1, the last two terms of the latter equation
are independent of KT , the function is concave in KT , and taking first order differences yields
that P (K¯T , λF (τ)) >
c
w
> P (K¯T + 1, λF (τ)).
Proof of Lemma 12:
Note that T (w,Q,K) = wQ + (w + p)(min(K , (D(λ, τ) − Q)+) ≤ Γ. Therefore, for a
choice of Q and τ , and a demand realization, it must be that wQ + (w + p)K ≤ Γ ⇒ K ≤
Γ−wQ
w+p
.
For the second part, by taking the partial derivative we learn that by increasing Q in
1 unit, KΓ (Q) decreases in
w
w+p
units, and KT increases in
p
w+p
units. Therefore for the
total quantity available, given the budget constraint, to increase by 1 unit, it must be that
p∆
w+p
≥ 1 ⇒ ∆ ≥ w+p
p
, where ∆ represents how many incremental units of the initial order
quantity are required to increase the total quantity. The ceiling function is used to keep
integrality.
Proof of Lemma 13:
We simply rearrange Hκ(Q, τ ;K) = (Bh(τ)+g−w−p)A(Q+K, τ)+(p+w−δ)A(Q, τ)−
(w − δ)Q − gλF (τ) ≥ 0 ⇒ A(Q + K, τ) ≥ (w−δ)Q+gλF (τ)−(w+p−δ)A(Q,τ)
B(τ)−w−p+g . Since A(Q + K, τ)
is non-decreasing in K, then all capacity buffers larger (respectively, smaller) than KE (Q,τ)
will (respectively, will not) satisfy the cost-effectiveness constraint.
Proof of Proposition 9:
212
For part a), Lemmas 11 and 12 provide upper bounds, while Lemma 13 provides a lower
bound. Then, when KE (Q,τ) > min(K¯(Q,τ), KΓ (Q)), there is no feasible solution involving a
positive capacity buffer.
For part b), (Q∗j,χ, τ
∗
j,χ) is a feasible solution whenK
∗
j,χ = 0. Therefore, if 0 < KE (Q∗j,χ,τ∗j,χ) ≤
min(K¯(Q∗j,χ,τ∗j,χ), KΓ (Q∗j,χ)), a positive capacity buffer is a feasible solution. Since Health’s ex-
pected utility and social welfare are non-decreasing in K (because Health can choose not to
purchase K), then K∗j,κ > 0 is guaranteed.
For part c), since Pharma’s profits are increasing in KT up to the value K¯T , then the
optimal solution binds at the upper bound given by the smallest of K¯(Q,τ) and KΓ (Q).
Proof of Lemma 14:
Recall that Γ−wQ
w+p
≥ KΓ (Q) > Γ−wQw+p − 1, and P
(
K¯T (τ);λF (τ)
)
> c
w
. Notice that for
KΓ (Q) > 0, P
(
Q+KΓ (Q);λF (τ)
) ≥ P (⌊Q+ Γ−wQ
w+p
⌋
;λF (τ)
)
= P
(⌊
Γ+pQ
w+p
⌋
;λF (τ)
)
. Then
if P
(⌊
Γ+pQ
w+p
⌋
;λF (τ)
)
< c
w
⇒ Q+KΓ (Q) ≥ Q+ K¯(Q,τ) ⇒ KΓ (Q) ≥ K¯(Q,τ).
Proof of Lemma 15:
Recall that KΓ (Q) is decreasing in p. As p→ 0+, T (w,Q,K)→ w(Q+K), and KΓ (Q) →⌊
Γ
w
⌋−Q, i.e., KΓ (Q)+Q→ ⌊ Γw⌋. Therefore, if P (Q+KΓ (Q);λF (τ)) > P (⌊ Γw⌋ ;λF (τ)) > cw ,
then KΓ (Q) < K¯(Q,τ).
Proof of Proposition 10:
In condition i), clearly Q∗S,κ ≤ QχΓ. Then for integer 0 < x < QχΓ, from Lemma 12b)
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it follows that KΓ (QχΓ−x) + Q
χ
Γ − x < QχΓ, which creates a decrease in social welfare due to
the decrease in the total inventory available in the system, and is therefore not incentive
compatible for Health.
In condition ii), Q¯χτ is a feasible solution, but wQ¯
χ
τ + (w + p)x > Γ, for x ≥ 1. Therefore
purchasing any positive capacity buffer above Q¯χτ violates the budget constraint, and from
condition i), reducing the initial order quantity can only reduce social welfare.
In condition iii), Q¯χτ is a feasible solution, but P (Q¯
χ
τ ;λF (τ)) <
c
w
< P (K¯T (τ);λF (τ)),
i.e., K¯T (τ) < Q¯
χ
τ .
Proof of Definition 3:
Recall that H(Q¯χτ , τ) ≥ 0 > H(Q¯χτ + 1, τ). Therefore, to maintain cost-effectiveness for
Q > Q¯χτ , it must be that the incremental costs: (Bh(τ)− δ + g)(A(Q, τ)−A(Qχτ , τ))− (w−
δ)(Q−Qχτ ) < 0, are lower than the incremental benefits: (Bh(τ) + g−w− p)(A(KT (τ), τ)−
A(Q, τ)) ≥ 0. Part a) replaces KT (τ) with the fixed value K¯T (τ). Part b) replaces KT (τ)
with the maximum capacity, as a combination of Q and K, that satisfies the budget con-
straint.
Proof of Lemma 16:
For part a), given a fixedKτ , S
κ
h(Q, τ ;K)−Sκh(Q−1, τ ;K) = δ(1−A(Q, τ)+A(Q−1, τ)) ≥
0, for Q > 0.
For part b), given a fixed Q, Sκh(Q, τ ;K)−Sκh(Q, τ ;K − 1) = (Bh(τ) + g)(A(Q+K, τ) +
A(Q+K − 1, τ)) > 0, for K > 0.
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For part c), given Q˘κτ ≤ Q¯κτ , K∗S,κ(Q, τ) = K¯(Q,τ), for Q ∈ [Q˘κτ , Q¯κτ ]. Therefore KT is
fixed, and from part a), social welfare weakly increases in Q.
For part d), given Q˘κτ > Q¯
κ
τ , KT (Q,τ) increases in Q from Lemma 12 as long as cost-
effectiveness is satisfied. From Lemma 13, increasing Q also increases the required K for
cost-effectiveness. Therefore increasing Q increases KT up to the point where satisfying
cost-effectiveness would require a total budget higher than Γ; i.e., social welfare increases for
Q ∈ [Q˘κτ , Q¯κτ ].
Part e) is simply a special case of part d), as K¯T (τ) is not a feasible solution due to the
budget constraint.
Proof of Proposition 11:
For part a), from Lemma 12a, any order quantity in the range
[
Q˘κτ , Q¯
κ
τ
]
is feasible con-
tingent on KT = K¯T (τ). Therefore Pharma’s total capacity choice is independent of Health’s
constraints. To find the order quantity, from Lemma 16c, social welfare is increasing in the
order quantity up to when δ > 0, and constant when δ = 0 (because only KT is relevant).
For part b), from Definition 3b, the budget constraint will be binding for Health, and
Pharma’s total capacity is bounded by Γ and the order quantity. From Lemma 16d and
Lemma 16e, social welfare is increasing in the order quantity up to Q¯κτ , and Pharma will
make its total capacity choice knowing Health’s optimal order quantity.
Proof of Proposition 12:
Parts a) - d) are equivalent to Propositions 1 and 3.
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For part e), suppose Sκh(Q+K, 1) = S
κ
h(Q+K, 2), for some Q+K > 0. We then obtain
the following equality:
(Bh(1) + g)A(Q+K, 1) + δ(Q− A(Q, 1))− gλF (1) =
(Bh(2) + g)A(Q+K, 2) + δ(Q− A(Q, 2))− gλF (2)
(Bh(1) + g − δ)A(Q+K, 1)− gλF (1) + δ(A(Q+K, 1)− A(Q, 1)) =
(Bh(2) + g − δ)A(Q+K, 2)− gλF (2) + δ(A(Q+K, 2)− A(Q, 2))
Notice that when K = 0, the expression is reduced to (Bh(1) + g − δ)A(Q, 1) − gλF (1) =
(Bh(2) + g− δ)A(Q, 2)− gλF (2), and recall A(Q, 2)−A(Q, 1) is non-decreasing in Q, which
implies that for K > 0: A(Q + K, 2)− A(Q + K, 1) ≥ A(Q, 2)− A(Q, 1)⇒ A(Q + K, 2)−
A(Q, 2) ≥ A(Q+K, 1)−A(Q, 1). Therefore if qh = Q+K, then Sκh(Q+K, 1) < Sκh(Q+K, 2)
for K > 0, which implies that qh > qκ.
For part f), when δ = 0, Sκh(Q + K, 1) = (Bh(1) + g)A(Q + K, 1) − gλF (1) = (Bh(2) +
g)A(Q + K, 2) − gλF (2) = Sχh (Q + K, 2), which is the same relationship from equation
(2.5.6).
Proof of Proposition 13:
For part a), when τ ∗S,χ = 1 and Q
∗
S,χ = Q¯
χ
1 , it must be that S
χ
h (q, 1) = S
χ
h (q, 2) <
0. Therefore the condition on the total capacity KT > q
κ is necessary but not sufficient.
Therefore to satisfy both constraints, it must be that qκ < KT = Q+KE (Q,2) ≤ Q+KΓ (Q).
For part b), when τ ∗S,χ = 2, then the same order quantity is feasible under the capacity
buffer contract, and since qκ ≤ qχ, then full access will continue to be optimal.
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Proof of Lemma 17:
For part a), on one hand the expected profit of purchasing an additional unit in advanced
is: Bh(τ)P (Q;λF (τ)) + δ(1− P (Q;λF (τ)))− w. On the other hand, the expected profit of
delaying the purchase is: (Bh(τ) − w − p)P (Q;λF (τ)). Therefore, purchasing in advanced
is profitable only if: P (Q;λF (τ)) > w−δ
w+p−δ . Since P (Q;λF (τ)) is decreasing in Q, it must
be that P (Qκτ ;λF (τ)) >
w−δ
w+p−δ > P (Q
κ
τ + x;λF (τ)) for any x ≥ 1.
For part b), recall P (Qχτ ;λF (τ)) >
w−δ
Bh(τ)+g−δ . Since we have assumed Bh(τ) + g > w+ p,
then w−δ
Bh(τ)+g−δ <
w−δ
w+p−δ < P (Q
κ
τ ;λF (τ)).
For part c), lim
(w+p)→(Bh(τ)+g)
w − δ
Bh(τ) + g − δ −
w − δ
w + p− δ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 14:
For part a), from Lemma 8c), Q+∆+KΓ (Q+∆) = Q+KΓ (Q)+1, and Q+α∆+KΓ (Q+∆) =
Q+KΓ (Q) + α. Recall A(Q, τ) =
∑Q
x=1 P (x;λF (θ)). Then it must be that
0 < Hκ(Qκτ + α∆, τ ;KΓ (Qκτ+α∆))−Hκ(Qκτ , τ ;KΓ (Qκτ )) =
(Bh(τ) + g − w − p)
Qκτ+α∑
x=Qκτ+1
P (Qκτ + α∆ +KΓ (Qκτ+α∆);λF (τ))− α∆(w − δ)
+(w + p− δ)
Qκτ+α∆∑
x=Qκτ+1
P (x;λF (τ))
For part b), it must be that Health’s cost-effectiveness constraint is satisfied, using the
definition of Lemma 9 and the result in Proposition 6.
Proof of Lemma 18:
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Follows directly from the solution process in Chapter 2, section 2.3.3
Proof of Lemma 19:
Suppose Q is fixed. Then, for part a), notice that
∂Hhigh(γ,r;Q)
∂γ
= (b − β)A(Q) > 0.
Therefore, when Q is at the upper bound of Hhigh(γ, r; Q), the increased profit gap created
by an increase in γ may be compensated by increasing Q.
Parts b) and c) are straightforward since the terms are not present in the corresponding
objective function.
For part d), notice that ∂Hlow(γ,r;Q)
∂r
= QP (m;λ) > 0. The argument then follows as for
part a).
For part e), QΓ is independent of γ and r; Q¯
ρ
low weakly increases in r; and Q¯
ρ
high weakly
increases in γ. Therefore, Q∗S,ρ weakly increases in γ and r.
Proof of Lemma 20:
Follows directly from the solution process in Chapter 2, section 2.3.3.
Proof of Lemma 21:
Observe the following derivatives of the critical fractiles from Lemma 20.
∂ w−δ
β+(b−β)γ−δ+g
∂γ
= − (w−δ)(b−β)
(β+(b−β)γ−δ+g)2 < 0.
∂ w−δ
β+(b−β)γ−δ+g
∂r
= 0
∂
w−δ−rP (m;λ)
β−δ+g
∂γ
= 0
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∂
w−δ−rP (m;λ)
β−δ+g
∂r
= −P (m;λ)
β−δ+g < 0.
When the critical fractiles decrease, the order quantity increases, proving parts a-d. For
part e), QΓ is independent of γ and r; Q
ρ
low weakly increases in r; and Q
ρ
high weakly increases
in γ. Therefore, Q∗H,ρ weakly increases in γ and r.
Proof of Proposition 15:
From Lemmas 18 and 19, if Q¯ρhigh > Q¯
ρ
low, then γ can be decreased without affecting the
optimal order quantity; if Q¯ρhigh < Q¯
ρ
low, then r can be decreased without affecting the opti-
mal order quantity. Lemmas 20 and 21 give an equivalent result for Qρhigh and Q
ρ
low. Notice
that Hhigh(Q; γ, r)−Hlow(Q; γ, r) = γ(b− β)A(Q)− rQP (m;λ). By setting the difference
to zero, it follows that: r
γ
=
(
A(Q)
Q
)(
b−β
P (m;λ)
)
. Since this must hold for any Q chosen by
Health, it must hold for Q∗j,ρ.
Proof of Lemma 22:
It follows directly by replacing r∗j,ρ (γ) =
(
A(Q∗j,ρ)
Q∗j,ρ
)(
b−β
P (m;λ)
)
(γ) into Pharma’s objective
function: M(γ, r∗j,ρ(γ); Q
∗
j,ρ) = M(γ; Q
∗
j,ρ) = (w − c)Q∗j,ρ − A(Q∗j,ρ)(b− β)(γ)G(γm).
Proof of Corollary 3:
Given Pharma’s private knowledge, the expected transfer from Pharma to Health is:
r∗j,ρQ
∗
j,ρG(γ
∗
j,ρm)P (m;λ). Additionaly, Pharma incurs the verification cost v(m). As a result
the incremental revenue achieved by offering the performance based contract, must be larger
than the incremental costs; that is: (w−c) (Q∗j,ρ −Q∗j,χ) > r∗j,ρQ∗j,ρG(γ∗j,ρm)P (m;λ)+v(m)⇒
(w − c)
(
Q∗j,ρ−Q∗j,χ
Q∗j,ρ
)
> r∗j,ρG(γ
∗
j,ρm)P (m;λ) +
v(m)
Q∗j,ρ
.
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Appendix 3: Proofs for Chapter 4
Proof of equation (4.3.9) and (4.3.10):
To avoid unnecessary repetition, the notation Qa is used as a general order quantity,
contingent on the value of x (instead of separating for Qa,1 and Qa,0). By use of Leibniz
Rule:
∂ZSI2 (Q)
∂Qa
= −c+ (βaQa + βbxN)ψ(Qa)− (Qa + xN)
[
βa
(
Qa
Qa + xN
)
+ βb
(
xN
Qa + xN
)]
ψ(Qa)
+
∫ λ
Qa
[
βa
(
ξ
ξ + xN
)
+ βb
(
xN
ξ + xN
)]
ψ(ξ) dξ = 0
Rearranging terms:
− c+
∫ λ
Qa
[
βa
(
ξ
ξ + xN
)
+ βb
(
xN
ξ + xN
)]
ψ(ξ) dξ = 0
c =
∫ λ
Qa
[
βa
(
1− xN
ξ + xN
)
+ βb
(
xN
ξ + xN
)]
ψ(ξ) dξ
c = βa
∫ λ
Qa
ψ(ξ) dξ + (βb − βa)
∫ λ
Qa
(
xN
ξ + xN
)
ψ(ξ) dξ
c = βa (1−Ψ(Qa)) + (βb − βa)
∫ λ
Qa
(
xN
ξ + xN
)
ψ(ξ) dξ
Proof of Proposition 16:
221
By replacing Qa,1 with Q
MI
a in equation (4.3.9):
{
(βa)
[
1−Ψ (QMIa )]− c}+ (βb − βa)∫ λ
QMIa
xN
ξ + xN
ψ(ξ)dξ
From equation 4.3.2, (βa)
(
1−Ψ (QMIa ))−c = 0, and therefore the sign of the slope (i.e., the
sign of equation 4.3.9) will be positive (alternatively, negative) when βb > βa (alternatively,
βa > βb), which implies that the optimal order quantity lies to the right (alternatively, left)
of the order quantity under dedicated channels.
Proof of Lemma 23:
The case when x = 0 is trivial because QMIb = Q
SI
b = 0, and therefore Z
SI
2 (Q + 0) =
ZMISa (Q) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(0), for any Q.
The case when x = 1 and βa = βb is also trivial since equation (4.3.9) collapses into
(4.3.2), and it is irrelevant which patient receives the drugs.
Next, suppose x = 1 and βa > βb. If D(ε, e) = ε + N ≤ QMIa + N , then clearly
ZSI2 (Q
MI
a + N) = Z
MI
Sa
(QMIa ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(N). However, if D(ε, e) = ε + N > QMIa + N , then
ZSI2 (Q
MI
a +N) > Z
MI
Sa
(QMIa ) +Z
MI
Sb,2
(N), because for every expected stockout from a patient
of Sb under SI, a health benefit of (βa − βb) > 0 is achieved, relative to the MI arrange-
ment. From Proposition 16, we know that when βa > βb and x = 1, then Q
SI
a < Q
MI
a . By
transitivity, ZSI2 (Q
SI
a +N) > Z
SI
2 (Q
MI
a +N) > Z
MI
Sa
(QMIa ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(N).
Alternatively, suppose x = 1 and βa < βb. As before, if D(ε, e) = ε + N ≤ QSIa + N ,
then clearly ZSI2 (Q
SI
a +N) = Z
MI
Sa
(QSIa ) +Z
MI
Sb,2
(N). However, if D(ε, e) = ε+N > QSIa +N ,
then ZSI2 (Q
SI
a + N) < Z
MI
Sa
(QSIa ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(N), because for every expected stockout from a
patient of Sb under SI, a health benefit of (βb − βa) > 0 is not achieved, relative to the MI
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arrangement. By definition of optimality, ZMISa (Q
SI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(N) < ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(N),
and by transitivity: ZSI2 (Q
SI
a +N) < Z
MI
Sa
(QSIa ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(N) < ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(N).
Proof of Proposition 17:
From Lemma 23a, ZSI2 (Q
SI
a,0)
∣∣
x=0
=
(
ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(QMIb )
)∣∣
x=0
; this scenario realizes
with probability (1 − g(e)), when effort level e is exerted. From Lemma 23b, when x = 1
which occurs with probability g(e), ZSI2 (Q
SI
a,1 + N) |x=1T
(
ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(QMIb )
)∣∣
x=1
,
depending only on whether βa T βb. We can therefore rewrite the first order conditions for
the optimal effort levels under the multiple and single channel structures, respectively, as
follows:
∂
(
ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,1
(e; QMIb )
)
∂e
= −C ′(e)− g′(e)
((
ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(QMIb )
)∣∣
x=0
)
+g′(e)
((
ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(QMIb )
)∣∣
x=1
)
= 0
∂ZSI1 (e; Q
SI)
∂e
= −C ′(e)− g′(e) (ZSI2 (QSIa,0))∣∣x=0 + g′(e) (ZSI2 (QSIa,1 +N))∣∣x=1 = 0
It is true that
∂ZMISa (Q
MI
a )
∂e
= 0, and its inclusion is not required. However, writing it in
such way, only the last term is different between the two first order conditions. It is easy to
see that the second order condition for concavity is satisfied:
∂2
(
ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,1
(e; QMIb )
)
∂e2
= −C ′′(e)
+g
′′
(e)
[((
ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(QMIb )
)∣∣
x=1
)
−
((
ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(QMIb )
)∣∣
x=0
)]
< 0
because C
′′
(e) ≥ 0, g′′(e) ≤ 0, and (ZMISa (QMIa ) + ZMISb,2(QMIb ))∣∣x=1 > (ZMISa (QMIa ) + ZMISb,2(QMIb ))∣∣x=0.
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Therefore at optimality,
C ′(eMI)+g′(eMI)
((
ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(QMIb )
)∣∣
x=0
)
= g′(eMI)
((
ZMISa (Q
MI
a ) + Z
MI
Sb,2
(QMIb )
)∣∣
x=1
)
.
If we plug eMI into the first order condition under a single channel, we obtain (see Lemma
23 for details):
C ′(eMI) + g′(eMI)
(
ZSI2 (Q
SI
a,0)
)∣∣
x=0
= g′(eMI)
(
ZSI2 (Q
SI
a,1 +N)
)∣∣
x=1
, when βa = βb
C ′(eMI) + g′(eMI)
(
ZSI2 (Q
SI
a,0)
)∣∣
x=0
< g′(eMI)
(
ZSI2 (Q
SI
a,1 +N)
)∣∣
x=1
, when βa > βb
C ′(eMI) + g′(eMI)
(
ZSI2 (Q
SI
a,0)
)∣∣
x=0
> g′(eMI)
(
ZSI2 (Q
SI
a,1 +N)
)∣∣
x=1
, when βa < βb
Due to concavity, if the right hand-side is larger than (respectively lower than) the left-
hand side, then the optimal effort eSI must be to the right (respectively, to the left) of
eMI .
Proof of Theorem 5:
Follows directly from Propositions 16 and 17, and Lemma 23.
Proof of Lemma 24:
The proof is equivalent to that of Proposition 16, where only c is replaced with the selling
price w.
Proof of Proposition 18:
To show the relationship between eMX and eSX , we simply compare the first order con-
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ditions for the optimal effort under multiple and single channels.
C ′(eMX) = (w − c) (g′(eMX))N
C ′(eSX) = (w − c) (g′(eSX)(N +QSXa,1 −QSXa,0 ))
From Lemma 24, QSXa,1 > Q
SX
a,0 = Q
MX
a , when βb > βa; similarly Q
SX
a,1 < Q
SX
a,0 , when βb < βa,
and QSXa,1 = Q
SX
a,0 , when βb = βa. Due to concavity of Pharma’s problem, if the right hand-
side is larger than (respectively, lower than) the left-hand side, then the optimal effort eSX
must be to the right (respectively, to the left) of eMX .
Proof of Theorem 6:
Follows from Lemma 24 and Proposition 18.
Proof of Proposition 19:
Part a) is satisfied by definition since MMX(eMX ;QMX) − T ∗ = MSX(eSX ;QSX), and
MMX(eMX ;QMX) = R∗ +MSX(eSX ;QSX).
For part a)MMX(eMX ;QMX) − T ∗m = MSX(eSX ;QSX) < MMX(eMX ;QMX) = R∗s +
MSX(eSX ;QSX). Parts b) and c) follow almost directly.
For part b), when T = T ∗m, then Pharma’s profits if x = 1 under a multiple channel
design are the same as when there was no transfer in a single channel design. Therefore the
effort level chosen will be equal to eSX .
For part c), when R = R∗s, then Pharma’s profits if x = 1 under a single product, are the
same as when there was no transfer in a multiple channel design. Therefore the effort level
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chosen will be equal to eMX .
Proof of Proposition 20:
Equivalent to Proposition 19.
Proof of Proposition 21:
For part a), when βa > βb, the efficient design choice is a single channel (Theorem 5). If
Ci,M(x) > Ci,S(x), the incentive for pulling further increases.
For part b), when βb > βa, the efficient design choice is multiple channels to prevent the
pulling effect (Theorem 5). If Ci,M(x) < Ci,S(x), the incentive for pulling further decreases.
For part c), when Ci,M(x) = Ci,S(x) + K, the first order condition remains unchanged.
The reason why the efficient design may change is given in Propositions 19 and 20.
Proof of equation (4.7.13):
By use of Leibniz Rule:
∂ZSS2
∂Q
∣∣∣∣
x=0
= −c+ βa
(
Qφ(Q | 0)−Qφ(Q | 0) +
∫ ∞
Q
φ(θ | 0) dθ
)
= −c+ βa(1− Φ(Q | 0))
⇒ QSSa,0 = Φ−1
(
1− c
βa
∣∣∣∣ 0)
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Proof of equation (4.7.14):
Let α = (βaE[εa | Θ = θ, x = 1] + βb (E[εb | Θ = θ, x = 1])).
Then, by use of Leibniz Rule:
∂ZSS2
∂Q
∣∣∣∣
x=1
= −c+ αφ(Q | 1)− Qαφ(Q | 1)
Q
+
∫ ∞
Θ=Q
α
θ
φ(θ | 1) dθ
= −c+
∫ ∞
Θ=Q
α
θ
φ(θ | 1) dθ
= −c+
∫ ∞
Θ=QSSa,b
(
βaE[εa | Θ = θ, x = 1] + βb (E[εb | Θ = θ, x = 1])
θ
)
φ(θ | 1) dθ
Proof of Lemma 25:
Recall that φ(y|0) = ψa(y) for any y > 0. The proof then follows by direct comparison
of (4.7.15) and (4.7.2).
QSSa,0 = Φ
−1
(
1− c
βa
∣∣∣ 0) = Ψ−1a (1− cβa) = QMSa
Proof of Lemma 26:
The result is equivalent to Proposition 16. Let βb > βa. By plugging Q = Φ
−1
(
1− c
βa
∣∣∣ 1)
into (4.7.15), the left hand side of the equation becomes larger than c,⇒ QSSa,b > Φ−1
(
1− c
βa
∣∣∣ 1).
By plugging Q = Φ−1
(
1− c
βb
∣∣∣ 1) into (4.7.16), the left hand side of the equation becomes
less than c, ⇒ QSSa,b > Φ−1
(
1− c
βb
∣∣∣ 1). The opposite is true when βb < βa.
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